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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The social sciences have four explanations for the gender wage gap: preference, 
crowding, power, and socialization. Neoclassical economists explain the wage gap as the 
result of employers and employees’ work-related preferences. Crowding theorists argue 
the wage gap is caused by women crowding into a small number of occupations. Power 
theorists contend men use their socioeconomic superiority to maintain a two-tier wage 
system that discriminates against women. Socialization theorists note women’s secondary 
status in the labor markets is a result of lifelong socialization processes. Previous 
econometric research has mostly overlooked the power explanation. Crowding 
researchers have also not examined the crowding hypothesis over the entire post-World 
War II era, choosing instead to focus on one particular year or a few years; this research 
decision is made even though women were continually increasing their share of the labor 
force throughout the postwar era.  
The purpose of this study is to address the two mentioned shortcomings. A wage 
model is constructed with controls for compensating differentials, power, and female 
iv 
 
crowding. The model is fitted on male and female workers who were employed in 103 
occupations; the 103 occupations were selected because their categorizations have 
remained consistent between 1950 and 2008. Approximately 30 percent of male workers 
and 40 percent of female workers are employed in the 103 selected occupations. The 
robustness of the wage model is tested on ten time-sensitive Census and American 
Community Survey PUMS.   
The study finds supporting evidence for the power and crowding explanations. 
Male workers earn wage premiums when employed in occupations with high degree of 
collective bargaining whereas women receive wage penalties. Women also receive no 
premiums in occupations with apprenticeship requirement until 1990, even though their 
presence in these occupations has not changed between 1950 and 2008. Also, men and 
women employed in female-crowded occupations receive wage penalties in every 
surveyed postwar year, but women are more likely to be employed in female-crowded 
occupations than their male counterparts.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 The gender wage gap phenomenon has a long history in U.S. labor studies. In the 
early days of the republic, women employed in agriculture and domestic activities earned 
28.8% of their male counterparts’ wages (Goldin 1990, 63). The development of 
manufacturing industries pushed women’s wages up a considerable extent; the female-to-
male manufacturing wage ratio increased to 44% by 1832 and then 50% in northeastern 
states by 1850 (Goldin 1990, 63). The overall female-to-male wage ratio narrowed again 
at the turn of the century, increasing from 46% in 1890 to 56% in 1930 (Goldin 1990, 
62). The second narrowing of the gender wage gap occurred not as a result of women 
earning more but rather because men were earning less. Clerical work boomed 
dramatically in the late 1800s and early 1900s as large corporations replaced small firms. 
Women’s increasing education—more women graduated from high school than men by 
the early 1900s—but lack of employment opportunity made them a desirable substitute 
for male clerical workers (Goldin 1990, 106). Female entry into clerical work coincided 
with the decline of male wages. The average male clerical worker earned 1.6 times his 
counterpart in the manufacturing sector in 1890, but this wage advantage disappeared by 
1930 (Goldin 1990, 107).   
 World War II was a watershed moment in the history of working women. Married 
women, who did not typically work in the prewar era, entered the labor force in dramatic 
numbers. Married women outnumbered single women in the labor force 45.7% to 40.9% 
for the first time in 1944 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, 133). Married women 
continued to work after the war, mostly as part-time personal service workers (Kessler-
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Harris 1982, 301). Many more single women found employment in the government 
sector as clerical workers; the federal government increased its payroll from five to 
twelve million workers between 1947 and 1969 (Nicholson 2004, 269). The female labor 
force participation rate stood at 36.9% in 1956, surpassing the wartime high of 36.3% in 
1944 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, 131-132). Kessler-Harris (1982) summarized the 
female presence in the postwar labor force as follows: A woman who did not work for 
wages by the mid 1960s was an anomaly (Kessler-Harris 1982, 302).    
The significant presence of women in the labor force prompted the federal 
government to undertake numerous legal actions in the 1960s to protect female workers. 
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 prohibits employers from paying men and women different 
wages when both are employed in equivalent jobs.1 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 makes it illegal for employers to discriminate against women because of their sex.  
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 gives federal courts the power to force 
employers to implement affirmative action plans when the latter is found guilty of gender 
discrimination. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 forbids the practice of 
gender discrimination in educational institutions receiving federal funding. Despite the 
federal government’s push to secure gender-equal protection, women’s wages relative to 
men’s did not improve in the first three postwar decades. The female-to-male wage ratio 
stagnated at 60% between 1950 through 1980 even though women’s labor force 
participation rate grew from 36.9% in 1959 to 43.3% in 1970 and then to 51.5% in 1980 
(Goldin 1990, 62; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, 131-132; U.S. Bureau of Labor 
                                                          
1 Equal pay for performing equivalent job is not the same as “equal pay for equal work,” which is 
the mantra of the 1980s comparable worth movement. Bielby and Baron (1986a) found by employers give 
men and women different job titles even when they were performing equivalent work tasks. The goal of the 
comparable worth movements was for women to receive equal pay for performing equivalent work tasks 
regardless of job titles.   
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Statistics 2010, 8). The gender wage gap began to narrow again after 1980. The female-
to-male wage ratio increased from 64.2% in 1980 to 71.9% in 1990 and then 76.9% in 
2000 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010, 52). More recently, the female-to-male wage 
ratio increased to an all time high of 81% in 2005, and it had since decreased slightly to 
80.2% in 2009 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010, 52).   
Social scientists observing the persistent nature of the gender wage gap have 
proposed four broad explanations. Neoclassical economists explain the wage gap as the 
result of individual preference. Demand side neoclassical economists say employers, 
consumers, and workers have a preference for engaging in market interactions with men 
rather than women (Becker 1971; Phelps 1972). Supply side neoclassical economists 
posit female workers have a preference for lower human capital investments, and, thus, 
cannot reap higher wage compensations (Mincer and Polachek 1974; Polachek 1981; 
Filer 1989). Heterodox economists and power theorists working in sociology and history 
disciplines believe the unequal distribution of power in the wage bargaining process 
between the sexes is the cause of the wage gap. According to this theory, men are the 
superior sex in American patriarchal society, and their social superiority maintains a two-
tier wage system that discriminates against women (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards 1973; 
Hartmann 1976 and 1981; Matthaei 1982; Fligstein and Fernandez 1988; Kessler-Harris 
1990; Kessler-Harris 2007). Socialization theorists argue women’s secondary status in 
the labor markets is a result of lifelong socialization processes. Girls are taught to aspire 
to do “female work,” and women are confined to performing female work despite the low 
wages because they do not have social ties with men employed in male-dominated 
occupations (Granovetter 1983; 1985; 1992; 2005; Jacobs 1989; McPherson, Smith-
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Lovin, and Cook 2001; England and Folbre 2005).  Still, other theorists in the social 
sciences believe female crowding is the cause of the gender wage gap (Bergmann 1974; 
England 1984; Johnson and Solon 1986; England et al 1988; Macpherson and Hirsch 
1995; England, Reid, and Kilbourne 1996; Lewis 1996; Bellas and Coventry 2001; 
Solberg 2005). Women are penalized with lower wages because the majority of female 
workers are crowded into a small number of occupations.2 The preference, power, 
socialization, and crowding explanations are the social scientists’ understanding of the 
wage gap. 
Previous studies examining the wage gap explanations have demonstrated two 
shortcomings. First, crowding studies have not examined the change in the wage effect, if 
any, that may result from changes in the gender composition of occupations. In other 
words, past research has focused on the wage effect of female occupational crowding at 
one moment in time and has found workers employed in occupations with a high 
concentration of women received wage penalties. No study has examined the changes in 
the wage effect of female occupational crowding over time. An examination of how wage 
changes when there is a change in female occupational crowding is important for two 
reasons. First, there has been a historic movement of women into the formal labor force 
since the end of World War II. The female share of the labor force nearly doubled from 
29% in 1948 to 47% in 2008 (Bloom 1986, 25; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010, 1). 
Second, women have lowered their concentrations in administrative and service 
                                                          
2 Bergmann (1974) argued female crowding lowers the marginal productivity of labor (𝑀𝑃𝑙) of all 
workers in the occupation. The equilibrium wage is equivalent to the 𝑀𝑃𝑙  in the competitive labor market; 
thus, a lower 𝑀𝑃𝑙  yields lower wages. England et al. (1988) rejected Bergmann’s marginal productivity of 
labor interpretation of the connection between female crowding and low wages; they offered an alternative 
explanation: employers’ sexist attitudes cause female crowding and low wages. The debate between 
Bergmann (1974) and England et al. (1988) is not settled.   
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occupations since the 1970s and were the majority of workers in professional and 
management and related occupations in 2009 (51% women to 49% men) (Blau and Kahn 
2000; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010, 1). Given the changes in the degree of female 
crowding in the labor force in general and in the administrative, service, management, 
and professional occupations specifically throughout the postwar era, one may wonder if 
the relationship between female occupational crowding and wages has remained stable or 
has changed. Heckman (1991; 2001) noted a socioeconomic relationship like female 
occupational crowding and wage is state-dependent. Factors that influence this 
socioeconomic relationship may change over time, which may result in a new 
socioeconomic relationship. Past research has focused on the relationship between female 
occupational crowding and wages at one chosen moment in time, but it has not examined 
the relationship over an extended time period when women have made great advances in 
the workforce. An investigation about the female occupational crowding and wages 
connection throughout the postwar era is warranted.  
Second, econometric studies have largely ignored the power explanation of the 
gender wage gap. Power theory argues the gender wage gap is caused by the unequal 
distribution of power between the sexes in the wage bargaining process. Macpherson and 
Hirsch (1995) did account for the wage effect of the worker’s union membership status, 
and England, Reid, and Kilbourne (1996) also controlled for the incidence where the 
worker’s wage is set by union collective bargaining. However, Macpherson and Hirsch 
(1995) and England, Reid, and Kilbourne (1996) did not intend to examine power status 
difference between the sexes in their studies, so they did not give a more complete 
treatment of the power explanation. Furthermore, Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) and 
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England, Reid, and Kilbourne (1996) used a power variable measured at the level of the 
individual worker. There is reason to believe gender power difference also occurs above 
the individual level—that is, at the occupational level. Reich, Gordon, and Edwards 
(1973) and Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982) showed men and women are separated 
into different occupations and men are assigned to occupations with more desirable work 
tasks and career ladders. Hartmann (1976) also hypothesized that employers’ and male 
workers’ patriarchal attitudes ensured that women stay in the less-than-desirable 
occupations.   
The purpose of this dissertation is to address these two shortcomings. A 
logarithmic wage model that includes elements from three of the four explanations of the 
gender wage gap, preference, power, and crowding, is presented in this study.3 The data 
chosen for this study is the Census and ACS PUMS, which are cross sectional datasets 
and do not contain information about a worker’s youth or adult work-related aspirations 
or experiences. Consequently, the socialization explanation cannot be examined.      
The preference explanation is composed of numerous theories, many of which 
cannot be empirically examined. One particular preference theory called compensating 
differentials, which argues the gender wage gap exists because women are willing to 
trade off lower wages for desirable work conditions, is empirically testable and will be 
examined in this dissertation. Filer (1989) found men earn a wage premium over women 
because they work in physically demanding occupations. Jacobs and Steinberg (1990) 
found both men and women suffer wage penalties when employed in physically 
demanding jobs, while women suffer additional wage penalties if they work in jobs 
                                                          
3 Chapter 2 will discuss the superiority of the logarithmic human capital model in predicting 
wages in the gender wage gap literature.  
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performing repetitious tasks. The mixed findings in Filer (1989) and Jacobs and 
Steinberg (1990) necessitate another examination of compensating differentials theory. In 
particular, this study will look at the wage effects of three compensating differentials 
variables: 1) degree of mental stress required by the occupation, 2) degree of physical 
hardship required, and 3) degree of the lack of freedom a worker has in determining his 
or her work goals and pace of work.   
The preference explanation contains four other theories: human capital (Mincer 
and Polachek 1974), occupational self-selection (Polachek 1981), taste for discrimination 
(Becker 1971), and statistical discrimination (Phelps 1972). The wage model presents in 
this study includes three human capital variables: years of schooling, years of potential 
work experience, and the square of years of potential work experience. Human capital 
theory has been subjected to valid criticisms, which will be discussed in Chapter 2; 
however, the criticisms do not dismiss the importance of education and work experience 
in predicting an individual’s wage rate (Johnson and Solon 1986; England et al. 1988; 
Macpherson and Hirsch 1995; England, Reid, and Kilbourne 1996; Lewis 1996; Stanley 
and Jarrell 1998; Bellas and Coventry 2001; and Solberg 2005). No examination of 
occupational self-selection, taste for discrimination, and statistical discrimination will be 
carried out because the first theory requires knowing an individual’s preference for work 
and home life balance and the latter two theories require information about an 
individual’s subjective valuation for “maleness” versus “femaleness.” The Census and 
ACS PUMS do not contain sufficient information to be able to model an individual’s 
preference structure.  
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 The power explanation of the gender wage gap is also examined by means of five 
power variables: whether the occupation requires a license or certification for entry, 
whether the occupation has voluntary licensing or certification, whether the worker can 
only gain entry into the occupation via an apprenticeship program, percentage of workers 
who are unionized in the occupation, and percentage of workers who are covered by 
collective bargaining agreements in the occupation. All five power variables are 
measured at the occupational level. The first three variables examine occupational 
barriers to entry. Restricting occupational entry gives workers already employed in these 
occupations an advantage in the wage bargaining process. The latter two variables 
measure unions’ ability to bargain for higher wages in the occupation. Previous research 
shows men and women do not work in the same occupations (Reich, Gordon, and 
Edwards 1973; Hartmann 1976; Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982, Bergmann 1986 and 
2005). Consequently, if men and women do possess different power status, the difference 
should be revealed at the occupational level.   
Furthermore, the study requires a dataset that contains historical information 
about common occupations of employment in the United States. The dataset that meets 
this requirement is the ACS PUMS and its predecessor, the Census PUMS. The Census 
PUMS contains detailed information about demographic, income, and employment 
characteristics of one percent of individuals living in the U.S. The Census PUMS was 
conducted in April every ten years (coinciding with the decennial national population 
count) between 1850 and 2000.  The ACS PUMS replaced the Census PUMS starting in 
2001. The ACS PUMS is conducted annually but throughout the year instead of a certain 
month. The 2001 through 2004 ACS PUMS are too small and not comparable to the 
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Census PUMS; however, the ACS increased the PUMS sample size beginning in 2005, 
making it comparable to the Census PUMS. At the time of initiating this study, the 2008 
ACS PUMS is the latest sample made available to the public. 
The time coverage of this study is limited to the 1950 Census through 2008 ACS 
PUMS. Historic changes in the female work experience took place between these PUMS. 
Women nearly doubled their labor force participation rate, doubled their share of the total 
labor force, and outnumbered men in the professional and management and related 
occupations during this time period (Bloom 1986, p.25 and U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2010, p.1). In general, women’s historic gains in professional and management 
occupations indicate the gender composition in occupations have changed since the end 
of World War II. Consequently, the time period between the 1950 Census and 2008 ACS 
PUMS is ideal for examining the changing relationship, if any exist, between female 
occupational crowding and wages.   
The most significant problem encounters in this study is the lack of occupational 
code comparability across the PUMS. The U.S. Census Bureau defines occupations and 
then categorizes them into occupational codes to enhance informational consistency.4 
The bureau tries to keep its list of occupations up to date in order to reflect changes in 
labor demand, but this task results in occupations being added, deleted, and merged into 
new or existing codes across time. The lack of occupation code comparability makes it 
impossible to track changes in gender composition in occupations over time. A solution is 
proposed to circumvent this problem: narrow the focus of the study only to occupation 
                                                          
4 For example, two sampled individuals may report different job titles assigned by employers, but 
their work tasks are similar.  The Census Bureau would categorize both individuals as being employed in 
the same occupation code.  This practice allows for greater employment comparability among sampled 
individuals.   
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codes in which the occupations listed in the codes have remained stable between the 1950 
Census and the 2008 ACS. 103 occupation codes meet this criterion, and they are labeled 
the “selected occupations” for ease of exposition. Approximately 30% of male workers 
and 40% of female workers are employed in the selected occupations in each PUMS. 
Interested readers should refer to Appendix A to examine the complete list of selected 
occupations.  
 The findings of this study, while limited to the selected 103 occupations, provide 
support for the power and crowding explanation but not for the compensating 
differentials theory. The following dissertation is divided into four chapters. Chapter 2 
surveys the specific theories grouped under the four broad explanations of the gender 
wage gap: preference, power, crowding, and socialization. Chapter 3 explains the 
methodology of the study. Chapter 4 reports the study’s findings. Chapter 5 summarizes 
the study and proposes future research plan. A website has been created to share data 
files, SAS® programs, and complete regression results in Microsoft Excel® spreadsheets 
with the readers. Interested readers may download the files by 
visiting https://sites.google.com/site/bridgecodes/. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The social science understanding of what causes the gender wage gap can be 
grouped into four broad explanations: preference, crowding, power, and socialization. 
The preference explanation is subdivided into two categories, demand- and supply-side 
theories. Demand-side preference theories include taste for discrimination (Becker 1976) 
and statistical discrimination (Phelps 1972), while supply-side preference theories include 
human capital (Mincer and Polachek 1974), occupational self-selection (Polachek 1981), 
and compensating differentials (Filer 1989). The demand- and supply-side theories share 
the assumption that the gender wage gap is caused by employers’ and employees’ work-
related preferences. At the opposite end of the spectrum of explanations for the gender 
wage gap is the crowding explanation.  Bergmann (1974) said the wage gap can be 
explained without making an assumption about individuals’ preferences. Women earn 
less than men because they are crowded in a small number of occupations; the excess 
supply of labor in the female-crowded occupations causes women’s marginal 
productivity and wages to fall. England et al. (1988) have challenged Bergmann (1974) 
by noting that female occupational crowding and low female wages are symptoms of 
gender discrimination and that crowding alone does not cause wage depreciation. The 
debate between Bergmann (1974) and England et al. (1988) is far from settled. 
Nevertheless, both sides agree female occupational crowding is a significant predictor of 
wages. Women earn lower wages when they work in female crowded occupations. 
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The power explanation of the gender wage gap differs from both the preference 
and crowding explanations in its belief that work is a social phenomenon fraught with 
power. Hartmann (1976; 1986) showed patriarchal attitudes keep women stuck in 
secondary status in the households. Capitalism creates the condition for both sexes to 
work, thus, endangering men’s superior status. Male employers, unionists, and workers 
made a concerted effort to create a hostile and unfair workplace for women. Reich, 
Gordon, and Edwards (1973) and Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982) showed the labor 
market is made up of two segments, primary and secondary. Female workers are mostly 
employed in the secondary segment and the lower levels of the primary segment where 
work is unfulfilling and wages are low. Male workers are employed at the upper levels of 
the primary segment where work is a creative, independent endeavor and wages are high. 
Hence, the power explanation places the difference in gender power in workplaces at the 
heart of the origin of the gender wage gap. 
The socialization explanation of the gender wage gap supports the power 
explanation that work is a social phenomenon and not merely of preferences. The 
cumulative disadvantage theory argues that boys and girls are socialized at a young age to 
perform gender-appropriate tasks (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001; England 
and Folbre 2005). When girls grow up to become women, they are confined to working 
in female-dominated occupations due to their lack of network ties to men. The social 
control theory criticizes the cumulative disadvantage theory as being too simplistic; youth 
socialization is not a strong enough force to keep women tied to low-paying female work.  
Jacobs (1989) showed there are social mechanisms in the workplace that keep women 
tied to their gender-appropriate positions. Socialization occurs at all stages of life. 
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The purpose of this literature survey is to examine the theories subsumed under 
each of the four explanations of the gender wage gap.  
Preference  
 The preference explanation of the gender wage gap includes five theories: tastes 
for discrimination, statistical discrimination, human capital, occupational self selection, 
and compensating differentials. The five theories are grounded in the neoclassical 
economic perspective of the labor market called the Walrasian auctioneer theory.  
The Walrasian auctioneer theory makes three assumptions about the workings of 
the labor market. First, buyers and sellers interacting in the labor market are rational, 
utility-maximizing individuals. Workers only work if they can maximize their utility 
given their preferences about work; employers only hire labor power if they can 
maximize their profits given the competitive conditions in the product markets. Second, 
employers do not differentiate between the labor power of worker A versus that of 
worker B unless the workers have different levels of productivity. Third, workers and 
employers make their decisions independently about how much labor power to sell and 
buy at different prices and communicate the information to a third party called the 
Walrasian auctioneer. The auctioneer sums the units of labor demanded and supplied at 
different prices. The market clears when the quantity of labor demanded equals its 
quantity supplied; workers sell their labor power at the market-clearing price.5   
                                                          
5 Some readers may argue the third assumption is not a realistic representation of neoclassical 
theory of labor market and that modern neoclassical theorists understand the complex interactions between 
workers and employers in the labor market. It is true neoclassical theorists do acknowledge that while 
reality deviates from the Walrasian auctioneer model, they still hold the model as the ideal labor market. In 
fact, the Walrasian auctioneer guarantees buyers and sellers of labor power have access to the same 
information, which ensures market clearing. If buyers and sellers do not share the same information, they 
may not agree on an equilibrium price and quantity. Furthermore, the parties may withhold information 
from each other in order to maintain a superior position in the wage bargaining process.   
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The existence of a gender wage gap is a contradiction to the Walrasian auctioneer 
theory because workers are paid different wages because of their sex.  Preference theories 
explain this inconsistency from two different perspectives: demand-side and supply-side. 
The demand-side perspective argues that the gender wage gap is due to employers’, 
consumers’, and workers’ preferences for market interactions with men rather than 
women. Taste for discrimination and statistical discrimination are theories that fall under 
the demand-side perspective. On the other hand, the supply-side perspective believes 
women’s own preferences about work are the cause of the gender wage gap. Women 
prefer to be employed in situations that pay less than men.  Human capital, occupational 
self selection, and compensating differentials represent the supply-side perspective.   
Demand-Side Preference Theories 
Neoclassical demand-side preference theories focus on the demand for female 
labor—or more appropriately, lack of it—as the reason for the gender wage gap. Becker 
(1971) argued that male and female employers, workers, and customers may have a taste 
for discrimination, which results from their subjective prejudice for the female sex and/or 
their ignorance of the economic efficiency of this sex. Becker used the “discrimination 
coefficient” as a proxy for an individual’s taste for discrimination, and he assumed each 
individual can convert his or her discrimination coefficient into a monetary value.   
An employer who has a taste for discrimination against women believes hiring 
female workers is a cost to him or her. Consequently, the employer would consider the 
cost of hiring a woman to be 𝜋(1 + 𝑑𝑒), where 𝜋 is the wage rate offered to men, and 𝑑𝑒 
is the employer’s monetized discrimination coefficient. If 𝜋(1 + 𝑑𝑒) is higher than 𝜋, the 
employer would not hire a female worker unless she accepts a wage equal to or less than 
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𝜋𝑑𝑒. A discriminating worker who is forced to work with a woman would consider his or 
her wage to be 𝜋(1 − 𝑑𝑤), where 𝑑𝑤 is the worker’s DC; the worker may leave for 
another job that pays a wage greater than 𝜋(1 − 𝑑𝑤). A consumer, too, may go elsewhere 
if s/he deems the cost of buying from a woman to be p(1 + 𝑑𝑐), where p is the price of 
buying from male workers and 𝑑𝑐 is a customer’s DC. A non-discriminating employer 
may still be forced to forgo hiring women because s/he does not want to lose 
discriminating male workers or discriminating customers. Becker argued the market 
mechanism would not support an employer with a taste for discrimination in the long run 
because the employer is paying a wage premium to keep male workers. The 
discriminating employer would have higher labor costs, making it ever more difficult for 
him or her to stay competitive against other producers.  
Phelps (1972) furthered Becker’s analysis by asking why employers want to have 
a taste for discrimination when this preference leads to higher costs and lower profits. 
Phelps hypothesized that employers have to make hiring decisions in the face of limited 
information. Employers can only obtain additional information about the applicant’s 
potential performance at excessive costs, which can hamper their goal of profit-
maximization. As a result, employers will use gender as a proxy for unavailable data. 
Phelps said employers have a priori beliefs about male and female workers, and they will 
make hiring decisions based on those beliefs. Employers may view female applicants as 
less qualified than males because of their previous experience with male and female 
workers; they may also hold the belief that women grow up disadvantaged due to sexual 
hostility and, thus, are not as well trained as male workers. Employers would only hire 
female workers if they can get the labor power at a discounted price to offset their risks. 
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Because employers make their assessments about workers on a “statistical average” basis, 
Phelps called his explanation the theory of statistical discrimination.  
The demand side theories have been criticized by supporters and critics of 
neoclassical economics alike. Arrow (1998) lamented:   
The trouble with these explanations is that they contradict in a direct way 
the usual view of employers as simple profit-maximizers. While they do 
not contradict rational choice theory, they undermine it by introducing an 
additional variable. First, consider the simple hypothesis of employer 
discrimination. If employers have one variable other than profits in their 
maximands, why not others? (Arrow 1998, p. 94-95) 
  
Given Arrow’s question, one must wonder what other variables individuals must 
want to maximize besides profits. Neoclassical economics is grounded on two 
maximizing variables: profit, on the production side, and utility, on the consumption side. 
Other variables of maximization must be deduced to profit or utility because economic 
activities belong to the sphere of production or consumption. Hannan (1982) examined 
profit and utility maximization and found they are equivalent concepts. He began his 
analysis by noting that a representative owner of a firm has a minimum reservation 
managerial wage, which is the amount that must be paid to induce the owner to perform 
managerial duties. The owner hires managers because s/he has a greater preference for 
non-pecuniary activities than managerial duties. In order for the owner to maximize 
his/her utility from engaging in non-pecuniary activities, s/he must maximizes profit to 
pay hired management.    
Prasch (2008) further noted that neoclassical economics treats labor as a 
commodity, and, thus, the owner’s preference for labor power must be treated like 
preferences for all other goods. In the context of firm’s production, the owner must 
choose between labor and capital inputs, given that his/her non-pecuniary preferences 
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remain constant. The owner’s preference for labor and capital must satisfy three 
conditions of rationality:  
1. Completeness: The owner is able to rank all possible combinations of labor 
and capital inputs. S/he prefers more labor (capital) to less of the same input. 
2. Transitivity: If there are three combinations of labor-capital inputs called x, y, 
and z and if x has more labor and capital inputs than y and y has more than z, 
then the owner must prefer x to y, y to z, and x to z.  
3. Reflexivity: For every combination of labor-capital input called x, x is as good 
as itself. 
Lee and Keen (2004) showed the range of technology that the owner can choose to 
include in his/her production function may contain fixed production coefficients. If fixed 
production coefficients exist, then an increase in labor or capital input alone is necessary 
but not sufficient for an increase in output (Lee and Keen 2004, 182). An owner has no 
incentive to prefer more labor if it does not result in greater output (but definitely greater 
labor cost!). Keynes (1964 [1936]) also showed an owner’s decision about how much 
labor to employ depends on general macroeconomic conditions. An owner may very well 
prefer labor-capital combination z over x and y if s/he anticipates this level of output 
sufficiently meets buyers’ demand. Consequently, there is insufficient evidence to 
suggest the owner has rational preferences as presumed in neoclassical theory.    
 Lee and Keen (2004) also demonstrated the downward sloping demand curve for 
a given good (such as hired labor) cannot exist if there is no quasi-concave utility curve. 
The existence of the utility curve, in turn, is dependent on the rationality of preferences, 
but it has been shown the representative owner does not necessary have rational 
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preferences. Consequently, the owner does not possess a downward sloping demand 
curve for hired labor. Without an individual demand curve for labor, there cannot be an 
aggregated downward sloping market demand curve for labor.  
The demand-side preference explanations of the gender wage gap contend the 
market demand curve for male labor is to the right of the demand curve for female labor, 
and this is why men receive a greater equilibrium wage rate compared to women. The 
questionable existences of the representative owner’s rational preferences, the owner’s 
demand curve for labor, and market demand curve for labor pose a serious theoretical 
criticism to the demand-side theories, however. The gender wage gap cannot be 
adequately explained from a demand-side preference perspective given the shortcomings 
of neoclassical demand theory.  
From an empirical perspective, researchers have also found it impossible to 
measure employers’, workers’, and consumers’ preferences for men over women. 
Supporters of demand-side neoclassical theories have resorted to counting the “leftover” 
portion of the gender wage gap as a proxy for the preference against female workers. The 
leftover portion of the wage gap is the part that cannot be explained by the workers’ 
skills, labor force experience, degree of attachments to the labor force, or the industries in 
which they work.6 Dougherty (2005) said this approach to measuring a preference for 
discrimination is inappropriate. The leftover portion of the wage gap includes both the 
effects of discrimination (i.e. an employer pays a female worker less than a male worker 
on the basis of her gender) and self-selection (i.e. a female worker chooses a lower 
paying job because it allows her to have a flexible schedule to perform familial duties) 
                                                          
6 The industries in which individuals are employed are important in the wage determination 
process. For example, the finance industry pays a higher average wage than agriculture.   
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(Dougherty 2005, 970). Also, the leftover portion may include the effects of other types 
of discrimination besides gender—such as discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, or nationality. Dougherty concluded there is no way to know which part of 
the leftover portion is due solely to gender discrimination.7   
Supply-Side Preference Theories 
Supply-side preference theories differ from the demand-side theories because they 
emphasize women’s own preferences for work. Supply-side theories attribute women’s 
lack of dedication to the formal workforce as the cause of their lower earnings compared 
to men. Mincer and Polachek (1974) gave the first presentation of this supply-side 
perspective via human capital theory.8 Mincer and Polachek (1974) said all families must 
allocate time and physical and human capital among three activities: leisure, labor market 
production, and home production. Leisure and labor market production are shared by all 
family members. Home production, on the other hand, is the responsibility of wives 
(Mincer and Polachek 1974).  Mincer and Polachek (1974) gave three reasons for 
women’s dominance in home production. First, women are faced with the biological 
constraint of childbearing, so they must leave the labor force for a considerable amount 
of time. Second, women invest less in their human capital during their single years 
                                                          
7 Some examples help to demonstrate Dougherty’s criticism. Wood, Corcoran, and Courant (1993) 
examined the wages of individuals who graduated from the University of Michigan Law School classes of 
1972-1975 fifteen years after they left school. The authors found the gender wage gap was 40 percent. The 
gap still remained at thirteen percent after Wood, Corcoran, and Courant controlled for variables regarding 
academic performance while in school, work experience after school, personal characteristics, place of 
work characteristics, and number of hours worked. Likewise, Weinberger (1998) studied 5,952 college 
graduates who were no more than 30 year old, not enrolled in school full time, and working either full time 
or involuntarily part time in April 1985. Weinberger reported a gender wage gap of ten to fifteen percent 
(depending on their race) after she controlled for college majors, grade point average, and college 
institution attended. Both studies show that while researchers can narrow Dougherty’s leftover portion by a 
significant amount by controlling for more factors, they still do not know how much of what is left 
unexplained is due to gender discrimination or some other unaccounted factors.   
 
8 Becker (1975) provided a similar analysis to Mincer and Polachek (1974).   
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because they expect to spend less time in the labor force after marriage. On the contrary, 
men probably invest more in their human capital because they expect to spend most of 
their adult lives in the labor force. Third, even if women invested more in their human 
capital but take time off to care for young children, their leave of absence from the labor 
force causes their human capital to depreciate. When women decide to reenter the labor 
force (presumably after the children are grown), they cannot command a wage rate 
similar to men. Consequently, women’s low level of human capital is the cause of their 
low wages.  
Polachek (1981) furthered Mincer and Polachek (1974) by asking how women 
can maximize their lifetime earnings given that they know they would spend most of their 
lives outside the formal labor force. Polachek (1981) proposed women tend to choose 
occupations that have the lowest penalties for intermittent labor force participation. 
Polachek (1981) called this penalty the “atrophy rate.” Polachek argued occupations with 
high atrophy rates are riskier investments than low atrophy rate occupations. Occupations 
with high atrophy-rates usually offer low entry-level wages, leading workers who want 
higher wages to spend much more time honing their skills. On the other hand, entry-level 
wages are often higher in low atrophy-rate occupations that do not require extensive skill 
training. Female workers are better off maximizing their lifetime earnings by entering 
low atrophy-rate occupations since they have childbearing and child rearing 
responsibilities. In exchange for higher entry-level wages and lower skill requirements, 
women in low atrophy-rate occupations have to forgo future promotional opportunities. 
Consequently, women self-select into low atrophy-rate occupations because this is the 
most profitable investment for them. 
 
 
21 
 
Bowles and Gintis (1975) have criticized human capital and occupational self-
selection on three grounds. First, economically relevant skills are not uni-dimensional 
and cannot be aggregated into a single measure called “human capital” where some 
individuals have more while others have less of it (Bowles and Gintis 1975, 78-79). 
Second, the theories eliminate class as a central feature of capitalist production. Mincer 
and Polachek (1974) and Polachek (1981) assume every worker contributes an 
identifiable amount of “human capital” to the production process, and s/he receives a 
factor payment equivalent to his/her contribution. Every worker is, in essence, his/her 
own capitalist (Bowles and Gintis 1975, 74). In reality, production is a class-conflicted 
process. In order for raw materials to be transformed into products, individuals with labor 
power must first be transformed into workers with skills and consciousness compatible 
with the class-based system; workers must cooperate with capitalists as the latter exploit 
the former to the fullest to gain a larger profit margin. Consequently, capitalists have an 
interest to control the education system to ensure trained workers have the desired 
characteristics needed by the capitalist system. Human capital and occupational self-
selection fail to account for this class conflict in the wage structure. 
 The third criticism Bowles and Gintis (1975) directed against human capital and 
occupational self-selection theories is their superficial interpretation of the positive 
correlation between wages and education. Mincer and Polachek (1974) and Polachek 
(1981) argued workers with higher educational levels are more productive, and, thus, 
earn higher wages. Bowles and Gintis (1975) argued there are alternative explanations for 
why investment in education yields higher wages. Capitalists may seek out individuals 
with high level of educational investment because these individuals have been trained to 
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accept supervisory authority. Educated workers may have been taught motivational 
patterns compatible with the class-based power structure and thus are more willing to let 
capitalists exploit their labor power (Bowles and Gintis 1975, 80). Educated workers also 
serve as a mean of division in the laboring class. Capitalists can justify the low wages of 
the majority of workers, who do not have high level of educational investment, by way 
singling out the “productivity” of the educated workers. Divided workers are less likely 
to push for a higher share of the production surplus, which leaves more profits for 
capitalists.  
 Another theoretical criticism can be directed at human capital and occupational 
self-selection theories when we examine the neoclassical law of supply, which argues a 
positive relationship exists between price and quantity of supplied labor. Prasch (2008) 
showed it is likely that the supply of labor is not represented by an upward sloping curve 
but rather a backward bending one, as depicted in Figure 2.1. The backward bending 
supply curve shows that the segment above the subsistence wage level (Ws) is indeed 
upward sloping. A worker who earns a real wage at the subsistence level can maintain a 
socially acceptable minimum standard of living. The worker would only sell more labor 
power if s/he is offered a premium above Ws. The portion of the supply curve above Ws 
is indeed upward sloping and, thus, conforms to the neoclassical supply curve. However, 
if the real wage falls below the subsistence wage, the worker will supply additional labor 
power in order to maintain his/her socially acceptable minimum standard of living. The 
negative relationship between wage and quantity of labor supplied continues until the real 
wage falls below the unsustainable level (Wu). The worker cannot supply any more 
additional labor to maintain the minimum standard of living; s/he also becomes too 
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physically exhausted and cannot sell additional labor. The supply curve begins to turn 
inward at Wu. The backward bending market supply curve indicates there is no unique 
relationship between each rate of marginal productivity of labor (𝑀𝑃𝑙) and wage. In other 
words, a worker can be equally productive at different wage rates. Mincer and Polachek 
(1974) and Polachek (1981) assumed male and female workers earn wages comparable to 
their marginal productivity of labor. Since men are more productive workers due to their 
higher human capital investments, men earn higher wages. The backward bending supply 
curve, however, suggests it is possible that male and female workers can be equally 
productive but earn different wages.   
 
FIGURE 2.1: BACKWARD BENDING SUPPLY CURVE 
 
Source: Adapted from Robert E. Prasch, How Markets Work: Supply, Demand, and the 
‘Real World’ (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), 88, figure V.2.   
 
The empirical evidence also does not support human capital or occupational self-
selection theories. Blau and Ferber (1986) reported women’s post-secondary educational 
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attainments (including their chosen fields of study) and experiences and attachments to 
the labor force began to mirror men’s since the 1970s. Bellas and Conventry (2001) 
found men and women working in female-dominated sales occupations have more 
education than comparably paid workers in non-female sales occupations. Bergmann 
(2005) showed women’s educational attainments surpassed men’s in early 2000s. 
Women were more likely to receive some form of higher education than men—63.1% to 
56.6%. Women were also more likely to earn bachelor degrees than men—22% to 19%. 
Women also held as many graduate degrees as men (Bergmann 2005, p.51-52).  
England (1984) found no evidence supporting Polachek’s occupational self-
selection theory. England argued that if women do self-select into feminine occupations 
due to the low wage penalty for intermittent labor force participation and human capital 
depreciation, we should expect a negative correlation between female workers’ wages 
and the atrophy rates in male-dominated occupations. England constructed atrophy rates 
for male-dominated occupations and correlated this variable against female wages in 
these occupations. She found the variables were not statistically correlated.   
In response to the criticisms against human capital and occupational self-selection 
theories, Filer (1989) proposed a new supply-side explanation for the gender wage gap 
called compensating differentials.9 Filer (1989) made the argument that women, even 
with the same level of human capital as men, may still earn less because they choose to 
                                                          
9 A reader has pointed out that the theory of compensating differentials is simply a rationalization 
of the theory of human capital, which has been shown to have theoretical and empirical shortcomings. 
Compensating differentials is an attempt to “save” human capital theory. This dissertation does not agree 
with this assessment. Compensating differentials theory is treated as a unique explanation of the gender 
wage gap in both the neoclassical economics and sociology literature. Moreover, while it is probable that 
workers with low level of education and work experience are more likely to be employed in occupations 
that are physically challenging and lacking work freedom, the same generalization cannot be made about 
individuals working in mentally stressful occupations. Consequently, compensating differentials theory is 
treated as a separate explanation of the gender wage gap.     
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take a larger portion of their compensation in the form of non-pecuniary amenities. 
Women prefer not to work in occupations with dangerous and unfavorable work 
conditions, so they are willing to trade away some of their wages away to satisfy their 
preference. Men receive a wage premium because they do not mind working in 
physically demanding occupations.  
England et al. (1988) found workers in female-dominated occupations earn lower 
wages than those in non-feminized occupations after controlling for differences in human 
capital, skill demands, and working conditions. Jacobs and Steinberg (1990) analyzed job 
titles in the New York State Civil Service and found female and male jobs had 
comparably undesirable working conditions. Furthermore, male and female workers are 
penalized—not rewarded—for being employed in jobs with unfavorable work conditions. 
Individuals employed in white male-dominated jobs were heavily penalized for working 
in environments that have a high risk of injury and involved strenuous physical activity, 
and individuals working in female-dominated jobs were also heavily penalized for 
performing repetitious tasks.  
The mixed findings about wage effect of undesirable work conditions necessitate 
another examination of compensating differentials theory. The wage model presents in 
this dissertation includes measures for occupational physical hardship, mental stress, and 
lack of freedom to control one’s work goals and pace of work. Occupational self-
selection theory and demand-side preference theories are not examined because the 
Census and ACS PUMS do not report an individual’s preference for “maleness” versus 
“femaleness” and work versus home-life balance. 10 Three “human capital” variables, 
                                                          
10 A possible way around this problem is to include gender as an explanatory variable in the wage 
regression, but this method requires the error structures of male and female wage models to be the same. 
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years of schooling, years of potential work experience, and the square of years of 
potential work experience, are also included in the presented wage model. The human 
capital variables are included because they have been shown to be important predictors of 
a worker’s wage rate in previous gender wage gap studies (Johnson and Solon 1986; 
England et al. 1988; Macpherson and Hirsch 1995; England, Reid, and Kilbourne 1996; 
Lewis 1996; Stanley and Jarrell 1998; Bellas and Coventry 2001; Solberg 2005).11  
Crowding 
The crowding explanation dates back to the nineteenth century when male 
workers and unionists popularized the belief that female entry into non-feminized 
occupations would eventually result in wage depreciation for all (Matthaei 1982; 
Nicholson 2004). Bergmann (1974) gave the first mathematical formalization of the wage 
effect of female occupational crowding.12 Bergmann (1974) built her crowding model on 
three assumptions. First, occupational gender segregation exists regardless of the actual 
cause of the segregation.13 Second, workers of the same average skills work in two 
occupations called “masculine” and “feminine.” Third, each worker is paid a wage 
                                                                                                                                                                             
One cannot make this assumption because Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) showed the unexplained factors 
which affect male wages may not be the same as the unexplained factors affecting female wages. 
Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) ran separate wage regressions for men and women, and this study follows 
Macpherson and Hirsch’s methodology. 
 
11 For example, Stanley and Jarrell (1998) conducted a meta-regression analysis of 41 gender 
wage gap studies and found those studies that omit work experience as an explanatory variable report a 
mean wage gap of 28 percent higher than studies that do not omit the variable. 
12 Bergmann (1974) credited Edgeworth (1922) for inspiring her formulation of the crowding 
hypothesis. A reading of Edgeworth (1922) shows Edgeworth’s analysis differs markedly from Bergmann’s. 
“The pressure of male trade unions,” said Edgeworth, “appears to be largely responsible for that crowding 
of women into a comparatively few occupations, which is universally recognized as a main factor in the 
depression of their wages” (Edgeworth 1922, p. 439). Edgeworth gave credit to the role that unequal 
distribution of power between female workers and male unionists as the cause of crowding. Bergmann did 
not make an attempt to explain the source of occupational segregation.   
 
13 In other words, occupational gender segregation is an exogenous variable. 
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equivalent to his or her marginal productivity. Illustration 1 shows a dual labor market in 
which women’s wage rate is 𝑊𝑓 when they are segregated into the feminine occupation. 
If the masculine occupation is desegregated and women are allowed entry, their presence 
increases the supply of labor in the masculine occupation causing the occupation’s 
marginal productivity to decline. Furthermore, the supply of labor in the feminine 
occupation decreases, causing the occupation’s marginal productivity to increase. The 
wage rate increases from 𝑊𝑓 to  𝑊𝑒 in the feminine occupation and decreases from 𝑊𝑚 to  
𝑊𝑒 in the masculine occupation. When wages in the masculine and feminine occupations 
are equalized at 𝑊𝑒, female entry into the masculine occupation stops.  
 
 
FIGURE 2.2: BERGMANN’S FEMALE OCCUPATIONAL CROWDING MODEL 
 
Source: Adapted from Francine D. Blau and Marianne A. Ferber, The Economics of 
Women, Men, and Work (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1986), 256, figure 8.1.  
 
 
Bergmann (1974) has received much theoretical but few empirical critiques. 
England et al. (1988) admitted female crowding leads to lower wages, but they argued 
other factors must be at play besides the proportion of women employed in an 
occupation. England et al. (1988) identified sexism as a possible explanatory factor. 
Employers may choose to hire only female workers and either offer them low wages at 
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the time of hiring or imposing low wages once the occupation is sufficiently feminized. 
Reich, Gordon, and Edwards (1973), Hartmann (1976), Matthaei (1982), Gordon, 
Edwards, and Reich (1982), and Kessler-Harris (1990) also argued that employers 
deliberately separate female workers into specific occupations and offer them lower 
wages than male workers in other occupations.14   
Empirical findings have been mostly supportive of Bergmann (1974). England 
(1984) estimated women’s wages increased by 1.9% for every 10% increase in the 
proportion of men who work in their occupations in the 1974 Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics after she controlled for human capital characteristics.  Johnson and Solon 
(1986) found a negative relationship between the “femaleness” of an occupation and the 
wage rate paid for individuals in the May 1978 Current Population Survey (CPS), but 
they argued a significant portion of the gender wage gap is due to men working in higher 
paying industries.15 England et al. (1988) reported white and black women in the 
National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) 1968-1980 panels and white men in the NLS 1966-
1981 panels suffered wage penalties when employed in occupations with the majority 
being female workers even after controlling for differences in human capital, skills 
demand, and working conditions. Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) found the same 
negative relationship between occupational femaleness and wage rates of men and 
women in pooled March CPS samples between 1983 and 1993; however, they found the 
gender wage gap narrowed by two thirds after controls for a large number of personal 
                                                          
14 Another theoretical criticism of Bergmann (1974) is her use of the neoclassical supply and 
demand concepts. Lee and Keen (1998) and Prasch (2008) have shown the theoretical problems of 
neoclassical laws of supply and demand.  
 
15 An example is necessary to elaborate on Johnson and Solon’s point. Accountants who work in 
the finance industry earn higher wages than their counterparts in the agricultural industry. If there are more 
male accountants in finance than in agriculture, male accountants would, on average, earn higher wages 
than female accountants.   
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characteristics and occupation and industry characteristics were added. England, Reid, 
and Kilbourne (1996) controlled for 200 industry-occupation combinations and found 
white women, black women, and white men in the 1979-1987 National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY) suffered wage penalties when they work in combinations where 
women are the majority workers. Lewis (1996) reported the same negative relationship in 
a pooled sample of full-time, white-collar, federal government employees for the years 
1976 and 1992.   
Solberg (2005) did obtain findings that do not support Bergmann’s hypothesis. 
Bergmann’s hypothesis implies crowding should occur at the occupational level only. 
Workers in feminized occupation A earn a lower wage rate than workers in non-
feminized occupation B because occupation A is crowded with female workers, but male 
and female workers within occupation A (or within occupation B) should not have 
different wages if they possess all similar personal characteristics except sex. Solberg 
tested Bergmann’s hypothesis by examining four different cohorts working in seven 
generalized occupations in the 1979 NLSY: professional and technical occupations in the 
hard sciences, professional and technical occupations in the social sciences, managers 
and administrators combined, sales and clerical workers combined, crafts, operatives, and 
laborers and service workers combined. In the first cohort, Solberg examined the wage 
gap within each occupation between white male and female workers and found the 
gender wage gap was statistically significant in three occupations: sales and clerical, 
crafts, and operatives. In the second cohort, consisting of only full-time, year-round white 
male and female workers, Solberg found the wage gap was statistically significant in the 
professional and technical occupations in the hard sciences and crafts.  In the third cohort 
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of only private sector white male and female workers, the wage gap was statistically 
significant in the professional and technical occupations in four occupations: social 
sciences, sales and clerical, crafts and operatives. In the fourth cohort of full-time, year-
round, private sector white male and female workers, a statistically significant wage gap 
was found in three occupations: professional and technical occupations in the hard 
sciences, professional and technical occupations in the social sciences, and crafts. Solberg 
concluded,  
...the results indicate that something else is going on besides the crowding 
of females into the seven occupational categories.  Perhaps females have 
encountered a ‘glass ceiling’ within each occupation, perhaps there is 
crowding within the categories, or perhaps there is some other form of 
overt gender discrimination within each category (Solberg 2005, p. 140).     
 
In this dissertation, the validity of the crowding hypothesis throughout the post-
World War II era will be examined. Women have achieved significant progress in the 
post-World War II labor force. Women’s labor force participation increased from 36.3% 
in 1944—its highest peak during World War II—to 60% in 1999—an all time high—and 
stood at 59.2% in 2009 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, p.131-132; U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2010, p.8 and 12). Women had a 47% share of the labor force in 2009, 
whereas they only had 29% in 1948 (Bloom 1986, p.25; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
2010, p.1). Women have also entered occupations that were closed to them in the prewar 
era. Blau and Kahn (2000) reported a decreasing concentration of women in 
administrative and service occupations since the 1970s, although the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics reported women accounted for 57.2% of workers in service occupations 
and 63% of workers in sales and office occupations in 2009 (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2010, 31 and 33). The Bureau of Labor Statistics also reported women made up 
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51% of all workers in management and professional and related occupations in 2009 
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010, p. 1). Given the changes in the degree of female 
crowding in the labor force in general and in the administrative, service, management, 
and professional occupations specifically throughout the postwar era, one may wonder if 
the relationship between female occupational crowding and wages has remained 
consistent or has changed. Heckman (1991; 2001) noted a socioeconomic relationship 
like female occupational crowding and wage is state-dependent. Factors that influence 
this socioeconomic relationship may change over time, which may result in a new 
socioeconomic relationship. Previous research has focused on the relationship between 
female occupational crowding and wages at one chosen moment in time, but it has not 
examined the relationship over an era when women have made great advances in the 
workforce. An investigation about the female occupational crowding and wages 
connection is warranted and is a focus of this study.  
Power 
 The power explanation of the gender wage gap is the antithesis of the preference 
explanation. Power theorists argue women do not prefer to work in low-paying 
occupations. Rather, women are forced to work for low wages because they lack the 
power to protect themselves against unfair employment and wage setting practices of 
male employers and workers. The power explanation is represented by two theories: 
labor market segmentation and patriarchy. Labor segmentation and patriarchy share a 
common starting theoretical position: a rejection of the Walrasian auctioneer labor 
market theory. The power explanation argues that the Walrasian market does not exist, 
and the real world labor market is characterized by power relationships. Klein (1987) 
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defined power as the “ability to decide, to control, to influence” (Klein 1987, p. 1343). 
Woodbury (1987) said power is present in every market interaction because workers and 
employers differ in their property right attainments. Employers have access to capital, or 
the plants and equipment, needed to carry out production. Workers own their own labor 
power. Eichner (1979) and Seccareccia (1991) noted workers are inherently 
disadvantaged in market interactions because they cannot store their labor power away in 
hopes of getting a better selling price on another day. Workers lose their skills if they do 
not work on a continual basis, and they perish without means of subsistence. Moreover, 
workers age over time and eventually lose the ability to work. On the other hand, 
employers have the power to withhold their monetary capital, turn off the machines, and 
lay off workers if they deem production will not garner a desired rate of profit.16 Veblen 
(1904) argued it is the employers’ unstable demand for labor that injects precariousness 
in workers’ livelihood. No worker is assured of finding a buyer for his or her labor 
power.  
Fligstein and Fernandez (1988) showed employers and workers are inherently 
unequal at the start of the wage bargaining process. Employers control the flow of capital 
and use this power to get workers to accept an “appropriate” wage rate, which usually 
means a rate at which employers can keep costs low enough to realize their desired rate 
of profit. On the other hand, workers try to get employers to commit to long-term hiring 
contracts and preferably ones with fixed real wages. Both parties try to exercise their 
“domination” strategies to achieve their respective goals. Employers’ domination 
strategies include using labor saving technology to limit their dependency on workers, 
                                                          
16 A desired rate of profit is one that compels the businessman to keep the production process 
going (Veblen 1904).  
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deskilling workers by refusing to train workers to understand an entire production process 
but rather only to perform individual steps in the process, forming agreements with other 
employers not to compete for the same workers, and lobbying with the government to 
protect their interests in labor-capital disputes (Marx 1990 [1867]; Wolff and Resnick 
1987; Fligstein and Fernandez 1988; and Braverman 1998). Workers also have their 
domination strategies: requiring employers to sign closed shop contracts, imposing 
apprenticeship requirements or professional licenses or certifications, and drafting 
collective bargaining agreements (Fligstein and Fernandez 1988; Nicholson 2004). 
Eichner (1979) observed that workers may increase their wage bargaining position in the 
short run, but he doubted the success of these strategies in the long run. Capitalism has a 
built-in relief mechanism for labor power shortage: There are always younger workers 
who have come of age and must work, and they are willing to accept less-than-desirable 
wages to gain entry into the workforce. Employers eventually find their alternative labor 
supply. 
Labor Market Segmentation Theory 
Using the power theory of the labor market, Reich, Gordon, and Edwards (1973) 
and Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982) proposed the theory of labor market 
segmentation as an explanation of the gender wage gap. Reich, Gordon, and Edwards 
(1973) noted nineteenth century workers were trained to perform similar tasks under 
similar working environment; this mass production system promoted labor fraternity, and 
workers unionized to stand against employers’ encroachments on their working 
conditions and wages. Nineteenth century mass production was a double-edged sword, 
however. The system was prone to overproduction, which caused intense competition and 
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declining profits for all. Firms responded by buying out their competitors, and this 
merger movement gave rise to large corporations by the early twentieth century. Large 
firms were freed from the nuisance of making a quick profit to stay afloat, and they 
turned their attention to creating an environment favorable to their long term survivability 
(Fligstein 1993; Roy 1999; Fligstein 2001). One of the first tasks the corporations 
undertook to secure their survivability was to resolve the problem of radical labor (Reich, 
Gordon, and Edwards 1973, 360-361). 
Corporations turned to the concept of scientific management, popularized at the 
time by its founder Frederick Winslow Taylor. Scientific management instituted a 
workplace hierarchy among workers, allowing some to have the freedom to determine 
their pace of work, tasks, and goals and denying the same privilege to others. Workers 
were divided into labor cohorts on the basis of their race, gender, age, work experience, 
work skills, and so forth. Workers in each cohort were placed on similar career paths. 
Gordon, Edward, and Reich (1982) categorized the cohorts into two broad categories: 
primary and secondary.  The secondary sector is composed of “dead-end,” low-paying 
occupations like those in unskilled service and manufacturing. Women and teenagers are 
the main workforce of the secondary sector. The primary sector differs from the 
secondary sector in that employers provide on-the-job training, job ladders, and higher 
wages to induce workers’ loyalty. All workers are not equal in the primary sector, 
however. The primary sector is divided into two segments: independent primary and 
subordinate primary. Independent primary sector workers are encouraged to demonstrate 
creativity and problem-solving skills. Examples of independent primary sector jobs are 
those in middle- and upper-management and skilled professional occupations. Men are 
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the core workforce of the independent primary sector. The subordinate primary sector is 
made up of workers who serve as assistants to the independent primary workers. 
Subordinate primary workers are expected to perform repetitive work routines and 
exhibit deferential attitudes toward their superiors. Women are the main workers of the 
primary subordinate occupations. These women are paid higher wages than women in the 
secondary sectors but less than men in the independent primary sector. 
 Labor market segmentation theory has garnered both support and criticism. 
Bergmann (2005) found significant gender segmentation in 357 occupations in the 2002 
Current Population Survey (CPS). Bergmann (2005) began her study by giving three 
definitions: an occupation having 35% to 55% female workers is “gender-integrated,” an 
occupation having less than 35% female workers is “male,” and an occupation having 
more than 55% female workers is “female.” Bergmann (2005) found half of all female 
workers were concentrated in 71 “female” occupations; these same occupations 
employed only 7% of all male workers. Half of all male workers were employed in 154 
“male” occupations, which employed only 8% of all female workers. Sixty gender-
integrated occupations employed 19% of all male workers and an equivalent percentage 
of all female workers (Bergmann 2005, p.46; see Appendix A.1 in same text for a 
complete list of occupations and their gender distribution).   
Bielby and Baron (1986a; 1986b) also conducted a study measuring the gender 
concentration of occupations, but they concluded their findings suggest labor market 
segmentation theory is too simplistic to capture the degree of gender segregation in the 
workplace. Bielby and Baron (1986a; 1986b) examined 40,000 working men and 11,000 
working women employed in 209 Californian firms between 1964 and 1979. The men 
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and women held 10,000 official job titles and worked in 645 detailed occupations and 
seven major occupational groups. Bielby and Baron (1986a) defined an occupation as 
being gender integrated if men account for no less than 20 percent and no more than 80 
percent of employment.  Bielby and Baron (1986a) found 266 firms out of 290 employed 
workers in at least one gender-integrated occupation, but only 144 firms employed both 
men and women in gender-integrated occupations (Bielby and Baron 1986a, 779). There 
were 3,000 job titles in the gender-integrated occupations, but only 215 job titles were 
filled by both sexes (Bielby and Baron 1986a, 779). In addition, only five firms 
accounted for 40 percent of the gender-neutral job titles (Bielby and Baron 1986a, 779).  
Bielby and Baron (1986a; 1987b) argued their study shows men and women are 
separated from each other at much smaller levels than labor market segments. The sexes 
do not share the same job titles even if they are employed in the same occupation, and, in 
some cases, do not work in the same firm even if they share the same job title.  
Patriarchy has emerged as the “other half” of the power explanation for the 
gender wage gap. Patriarchy notes that labor market segmentation theory fails to address 
a fundamental question: Why do employers choose to segregate women, but not men, 
into subordinate primary and secondary sectors? Hartmann (1976; 1981) provided an 
answer: employers’ patriarchal attitudes resulted in their discriminating against female 
workers. Hartmann (1976; 1981) showed the institution of patriarchy exists prior to the 
emergence of capitalism, and its roots are traced back to settled agriculture. Men and 
women equally shared the burden of producing a material subsistence prior to the rise of 
settled agriculture. Women were gatherers, and men were hunters. Women provided a 
greater share of the material production in many instances, as hunting was not a 
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dependable means of obtaining food. Settled agriculture lessened women’s contribution 
to the community’s livelihood because their work of gathering food was no longer 
needed. Instead, women’s labor power was now directed at being caretakers of men, 
children, and elders. Women lost their say over material surplus redistribution, and 
patriarchy emerged as an institution of importance. Patriarchal attitudes advanced further 
when men started exchanging women within their own kin groups to men in other 
groups.17 Women who were separated from their kin groups were completely dependent 
on their male providers (such as husbands) for their material livelihood. Capitalism grew 
out of this history of patriarchy. 
The capitalistic mode of production requires both men and women to work 
outside the home. Hartman (1976; 1981) noted the appearance of working women is a 
threat to patriarchy in three ways: male employers did not want to subsidize male workers 
for child rearing and housekeeping, which were provided by stay-at-home women at no 
extra cost, male workers’ superior status within their family partly depends on their 
ability to provide material livelihood for other family members, and male workers feared 
women would be the cheaper labor substitute and drive down their wages. Male workers 
understood it was not possible to bar women from working. Hence, male workers joined 
forces with male employers to limit women’s position in the workforce. Segregating 
women into “female” occupations and paying them low wages are two outcomes of this 
deliberate endeavor to marry patriarchy with capitalism.18  
                                                          
17 Veblen (1898; 1899) theorized that women were the first private property—men’s private 
property—in human societies. 
 
18 Kessler-Harris (1982) and Matthaei (1986) showed nineteenth and even early twentieth century 
male workers and employers and, in some instances, nonworking women promoted the “pin money myth” 
as justification for women’s lower wages. The “pin money” myth was a widespread social belief that 
women only worked to finance frivolous wants like clothes and accessories to improve their appearances. 
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 The 1970s and 1980s saw the blossoming of interest in the history of women and 
work. Research into this area yields much supporting evidence for patriarchy theory.  
Dublin (1979), Kessler-Harris (1982), Matthaei (1986), and Amott and Matthaei (1996) 
have written extensively about female workers in early industrial America. According to 
these authors, prior to the Industrial Revolution, colonial women were restricted to 
working from inside the home. Women were responsible for childbearing, child rearing, 
and housekeeping; they sometimes performed home production activities like weaving 
textiles, sewing clothes, farming, and keeping boarding houses to earn extra income. 
Women were not official labor force participants until textiles emerged as an early 
manufacturing industry in the nineteenth century. Francis Cabot Lowell, founding father 
of the American textile factory system, actively sought out female workers when he built 
the Boston Manufacturing Company in 1814 (Kessler-Harris 1982, 25). Lowell chose 
women for two reasons. First, women already possessed weaving skills, which they 
frequently performed to produce homemade clothing (Kessler-Harris 1982, 24-25). 
Second, female labor could be paid at a cheaper price since most women were property-
less (Heilbroner and Singer 1999, 106-107).19 Lowell created a publicity campaign to 
convince families to let their single daughters to go work in his mill. Lowell advertised a 
job as a “mill girl” would be a temporary venture, lasting two or three years between 
adolescence and marriage (Heilbroner and Singer 1999, 107). Lowell promised to teach 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Working women did not have to worry about basic material needs like food and shelter because these 
necessities were provided by their male family members. Male workers, on the other hand, had to take care 
of their stay-at-home wives, children, and other female relatives (such as the sisters who worked for “pin 
money”).   
 
19 Heilbroner and Singer (1999) noted early capitalist employers had trouble recruiting male 
workers because men owned farms. Farming men abhorred the idea of working for wages because it would 
result in a loss of self independence and self sufficiency. Women did not own their own farms, so they 
approached wage work with a less hostile attitude (Heilbroner and Singer 1999, 106-107). 
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the girls proper Protestant work ethics and prepare them for their roles as future 
housewives in return for their employment. Lowell said wages paid to the girls were only 
an extra incentive—and should not be considered the primary motive—for working. 
Lowell even offered to send wages directly to the girls’ male relatives so as to temper 
parents’ fears that their daughters would engage in frivolous and immoral consumption. 
The example of the Lowell mill girls demonstrates women’s low wages has long 
historical roots, and men played a critical role in setting the female wage condition.   
  The patriarchal control of women’s work extended beyond the textile industry.  
Teaching, once praised as women’s “true profession,” is another occupation deeply 
influenced by patriarchal attitudes (Hoffman 2003, 2).  The end of the Civil War brought 
a tremendous demand for teachers to go south to educate former slaves and to the west to 
teach in new frontier towns, but there were not enough teachers to meet the demand. 
Teaching was a low paying occupation prior to the Civil War, reserved for men enrolled 
in college who happened to be home on vacation and needed temporary work to earn 
extra income or older men who could not farm or do manufacturing work. Anti-slavery 
charities and their benefactors determined a more reliable teaching workforce was needed 
if they were to achieve their goal of educating former slaves.  Catherine Beecher, an 
education advocate, proposed educated, single women would be able to meet the nation’s 
need for teachers because they had the maternal instincts and patience needed to shape 
young minds. In an address given in 1846, Beecher said: 
...soon, in all parts of our country, in each neglected village, or new 
settlement, the Christian female teacher will quietly take her station, 
collecting the ignorant children around her, teaching them habits of 
neatness, order, and thrift; opening the book of knowledge, inspiring the 
principles of morality, and awakening the hope of immortality (Beecher 
2003, 78). 
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 Women responded to Beecher’s call to action in dramatic fashion.  The number of 
female teachers tripled between 1840 and 1880, and women were three fourths of all 
teaching professionals by 1990 (Hoffman 2003, 24-25). Women’s dominance in teaching 
did not reflect in their wages or career advancements, however. Women were assigned to 
teach lower grade levels, and they were rarely selected for administrative positions like 
school principals or district superintendents. Education level could not have been a factor 
for their low wages or lack of advancement opportunities. L.D. Coffman conducted a 
survey in 1910 and found 50 percent of male teachers had two to five years of education 
beyond elementary school whereas 50 percent of female teachers had three to five years 
of post-elementary school education (Carter 2002, 16). Coffman also found female 
teachers were significantly underpaid compared to male teachers. The median salary for 
teachers with five years of experience was $534 for men and $504 for women; with six 
years of experience was $658 and $543; with seven years of experience was $800 and 
$594; with eight years of experience was $983 and $671; and with nine years of 
experience was $1,083 and $688 (Carter 2002, 16). Women who had the most teaching 
experience were also the ones who earned the least as a proportion of the median male 
wage with comparable experience.   
Male school administrators made no apology for the gender wage gap in teaching, 
and they provided three justifications for the gap. First, men needed to earn a living wage 
to take care of their families, while women were just earning “pin money.” This 
justification was given in spite of a 1913 survey that showed almost a third of single 
female teachers did not live with their parents (Carter 2002, 19). Second, men needed the 
monetary incentive to stay in teaching so schools could train them for administrative 
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positions. Women, on the other hand, quit their jobs when they got married. Third, 
women were biologically, mentally, and physically inferior to men and thus did not 
deserve the same wage rate (Carter 2002, 35).   
 The example of women’s entry into teaching in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century shows patriarchy’s grip extends into the professional sector as well. 
Carter (2002) noted, 
In their zealous promotion of women as teachers, these early school 
reformers constructed an identity for female instructors: They embodied 
self-sacrifice, sentimentality, patience, and docility, and, though lacking 
“natural brilliance,” [they] willingly worked for low wages (Carter 2002, 
27).  
 
Women in other professional occupations also faced similar patriarchal attitudes. 
Women were told they were only suited to be nurses because they were natural 
caretakers, and they did not have the intellectual capacity to be doctors (Reverby 1987). 
Women were suitable for clerical work because their feminine nature was needed to 
soften the harsh and calculating office environment (Davies 1982). Patriarchal attitudes  
set the boundaries for the female existence in the workplace, and women were expected 
to stay within those boundaries.  
  The theory of patriarchy has been criticized for its adversarial generalizations 
about male and female social relationships. Kessler-Harris (1990) argued that patriarchy 
is not a strong enough force to create the gender wage gap on its own and that altruism 
also plays an important role. Kessler-Harris (1990) acknowledged that patriarchy was the 
prevailing structure of social and familial interactions in America before the Industrial 
Revolution, but she believed patriarchy’s effects on capitalism is much more nuanced 
than what has been suggested by Hartmann (1976; 1981). Kessler-Harris (1990) said 
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capitalism gave rise to the first labor-capital dispute in the 1870s. Workers supported the 
concept of “free labor,” which says every (male) individual should have access to self-
sufficiency because it is the only effective mean to achieving self-representation in the 
American republic (Kessler-Harris 1990, 37). On the other hand, employers promoted the 
concept of “freedom to contract,” which says every individual has the freedom to enter 
into a contract to work and such freedom is equivalent to suffrage in the republic 
(Kessler-Harris 1990, p. 38). Kessler-Harris (1990) said courts consistently supported the 
“freedom to contract” view, and frustrated workers began to speak of a new idea called 
the “living wage.” Male workers argued that if they had to contract themselves out for 
work, they wanted to ensure their wives and children were spared from such conditions. 
The living wage was meant to give men the economic means to achieve this goal. 
Kessler-Harris (1990) noted that while it was indeed male workers who attempted to keep 
women out of the workforce and who lobbied with employers for higher wages for 
themselves, men did not do what they did because they feared losing their authority over 
women. Instead, male workers wanted to protect their families. Patriarchal attitudes were 
indeed at work in the 1870s labor-capital dispute, but their manifestations were more 
complex than suggested by patriarchy theory. 
Kessler-Harris (1990) provided another example to show her point that altruism is 
an important factor in wage determination. Kessler-Harris (1990) explained that men and 
women living during the Great Depression held the belief that work should be given to 
deserving individuals regardless of gender. Kessler-Harris (1990) explained,  
In the code of honor of working people, jobs belonged to providers.  
Though this typically meant married men, the scales of justice 
encompassed widows, single women, and married women with 
unemployed or disabled husbands as well.  And while ambivalence 
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reigned about the rights of single men, males with other means of support 
were clearly excluded (Kessler-Harris 1990, 71). 
 
Kessler-Harris concluded an attitude about “deserving employment” does not square with 
patriarchal theory. Employment and wages are matters of livelihood in a capitalist 
society, and, as a consequence, people also demonstrate altruistic tendencies when 
determining who should work and how much they should be paid for their efforts.20   
Few econometric studies have been conducted to examine the power perspective 
of the gender wage gap because power is a difficult concept to quantify. Macpherson and 
Hirsch (1995) did attempt to address this quantification problem by adding a union status 
dummy variable to wage equations in their study about female occupational crowding. 
Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) found a positive correlation between union status and 
wages for both male and female workers. England, Reid, and Kilbourne (1996) also 
controlled for the incidence of a worker’s wage being set by union collective bargaining 
in another study about female crowding. The drawback with Macpherson and Hirsch 
(1995) and England, Reid, and Kilbourne (1996) is the authors did not intend to examine 
gender power status difference, so they did not give a more complete treatment of the 
power explanation. Moreover, Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) and England, Reid, and 
Kilbourne (1996) used a power variable measured at the level of the individual worker. 
There is reason to believe gender power difference also occurs above the individual 
level—that is, at the occupational level. Reich, Gordon, and Edwards (1973) and Gordon, 
Edwards, and Reich (1982) showed men and women are separated into different 
occupations and men are assigned to occupations with more desirable work tasks and 
                                                          
20 Kessler-Harris’s criticism of patriarchy theory is rooted in the perception that individuals have a 
preference between being selfish or altruistic. Hence, one could make the argument that Kessler-Harris’s 
criticism is the preference theories’ refutation of patriarchy theory.   
 
 
44 
 
career ladders. Hartmann (1976) also showed employers’ and male workers’ patriarchal 
attitudes ensured women stay in the less-than-desirable occupations and are paid lower 
wages. Consequently, a more complete treatment of the possibility of gender power 
difference at the occupational level and its wage effect is needed.    
This study attempts to provide the needed econometric examination of the power 
explanation of the gender wage gap by examining the occupational wage effects of five 
variables: 1) a dummy for occupations requiring licensing or certification, 2) a dummy 
for occupations with voluntary licensing or certification, 3) a dummy for occupations that 
require completion an apprenticeship program for entry, 4) the percentage of workers 
who are unionized in the occupation, and 5) the percentage of workers who are covered 
by collective bargaining agreements in the occupation. The first three variables examine 
workers’ abilities to restrict entry into their occupation and, thus, keep up their bargaining 
power against employers. The latter two variables measure unions’ power in wage 
bargains in the occupation. Previous research shows men and women do not work in the 
same occupations (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards 1973; Hartmann 1976; Gordon, 
Edwards, and Reich 1982, Bergmann 1986 and 2005). Consequently, if men and women 
do possess different power status, the difference should be revealed at the occupational 
level. I do not control for union status measured at the individual level because the 
Census and ACS PUMS do not report this information.      
Socialization  
The socialization explanation does not refute the importance of women’s 
preferences in selecting to work in “female” occupations for low wages; however, 
socialization theorists disagree with preference theorists that preferences can be taken as 
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exogenous variables. Instead, socialization theorists say men’s and women’s decisions 
about where to work, what to do, and for how much are influenced by social interactions. 
The socialization explanation offers two contrasting viewpoints about the relationship 
between socialization and the gender wage gap. Cumulative disadvantage theory argues 
individuals’ socialization in youth influence their work decisions as adults. On the other 
hand, social control theory argues childhood socialization is not strong enough to be a 
lifelong factor in work-related decisions and that gender socialization takes place 
throughout life. 
 Cumulative disadvantage and social control theories are grounded in a particular 
view of the relationship between individuals and society called social embeddedness. 
Granovetter (1983, 1985, 1992, and 2005) theorized that individuals are embedded in a 
system of social networks. Individuals interact with other individuals by transmitting and 
receiving information through networks. England and Folbre (2005) said information 
includes cultural values and beliefs, social norms, laws, and technical knowledge 
(England and Folbre 2005, 629). Individuals rely on the information received from social 
networks to make decisions in everyday life, including occupational decisions. For 
example, a female student decides to major in elementary education in college because 
she thinks she would enjoy being a teacher. The woman’s perception that she would 
enjoy teaching is probably influenced by many factors. The student sees that society 
accepts women as teachers because she observes many teachers are of her gender. The 
woman’s peers and family tell her teaching is an appropriate career for women. The 
woman discovers a scholarship exists for college students who want to become teachers, 
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and she wants to take advantage of the opportunity. The list of potential influencing 
factors is long.  
Cumulative Disadvantage Theory 
Cumulative disadvantage theory argues socialization begins in childhood and its 
effects are present through adulthood. McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001) 
reported that children know gender is a permanent personal characteristic by the time 
they are enrolled in school (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001, 422). Boys and 
girls tend to play with others of their own gender, and girls have smaller play groups than 
boys (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001, 422). England and Folbre (2005) said 
boys and girls are also socialized in school, where teachers reward children for 
demonstrating gender appropriate characteristics. Childhood socialization persists well 
into adulthood. McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001) noted men are more likely to 
have network ties that develop in the workplace whereas women are more likely to form 
ties with wives of individuals who work with their husbands (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, 
and Cook 2001, 435). Moreover, job-seeking women are less likely to benefit from their 
male contacts than female contacts unless women share voluntary organizational 
memberships with their male contacts (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001, 434). 
However, women belong to smaller voluntary organizations than men, and they also do 
not gain as many ties from their organizational memberships as men do (McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001, 432). Given that men’s and women’s network ties are quite 
different from each other, it is not difficult to see why they also work in different 
occupations, jobs, and firms. Women’s lack of male network ties also hampers their 
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ability to move into male-dominated occupations, where wages have traditionally been 
higher. 
Marini and Fan (1997) found a positive relationship between occupational 
aspirations and occupational attainments for first-time male and female full-time, labor-
force participants. Okamoto and England (1999) further found that the gender 
composition of occupations that men and women aspired and expected to work in is 
positively correlated with the gender composition of occupations they are actually 
employed in fourteen years later even when their present and aspired and expected 
occupations are different.   
Social Control Theory 
Social control theory differs from cumulative disadvantage in one way: It does not 
believe childhood socialization is a strong enough force to keep women tied to low-
paying female occupations. Jacobs (1989) acknowledged women face tremendous peer 
pressure to study “female” disciplines in high school and college, but he said the 
connection between disciplinary studies and subsequent employment is overstated 
(Jacobs 1989, 59). Instead, Jacobs (1989) proposed there are a set of social control 
mechanisms that keep women tied to female occupations. Jacobs (1989) found young 
women entering the labor force seek out female or gender-neutral jobs. Employers, too, 
hired a large number of women for female jobs, a moderate number for gender-neutral 
jobs, and a small number in male jobs. Women are thus given the opportunity to enter 
gender-neutral and male jobs, but they do not remain in these jobs. Male colleagues view 
hired women as social misfits, which often leads to verbal or physical harassment 
directed at the women. In addition, male superiors choose to bypass women for 
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promotions even when the latter demonstrate the desired level of competency. Female 
workers employed in gender-neutral and male occupations become frustrated with their 
work conditions and move to female jobs, where wages are lower but so is the emotional 
distress.   
Jacobs (1989) conducted a study in which he found a positive relationship 
between the gender compositions of occupations women aspired to and actual attainment 
after being in the labor force for ten years, but he did not interpret his finding the same 
way as Marini and Fan (1997). Instead, Jacobs (1989) said the weak correlation between 
occupational aspiration and attainment is due to a peculiar characteristic in his data: A 
small number of women in his study remained in the occupations they aspired to at the 
beginning of their work careers. Jacobs (1989) believed these women and their stable 
aspirations and attainments masked the true relationship between occupational aspirations 
and attainments for the majority of individuals in his study. When he excluded the 
women with stable aspirations and attainments, Jacobs (1989) found no significant 
relationship between the gender compositions of occupations women aspired to and 
actually attained.21 However, Okamoto and England (1999) repeated Jacobs’s 
“exclusion” methodology and found a statistically significant positive relationship 
between gender compositions of occupations women aspired to and actually attained.   
Kmec, McDonald, and Tremble (2010) also found evidence consistent with 
another aspect of social control theory. In their study of individuals who found their 
current jobs informally through their social networks and who were not actively 
                                                          
21 Jacobs’ exclusion of women who have stable occupational aspirations and attainments (a smaller 
portion of sampled individuals than those who change their aspirations and attainments) is a 
methodological flaw.  By excluding women with stable occupational aspirations and attainments, Jacobs 
eliminated a key characteristic of the original dataset, and, thus, cherry picked his sample observations to 
ensure a desired regression result.   
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searching for the jobs at the time (the authors called these individuals informal non-
searchers), Kmec, McDonald, and Tremble (2010) found male non-searchers who used to 
work in female-dominated environments and who moved to jobs in male-dominated 
environments saw their authority over the work environments and wage rates increased. 
Female non-searchers did not see an increase in their job authority or wage rates when 
they moved to male-dominated work environments, however. Kmec, McDonald, and 
Tremble (2010) concluded social networks exert control over men and women in such a 
way that they elevate men to positions of higher authority and higher wages while 
keeping women down. 
The socialization perspective of the gender wage gap is not examined in this 
study. The dataset selected for this study, Census and American Community Survey 
(ACS) Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS), are cross sectional data and do not survey 
career aspirations nor do track individuals’ employment decisions throughout their 
lifetime. Without this information, socialization factors cannot be included in the study’s 
presented wage model. 
In conclusion, social scientists have proposed many theories to explain the gender 
wage gap. Neoclassical economists argue the gap is caused by women’s preferences 
about work, which happen to be different from men’s. Crowding theorists hypothesize 
female occupational crowding is the cause of women’s lower wages. Power theorists 
believe men and women earn different wages because they have different power status in 
workplaces. Researchers of the gender wage gap phenomenon are best served by being 
cognizant of the four explanations discussed above and their linkages with each other. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the wage effects of compensating 
differentials, power status, and female occupational crowding on men and women in 103 
selected occupations between the 1950 Census and 2008 ACS. Chapter 3 describes the 
methodology used to investigate the research questions of this study, and it is divided into 
three sections. The first section presents the wage models constructed to examine the 
wage effects of compensating differentials, power, and female crowding. The second 
section lays out the hypotheses about the wage effects of compensating differentials, 
power, and female crowding. The third section discusses the data and methods used to fit 
the wage models. 
Wage Models 
Mincer and Polachek (1974) presented the human capital wage model in their 
effort to explain the gender wage gap: ln𝑊𝑖 =  �𝛽𝑘𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑘 + �𝛽𝑙𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖 
 An individual’s natural log of the hourly wage rate is a function of his or her 
personal characteristics (such as gender, race, marital status, number of children, and full-
time or part-time work status) and human capital characteristics (such as work experience 
and education).   
Johnson and Solon (1986) extended Mincer and Polachek’s model to account for 
female occupational crowding. Gender crowding is represented by the variable FEM, 
which is the ratio of female workers to all workers (male and female) in an occupation:  ln𝑊𝑖 =  �𝛽𝑘𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑘 + �𝛿𝑙𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑙 +𝜃𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
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A negative FEM coefficient indicates a high concentration of women in an 
occupation is correlated with low wages for workers. Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) 
estimated Johnson and Solon’s wage model separately for male and female workers 
because they believe it is possible that the error structures of the male and female models 
are different. Factors left unaccounted in the male and female wage models may not be 
the same, and if this is the case, the error terms would be different as well.  
Filer (1989) included measures for physical hardship to the human capital wage 
model. Jacobs and Steinberg (1990) constructed a similar compensating differentials 
model, and they included measures for physical hardship and performing repetitive work 
tasks. Jacobs and Steinberg (1990) said the control for work repetition is necessary 
because women are employed in occupations that demand this undesirable work 
characteristic. Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) also included a large number of controls 
for physical hardship and repetitive work in their human capital with crowding model. 
This study includes three compensating differentials controls: physical hardship, mental 
stress, and lack of freedom to determine one’s work tasks and pace of work. The 
construction of the gender compensating differentials measures will be discussed in the 
data and methods section below.  
Past studies have not examined wage effect of gender power difference except in 
a very limited way. Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) included a dummy accounting for a 
worker’s union membership status in their wage model. England, Reid, and Kilbourne 
(1996) controlled for the incidence where a worker’s wage is set by union collective 
bargaining agreements. However, power theorists have argued gender power difference 
manifests itself above the individual level. Reich, Gordon, and Edwards (1973), 
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Hartmann (1976), and Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982) showed men and women are 
separated into different occupations and men are assigned to occupations with more 
desirable work tasks and career ladders. Consequently, the chosen wage model that 
incorporates the power explanation must do so at the occupational—and not the 
individual—level. Five power variables will be examined in this study: whether the 
occupation requires licensing or certification, whether the occupation has voluntary 
licensing or certification, whether a worker can only enter the occupation via an 
apprenticeship program, percentage of workers who are unionized in the occupation, and 
percentage of workers who are covered by collective bargaining agreements in the 
occupation.  The first three variables examine workers’ abilities to restrict entry into their 
occupation and, thus, keep up their bargaining power against employers. The latter two 
variables measure unions’ power in wage bargains in the occupation.   
Another focus of this dissertation is to examine the wage effects of female 
occupational crowding throughout the post-World War II era. This study defines the 
beginning of the postwar era as April 1949, the time period for which the 1950 Census 
(the first postwar census) was conducted, and the end of the postwar era as January to 
December 2007, the time period for which the 2008 American Community Survey was 
conducted.  During this specified time period of analysis, the relationship between female 
occupational crowding and wages may have undergone state-dependent changes. 
Consequently, the robustness of the chosen wage model will be tested on six Census 
PUMS between 1950 and 2000 and four ACS PUMS between 2005 and 2008.  
The dependent variable of the chosen wage model is the natural logarithm of 
annual wage, which is different from the natural logarithm of hourly wage dependent 
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variable typically used in gender wage gap studies [see discussion about Mincer and 
Polachek (1974) above]. Annual wage is income earned from working in a twelve months 
period, but this period does not necessarily coincide with a calendar year. The decennial 
Census Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) asked individuals to report their pretax 
wages and salaries from the previous calendar year. For example, individuals sampled in 
the 2000 Census would report their wages and salaries from 1999. The annual American 
Community Survey (ACS) PUMS asked individuals to report their wages and salaries 
from the past twelve months. Because the ACS is conducted throughout the year, 
sampled individuals’ reported wages and salaries do not reflect a calendar year. For 
example, an individual sampled in January 2008 would report his or her wage for January 
through December 2007 but an individual sampled in February 2008 would report wages 
for February 2007 through January 2008.   
 Attempts to construct an hourly wage rate were carried out, but a decision was 
made against using the hourly wage rate variable after noticing the loss of important 
sample information in the constructed variable. The hourly wage rate is constructed using 
the annual wage, the number of hours worked last week reported in intervals of hours, 
and the number of weeks worked last year reported in intervals of weeks for the 1950 
through 1970 Census. The 1980 Census through 2008 ACS do not report the number of 
hours worked last week in intervals of hours but rather the number of usual hours worked 
per week, so this variable is used to construct the hourly wage rate for these PUMS. The 
constructed hourly wage variable shows a large amount of sample information 
inconsistency. There are high, median, and low annual wage earners at every hourly wage 
rate; this is due to variation in the reported hours worked last week, the usual hours 
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worked each week, or the number of weeks worked last year. A two part solution for the 
problematic hourly wage variable is offered. First, this study will use annual wage as the 
dependent variable in order to retain the full sample information provided by the Census 
and ACS. Second, a control for the variation in the number of hours worked in a week 
and number of weeks worked is specified in the form of a “full-time” and “part-time” 
work status. A worker is considered part-time status if s/he works at least fifteen hours a 
week irrespective of the number of weeks worked last year. A worker is considered full-
time if s/he works at least 30 hours a week and for at least 40 weeks last year.22 
Individuals who do not meet part-time work status are excluded from the study. It is 
important to note that controlling for the hours and weeks worked is important because 
Stanley and Jarrell (1998) found researchers tend to report a larger wage gap when using 
annual wage rather than hourly wage as the dependent variable. The authors argued such 
a finding is not surprising because annual wage does not control for the difference in the 
number of weeks both sexes work in a year. Men are more likely to work more weeks in 
a year than their female counterparts (Stanley and Jarrell 1998, 963). 
 The following list specifies the ten wage models that are fitted to the ten PUMS 
between 1950 and 2008: 
Model 1 (Human Capital Model):     
 ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑𝛽𝑘,𝑡𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + ∑𝛽𝑙,𝑡𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   
Model 2 (Human Capital + Crowding Model):  
 ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑𝛽𝑘,𝑡𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + ∑𝛿𝑙,𝑡𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 +𝜃𝑡𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Model 3 (Human Capital + Compensating Differentials Model):   
                                                          
22 For example, an individual who works more than 30 hours a week but less than 40 weeks last 
year would be considered a part-time worker. 
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 ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑𝛽𝑘,𝑡𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + ∑𝛿𝑙,𝑡𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 +∑𝛾𝑚,𝑡𝐶𝐷𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Model 4a (Human Capital + Power Dummies):  
 ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑𝛽𝑘,𝑡𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + ∑𝛿𝑙,𝑡𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 +∑𝜑𝑛,𝑡𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Model 4b (Human Capital + All Power Variables):  
 ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑𝛽𝑘,𝑡𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + ∑𝛿𝑙,𝑡𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 +∑𝜑𝑛,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Model 5 (Human Capital + Crowding + Compensating Differentials):   
 ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑𝛽𝑘,𝑡𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + ∑𝛿𝑙,𝑡𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 +𝜃𝑡𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝛾𝑚,𝑡𝐶𝐷𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Model 6a (Human Capital + Crowding + Power Dummies):    
 ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑𝛽𝑘,𝑡𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + ∑𝛿𝑙,𝑡𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 +𝜃𝑡𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝜑𝑛,𝑡𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Model 6b (Human Capital + Crowding + All Power Variables):    
 ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑𝛽𝑘,𝑡𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + ∑𝛿𝑙,𝑡𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 +𝜃𝑡𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝜑𝑛,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Model 7a (Human Capital + Crowding + Compensating Differentials + Power 
Dummies): 
 ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑𝛽𝑘,𝑡𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + ∑𝛿𝑙,𝑡𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 +𝜃𝑡𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝛾𝑖,𝑚,𝑡𝐶𝐷𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 +             ∑𝜑𝑛,𝑡𝑃𝐷𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Model 7b (Human Capital + Crowding + Compensating Differentials + All Power 
Variables):  
            ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑𝛽𝑘,𝑡𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + ∑𝛿𝑙,𝑡𝐻𝐶𝑖,𝑙,𝑡 +𝜃𝑡𝐹𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝛾𝑖,𝑚,𝑡𝐶𝐷𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 +
∑𝜑𝑛,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where  
t = PUMS year, in which t is one of the following years: 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 
2000, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008 ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 = an individual’s natural logarithm of wage and salary for a year 
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PC = personal characteristic variables including: 
1) Four dummy variables representing race: Black/Negro (Black), American 
Indian or Alaska Native (Native), Chinese, Japanese, other Asian or Pacific Islander 
(Asian), and those of mixed race or whose race is not one of the previously cited category 
or white (Other). White (White) is the null dummy variable. 
2) Three dummy variables representing family status: Spouse represents 
individuals who are married with spouse present; Divorced for individuals who are 
“separated, divorced, or windowed”; Under5 is another variable indicating whether the 
individuals have children under five year old. Single is the null dummy variable. 
3) A dummy variable to identify part-time worker (PT).  
4) Twelve dummy variables representing the industry in which the individual is 
employed: mining (Mine), construction (Cons), manufacturing(Manufacturing), 
wholesale trade (Wholesale), retail trade (Retail), transportation and warehousing 
(Transportation), utilities (Utilities), information and communications (Information), 
finance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing (Finance), professional, scientific, 
management, administrative, waste management, educational, health, and social services 
(Professional), arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, food, and other (not 
public administration) services (Services), and public administration (PublicAd). 
Agriculture (Ag) is the null dummy variable. 
HC = human capital variables including years of schooling (Schooling), years of potential 
work experience (Expr), squared years of potential work experience (Expr²). The Census 
and ACS report an individual’s education in categories, which requires me to assign 
numerical values to the categories. Table 3.1 shows the number of years of schooling 
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assigned to each educational level category. Years of potential work experience is 
calculated as follows: Expr = age of individual – Schooling – 5. The number “5” 
represents the age an individual must reach before being able to attend kindergarten. 
TABLE 3.1 
ASSIGNED YEARS OF SCHOOLING 
Census & ACS Educational Level Assigned Number of Years of Schooling 
  
Not available or no schooling 0 
Nursery school to grade 4 4 
Grade 5, 6, 7, or 8 8 
Grade 9 9 
Grade 10 10 
Grade 11 11 
Grade 12 12 
1 year of college 13 
2 years of college 14 
3 years of college 15 
4 years of college 16 
5+ years of college  17 
 
 
CD = compensating differentials variables including three indices for physical hardship 
(Physical), mental stress (Mental), and lack of freedom to control one’s work tasks and 
pace of work (WrkFreedom) 
PD = power dummy variables including whether the occupation required licensing or 
certification for entry (LicenseRe); whether the occupation has voluntary licensing or 
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certification (LicenseVol); and whether a worker must be admitted into and complete an 
apprenticeship program to gain entry into the occupation (Apprentice) 
P = all power variables. These include the three power dummies (LicenseRe, LicenseVol, 
and Apprentice) plus the percentage of workers who are unionized in the occupation 
(UnionPer) and percentage of workers who are covered by collective bargaining 
agreements in the occupation (BargainPer).   
Information about occupational unionization and collective bargaining coverage 
was not available for samples prior to 1990. After 1990 this information is gathered from 
the Union Membership and Coverage Database. As a consequence, Models 4b, 6b, and 
7b are only fitted for the 1990-2000 Census and the 2005-2008 ACS PUMS. In addition, 
the ten wage models fit to the 1950 Census PUMS do not contain the variable Other due 
to lack of observations. No woman and only one man employed in selected occupations 
in the 1950 Census are identified as being of mixed or an unidentified race.  
Hypotheses 
Three hypotheses about the wage effects of compensating differentials, power 
status, and female occupational crowding are examined in this study. The first hypothesis 
is workers employed in the selected occupations that have a high degree of physical 
hardship (Physical) and lack of work freedom (WrkFreedom) received wage penalties; 
this hypothesis is consistent with Jacobs and Steinberg (1990). On the other hand, 
workers employed in mentally stressful (Mental) occupations should receive wage 
premiums; this hypothesis has not been examined in previous studies, but it is consistent 
with Filer (1989) who argued workers are paid higher wages for working in undesirable 
conditions. The second hypothesis is that workers employed in occupations with required 
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or voluntary license or certification (LicenseRe and LicenseVol), required apprenticeship 
(Apprentice), and high percentages of union membership (UnionPer) and collective 
bargaining coverage (BargainPer) have greater power status and, thus, earned wage 
premiums. The third hypothesis is that workers employed in female-crowded selected 
occupations suffer wage penalties; this hypothesis is consistent with Bergmann (1974).  
Joint Significance Tests of Compensating Differentials and Power Variables 
 In order to three hypotheses laid out above, a decision must be made which of the 
ten wage models is the most appropriate for selected male and female observations in 
each PUMS. The selection of the preferred wage model is a two step process. First, a 
determination must be made whether the inclusion of compensating differentials and 
power variables increase the predictive power of the basic human capital + crowding 
model (Model 2). Second, the increase in the predictive power of compensating 
differentials and power variables, if they are statistically significant, must justify the cost 
of selecting a less simple model over Model 2. Model 2 is chosen as the “base model” of 
analysis for two reasons: 1) Jarrell and Stanley (2004) showed schooling and work 
experiences are important wage determinants and 2) Johnson and Solon (1986), England 
et al. (1988), Macpherson and Hirsch (1995), England, Reid, and Kilbourne (1996), 
Lewis (1996), and Solberg (2005) showed female occupational crowding is also an 
important wage determinant.  
Two sets of joint significance tests, the first for compensating differentials 
measures and the second for power variables, are conducted on Models 7a and 7b. Model 
7a is the resulting wage model if the compensating differentials and the three power 
dummies are jointly significant. Model 7b is the resulting wage model if the 
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compensating differentials and all five power variables are jointly significant. As stated 
earlier, Model 7b is only fitted for the 1990 Census through 2008 ACS because the 
information needed to construct the UnionPer and BargainPer variables are not available 
until 1983.  
Wald Test of Joint Significance of Compensating Differentials Measures 
The test of joint significance of compensating differential variables is performed 
on Models 7a and 7b separately. The hypothesis of each test takes the following form: 
𝐻0: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 𝛾3 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 𝛾3 ≠ 0 
where: 
𝛾1 = estimate of the regression coefficient of wage effect of physical hardship (Physical) 
𝛾2 = estimate of the regression coefficient of wage effect of mental stress (Mental) 
𝛾3 = estimate of the regression coefficient of wage effect of worker’s lack of autonomy 
over work environment (WrkFreedom)  
The standard joint significance test used in regression analysis is the F-test; 
however, the F-test is not suitable when the dependent variable, the natural log of annual 
wage, is censored. The U.S. Bureau of the Census places a ceiling on reported annual 
wages of high earners. Because the wages reported for high income earners are not their 
true wages, OLS estimation yield biased estimates of the regression coefficients. The 
solution for the top coding problem is to utilize a “Tobit model” to fit the data.  (A 
detailed explanation of the Tobit model will be presented in the next section of this 
chapter.) When estimating nonlinear models like the Tobit, the Wald test is used in place 
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of the F-test. The calculated Wald statistic measures the distance in standard error 
between estimated parameters and the hypothesized value (Greene 2008, 299): 
𝑊 = [𝑟(𝑏) − 𝑞]′{𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒[𝑟(𝑏) − 𝑞]}−1[𝑟(𝑏) − 𝑞] 
where: 
 𝑟(𝑏)= estimate of 𝑟(𝛽), which is a column vector of J continuous functions of the 
elements of parameters 𝛽  
q = the hypothesized value, which is 0 in a joint significance test 
The calculated Wald statistic is compared against the critical value from the chi 
square distribution. The determination of the chi square critical value depends on the 
chosen level of significance, which is usually set at 1% or 5%.23 If the Wald statistic is 
greater than the critical chi square value, the null hypothesis is rejected.  
Wald Test of Joint Significance of Power Variables  
Three Wald tests for the joint significance of the power variables are also carried 
out. The first one tests the joint significance of the three power dummies; the second 
examines the joint significance of percentages of workers who have union membership 
(UnionPer) and who are covered by collective bargaining agreements (BargainPer); and 
the third examines all five power variables. The first Wald test is performed on Model 7a, 
and it takes the following form: 
𝐻0: 𝜑1 = 𝜑2 = 𝜑3 = 0 
𝐻1: 𝜑1 = 𝜑2 = 𝜑3 ≠ 0 
where: 
                                                          
23 The level of significance is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in fact 
true.  
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𝜑1 = estimate of the regression coefficient of wage effect of required license/certification 
for occupational entry (LicenseRe) 
𝜑2 = estimate of the regression coefficient of wage effect of voluntary 
license/certification (LicenseVol) 
𝜑3 = estimate of the regression coefficient of wage effect of required apprenticeship for 
occupational entry (Apprentice) 
 The second Wald test examines the significance of UnionPer and BargainPer:    
𝐻0: 𝜑4 = 𝜑5 = 0 
𝐻0: 𝜑4 = 𝜑5 ≠ 0 
where: 
𝜑4 = estimate of the regression coefficient of wage effect of percentage of workers who 
are union members in occupation (UnionPer) 
𝜑5 = estimate of the regression coefficient of wage effect of percentage of workers who 
are covered by collective bargaining agreements in occupation (BargainPer) 
 The third Wald test examines the significance of all five power variables, 
LicenseRe, LicenseVol, Apprentice, UnionPer, and BargainPer: 
𝐻0: 𝜑1 = 𝜑2 = 𝜑3 = 𝜑4 = 𝜑5 = 0 
𝐻0: 𝜑1 = 𝜑2 = 𝜑3 = 𝜑4 = 𝜑5 ≠ 0 
Preferred Wage Models 
The Wald tests determine whether the compensating differentials, power 
dummies, or all five power variables should be included in Model 2 for each PUMS, but 
they do not show whether the inclusion of these variables yield models that have the best 
goodness-of-fit. The minimum Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) rule is one that can be 
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applied to find the preferred model for each PUMS. The AIC is a measure of goodness-
of-fit for nonlinear regression models, and it is comparable to the adjusted R² fit measure 
in linear regressions. The calculation of the AIC is as follows (Greene 2008, 143): 
𝐴𝐼𝐶(𝐾) = 𝑙𝑛 �𝑒′𝑒
𝑛
� + 2𝐾
𝑛
 
 where: 
 𝑒′𝑒 = sum of squared residuals 
K = number of parameters 
n = number of observations 
 The AIC accounts for two things: the discrepancy between the estimated and real 
values of the dependent variable and the principle of parsimony, which favors fewer 
independent variables to more given a measured discrepancy (Wilson and Keating 2009, 
246-247). A calculated AIC has no practical meaning by itself, but the comparison of 
AICs calculated from two or more regressions is useful in determining goodness-of-fit. 
The minimum AIC rule indicates the model with the lowest AIC has the best goodness-
of-fit because it minimizes the measured discrepancy while adhering to the principle of 
parsimony. Thus, the preferred model chosen for each PUMS in this study is the simplest 
wage model with the highest predictive power, given the joint significance of the 
compensating differentials and power variables.   
Hypothesis Tests of Compensating Differential, Power, and Crowding Variables 
 After the preferred wage models are specified, the statistical significance of each 
compensating differentials, power, and crowding variables is examined.  
(1) 
𝐻0: 𝛾1 ≥ 0 
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𝐻1: 𝛾1 < 0 
where: 
𝛾1 = estimated regression coefficient of wage effect of physical hardship (Physical) 
(2) 
𝐻0: 𝛾2 ≤ 0 
𝐻1: 𝛾2 > 0 
where: 
𝛾2 = estimated regression coefficient of wage effect of mental stress (Mental) 
(3) 
𝐻0: 𝛾3 ≥ 0 
𝐻1: 𝛾3 < 0 
where: 
𝛾3 = estimated regression coefficient of wage effect of worker’s lack of autonomy over 
work environment (WrkFreedom) 
(4) 
𝐻0: 𝜑1 ≤ 0 
𝐻1: 𝜑1 > 0 
where: 
𝜑1 = estimated regression coefficient of wage effect of required license/certification for 
occupational entry (LicenseRe) 
(5) 
𝐻0: 𝜑2 ≤ 0 
𝐻1: 𝜑2 > 0 
 
 
65 
 
where:  𝜑2 = estimated regression coefficient of wage effect of voluntary license/certification 
(LicenseVol) 
(6) 
𝐻0: 𝜑3 ≤ 0 
𝐻1: 𝜑3 > 0 
where: 
𝜑3 = estimated regression coefficient of wage effect of required apprenticeship for 
occupational entry (Apprentice) 
(7) 
𝐻0: 𝜑4 ≤ 0 
𝐻1: 𝜑4 > 0 
where: 
𝜑4 = estimated regression coefficient of wage effect of percentage of workers who are 
union members in occupation (UnionPer) 
(8) 
𝐻0: 𝜑5 ≤ 0 
𝐻1: 𝜑5 > 0 
where: 
𝜑5 = estimated regression coefficient of wage effect of percentage of workers who are 
covered by collective bargaining agreements in occupation (BargainPer) 
(8) 
𝐻0: 𝜃 ≥ 0 
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𝐻1: 𝜃 < 0 
where: 
𝜃 = estimate of the regression coefficient of wage effect of female crowding in the 
occupation (FEM) 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the calculated t-test statistic (𝑡𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇 ) is less than 
the critical t-value at the chosen level of significance in a lower tail hypothesis test; the 
null hypothesis is rejected if the t-test statistic is greater than the critical t-value in an 
upper tail hypothesis test. (1), (3), and (9) are lower tail hypothesis tests whereas (2), (4), 
(5), (6), (7), and (8) are upper tail hypothesis tests.  
The t-test statistic (𝑡𝑘 ) is calculated as follows:  
𝑡𝑘 = 𝑏�𝑘 − 𝛽𝑘𝑠𝑒𝑏�𝑘  
where 
𝑡𝑘 follows a t-distribution with n-k degrees of freedom; n is the number of observations 
and k is the number of parameters estimated 
𝛽𝑘 = populated parameter  
𝑏�𝑘 = coefficient estimate of 𝛽𝑘 
𝑠𝑒𝑏�𝑘 = standard error of 𝑏�𝑘 
Data and Methods 
 Four data sources are used in this study: Census and American Community 
Survey (ACS) Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS), Occupational Information 
Network (O*NET), Occupational Outlook Handbooks (OOH), and Union Membership 
and Coverage Database. The Census and ACS PUMS provide the samples needed to fit 
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the constructed wage models. O*NET provides occupational work condition information 
necessary to construct the compensating differentials variables. OOH and UMCD provide 
power status information of workers employed in an occupation. This section describes 
the nature of each data source and its contribution to the study. 
Census and ACS PUMS 
The samples used in this study are six decennial 1% Census PUMS between 1950 
and 2000 and four annual ACS PUMS between 2005 and 2008. Each Census year sample 
contains demographic, work-related, and income information of 1% of the U.S. 
population during the sampled time period. The 1950 Census PUMS does not contain 
information about individuals living in Hawaii or Alaska. Each Census PUMS is 
conducted in April of every census year—1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. Each 
ACS PUMS is conducted throughout a given calendar year. There are four data 
comparability problems in the six decennial Census PUMS due to the extended period of 
time covers by the PUMS. The data comparability problems and solutions to overcome 
these problems are described below. 
Comparability of Age Variable 
The PUMS between 1950 and 1970 sampled working individuals 14 years and 
older. The PUMS after 1980 sampled workers 16 years and older. This study only 
examines individuals who are at least 16 year old in order to maintain minimum working 
age comparability across PUMS.   
Comparability of Hours Worked Last Week, Usual Hours Worked Last Week, and Weeks 
Worked Last Year 
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The hours worked last week, the usual hours worked each week, and the weeks 
worked last year variables are not measured the same. The hours worked last week 
variable was reported in intervals for the 1950 through 1970 PUMS whereas the usual 
hours worked each week was reported as values between 0 and 99 for the 1980 through 
2008 PUMS. The problem is resolved by taking the midpoint of each interval for the 
hours worked last week variable and assigning the midpoints as numerical values for 
sampled persons in the 1950 through 1970 PUMS. The midpoint values used are 0, 7.5, 
22, 32, 37, 40, 44.5, 54, and 60. The three variables measuring amount of time spend 
working are then used to construct two worker status dummies: part-time and full-time. A 
part-time worker must work at least 15 hours but less than 30 hours last week or usually 
each week; however, no number of weeks worked last year requirement is imposed. A 
full-time worker must work at least 30 hours last week or usually each week for at least 
40 weeks last year.  
Comparability of Occupational Titles and Codes 
 The Census and ACS group occupations into “occupational codes.” The 
occupational titles identified in each occupational code change from one PUMS to the 
next, and the changes are more pronounced in some years than in others. The Census and 
ACS change the titles in the codes because employer demand for worker skills has 
changed throughout the postwar era. The Census and ACS add new titles when 
employers demand new work skills. When employers cease demand for certain work 
skills, the Census and ACS delete the titles linked to these tasks. The Census and ACS 
also merge and split titles into new and/or existing codes if they deem the work tasks of 
certain titles were similar enough to be grouped together. The changing titles in the 
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occupational codes across the PUMS present a problem for the study. This problem is 
resolved by identifying occupational codes whose titles have remained consistent 
between the 1950 and 2008 PUMS. Two rules are created for matching the disparate 
occupational codes. 
The first rule is if the codes contain the same title(s) in all ten PUMS, they are 
matched together and are given one consistent occupational code based on the 2005 ACS 
coding structure. The new assigned code is labeled “recode” to differentiate between 
what code is assigned by the Census and ACS and what code is assigned by this study. 
Each recode represents one “selected occupation” in this study. The second rule is if there 
are PUMS years when previously existing title(s) under one code are split into two codes 
but no additional title(s) are added, this study combines the split codes into one code 
during the “split years” and the combined code is matched with the codes of the “non-
split” years. The matched “split” and “non-split” codes are then assigned a consistent 
recode. Each recode is a four digit number that is also based on the 2005 ACS coding 
structure; the fourth digit in each recode is “1,” and it signifies a selected occupation that 
has been split at some point in the PUMS. For example, “lawyers and judges” are 
assigned code “055” in the 1950 Census and code “105” in the 1960 Census. The 
occupation titles are split into two codes for the 1970 through 2000 Census: code “30” for 
judges and code “31” for lawyers in the 1970 Census, code “178” for lawyers and code 
“179” for judges in the 1980 and 1990 Census, code “210” for lawyers and code “211” 
for “judges, magistrates, and other judicial workers” in the 2000 Census.24 The 
occupational titles are then regrouped in the 2005 through 2008 ACS as code “210.” 
                                                          
24 Judicial workers do not include people in assistant positions like clerks or security personnel. 
They only include people who have power similar to those of judges.  
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These disparate occupational codes are matched up and then reassign the recode “2101” 
to create coding consistency. Recode “2101” is considered one selected occupation. 
There are eight other selected occupations with the same “split” and “non-split” codes 
like recode 2101: recode “2051” for “directors, religious activities and education and all 
other religious workers,” recode “2301” for “preschool, kindergarten, elementary, middle 
school, and secondary school teachers,” recode 2441 for “library technicians and clerical 
library assistants,” recode “2811” for news analysts, reporters, correspondents, and 
editors,” recode “4051” for “combined food preparation and serving workers, including 
fast food and counter attendants, cafeteria, food concession, and coffee shop,” recode 
5701 for “secretaries, administrative assistants, word processors, and typists,” recode 
8241 for “job printers, prepress technicians and workers, and printing machine 
operators,” and recode “9351” for “parking lot and service station attendants.”  
The result of the recoding procedure are reported in ten Occupational Bridge 
Codes tables entitled “code50” for the 1950 Census, “code60” for the 1960 Census, 
“code70” for the 1970 Census, “code80” for the 1980 Census, “code90” for the 1990 
Census, “code00” for the 2000 Census, “code05” for the 2005 ACS, “code06” for the 
2006 ACS, “code07” for the 2007 ACS, and “code08” for the 2008 ACS. The tables 
“code05,” “code06,” “code07,” and “code08” are exactly the same because the ACS last 
changed its coding scheme in 2005. Interested readers can access the Occupational bridge 
Codes tables at https://sites.google.com/site/bridgecodes/.   
The occupational title comparability requirement restricts the study’s analysis to 
selected occupations, suggesting there may be a problem of sample selection bias. 
Heckman (1979) noted selection bias exists when the sampled individuals select 
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themselves into a researcher’s study. Heckman showed parameter estimates are biased 
when regression models do not control for selection bias. Heckman’s solution for 
selection bias is a two step procedure. In the first step, the researcher constructs a 
selection model to estimate 𝜆 or the probability of a sampled individual being selected 
into the study. In the second step, 𝜆 is incorporated into the wage model to account for 
selection bias. In other words, the failure to correct for selection bias is equivalent to 
omitting an important explanatory variable of wage determination.   
If sample selection bias does exist in this study, then the bias is an arbitrary 
occurrence caused by the Census’ and ACS’s occupational categorization decisions. The 
Census and ACS do not publish information about the methods used in deciding how 
occupational titles are grouped together. Furthermore, it would not have been possible to 
make an educated guess as to why individuals choose to work in selected occupations 
even if the Census’s and ACS’s occupational categorization methodology is known. 
Without being able to determine systematic cause(s) of the selection bias, this possible 
problem cannot be corrected. 
Comparability of Wage Variable 
  The Census and ACS have a practice of “top coding” the wage variable.  Sampled 
individuals who reported wages above a predetermined ceiling are assigned the ceiling, 
or “top coded” value. The Census and ACS argued top coding is necessary to maintain 
the confidentiality of top income earners because there are fewer observations of top 
earners than observations of median and low income earners (U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1992, 3-1). The Census used a national top-coded wage value for the 1950 through 1980 
PUMS. The top-coded values for these years in chronological order are $10,000, 
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$25,000, $50,000, and $75,000. The Census switched to a state-level, top-coding scheme 
in the 1990 PUMS. Individuals who earned above the national ceiling of $140,000 had 
their wages and salaries top coded with the median value of all above-national-ceiling 
earners in their states of residence. The Census adopted a similar coding scheme in the 
2000 PUMS, which resulted in earners being coded above the national ceiling of 
$175,000 with the mean value of all above-national-ceiling earners in their states of 
residency. The bureau did not report how it decided on the published national ceilings in 
the PUMS except for census year 1990. The 1990 PUMS codebook contained the 
following statement about the national ceiling value: 
Most economic items were topcoded on a national basis.  The criteria used 
was whether the topcode protected either ½ of 1% of total universe or 3% 
of the cases with the characteristic.  In most instances, we used the value 
that was more favorable to the user (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992, C-
1). 
  
 A request was made with the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of 
the Minnesota Population Center, a federally funded research project whose mission is to 
collect and distribute census data, for assistance on finding the rule the Census used to set 
national wage ceiling values in other PUMS. Brandon Trampe, an IPUMS researcher 
who answered the request, was not able to find the rule. Furthermore, Mr. Trampe said he 
did not know of any individual who has completed research to determine how the Census 
sets its wage and salary ceiling.25 Interested readers should refer to Appendix B to view 
the electronic mail correspondences between this study’s author and Mr. Trampe.    
                                                          
25 Mr. Trampe also performed calculations to show that the variable wage is top-coded by state of 
residency and not state of employment. This top coding scheme is problematic because there are 
individuals who do not work and live in the same states. For example, some individuals work in Missouri 
but live in Kansas and vice versa. The top coding scheme rules out the possibility of controlling for state 
legislations that may affect the power status of workers in an occupation in a given state. For example, the 
variables UnionPer and BargainPer are included to account for the occupation’s bargaining power via 
unionization; however, a union’s ability to affect the wage bargaining process is limited by the law of the 
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The ACS eliminated the national ceiling coding scheme in its PUMS beginning in 
2005. The ACS set the ceiling at 99.5 percentile of the reported wages for each individual 
state. Individuals who earned above the state ceiling were assigned the mean value for all 
observations above that ceiling. The ACS’s top coding scheme results in 50 state-level 
wage ceilings for each PUMS. This dissertation addresses the incomparability between 
the Census’s national ceiling and the ACS’s state ceiling by imposing a national-level top 
code requirement on the ACS PUMS. The national ceiling in each ACS PUMS is set at 
the value of the state with the lowest top code. The state of West Virginia reported the 
lowest state-level top code for four consecutive years between 2005 and 2008, so its top 
codes were used as national ceilings. The assigned national ceiling values for the ACS in 
chronological order is $132,000, $143,000, $239,000, and $238,000. The assigned ceiling 
values ensured all individuals whose wages are top coded by the ACS would be identified 
in the wage regressions. The drawback of this practice is that it results in a larger 
proportion of individuals having top-coded wages than in the original PUMS. 
The practice of top coding wages is equivalent to censoring true data values. 
Tobin (1958) observed ordinary least squares estimation of censored data results in 
biased estimates. Tobin showed the censored data problem can be overcome by utilizing 
an index regression model (Greene 2008, 869): ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖∗ = 𝑥𝑖′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖, ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 𝑎 𝑖𝑓 ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖∗ ≥ 𝑎 ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 = ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖∗  𝑖𝑓 ln𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖∗ < 𝑎 
                                                                                                                                                                             
state in which their chapters reside. Right to work legislation illegalizes a union’s “closed shop” policy. The 
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation reports 23 states currently have some form of right to 
work legislation (http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm). Since it is not possible to control for state of employment, 
this dissertation cannot examine the wage effects of right to work legislation and the interaction between a 
right to work legislation dummy and UnionPer or BargainPer.   
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where 
𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 = vector of regressors  
𝑎 = national ceiling value in each Census or ACS PUMS, which is reported in previous 
paragraphs.   
Greene (2008) showed Tobin’s censored regression model (also called the “tobit 
model”) can be estimated using a log-likelihood function: 
ln 𝐿 = � −12
𝑦𝑖>0
�log(2𝜋) + 𝑙𝑛𝜎2 + (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖′𝛽)2
𝜎2
� + � ln [1 −Φ�𝑥𝑖′𝛽
𝜎
�
𝑦𝑖=0
 
The first part in the above function is the classical regression for the continuous 
observations, and the second part corresponds to the relevant probabilities for the 
censored observations (Greene 2008, 874-875). The estimated mean and the variance are 
as follows (Greene 2008, p. 871): 
𝐸[𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒] = 𝑎(1 −Φ) + [𝜇 + 𝜎𝜆]Φ 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒] = 𝜎2Φ[(1 − 𝛿) + (𝛼 − 𝜆2)(1 −Φ)] 
where 𝛼 = 𝑎−𝜇
𝜎
,𝜙(𝛼)𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝜆(𝛼) = −𝜙(𝛼)
Φ(𝛼)  
Occupational Information Network  
 The Occupational Information Network, or O*NET, is an online database 
sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor/Employment and Training Administration 
and the North Carolina Employment Security Commission. O*NET contains information 
about physical and mental demands of hundreds of occupations, which closely mirror the 
occupational codes in the Census and ACS PUMS. This dissertation utilizes the 
occupational characteristics in the O*NET to construct measures of physical hardship, 
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mental stress, and lack of work autonomy occupations. The physical hardship index 
contains 24 characteristics, and the characteristics are listed in Table 3.2 below. O*NET 
assigns a “grade” for each of the 24 work condition characteristics; each grade is 
measured on a scale between 0 and 100. The average of the 24 grades is calculated and 
then assigned as the mean degree of physical hardship (Physical) suffered when 
employed in the selected occupation.    
TABLE 3.2 
CHARACTERISTICS INCLUDED IN THE PHYSICAL HARDSHIP INDEX 
1. Frequency of being in cramped work space or awkward positions 
2. Frequency of dealing with physically aggressive people 
3. Frequency of being exposed to contaminants 
4. Frequency of being exposed to disease or infections 
5. Frequency of being exposed to hazardous conditions 
6. Frequency of being exposed to hazardous equipment 
7. Frequency of being exposed to high places 
8. Frequency of being exposed to minor burns, cuts, bites, or stings 
9. Frequency of being exposed to radiation 
10. Frequency of being exposed to whole body vibration 
11. Frequency of being exposed to extremely bright or inadequate lighting 
12. Frequency of working indoors in non-controlled environmental conditions 
13. Frequency of working outdoors and being exposed to the weather 
14. Frequency of being exposed to distracting/uncomfortable noise levels 
15. Frequency of spending time bending and twisting one’s body 
16. Frequency of spending time climbing ladders, scaffolds, or poles 
17. Frequency of spending time keeping or regaining balance 
18. Frequency of spending time kneeling, crouching, stooping, or crawling 
19. Frequency of spending time sitting 
20. Frequency of spending time standing  
21. Frequency of spending time walking and running 
22. Frequency of working in very hot or cold temperatures 
23. Frequency of having to wear common protective or safety equipment such as 
safety shoes, glasses, gloves, hearing protection, hard hates, or life jackets 
24. Frequency of having to wear specialized protective or safety equipment such as 
breathing apparatus, safety harness, full protection suits, or radiation protection. 
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The mental stress index contains twelve characteristics, and they are listed in 
Table 3.3 below. The average of the twelve grades is assigned as the mean degree of 
mental stress (Mental) suffered when employed in the selected occupation.  
TABLE 3.3 
CHARACTERISTICS INCLUDED IN THE MENTAL STRESS INDEX 
1. Seriousness of making a mistake that was not readily correctable 
2. Degree of being in contact with others to perform one’s work tasks 
3. Degree of importance of coordinating and/or leading others to accomplish one’s 
work tasks 
4. Frequency of dealing with unpleasant, angry, or discourteous individuals as part 
of one’s job requirements 
5. Frequency of facing conflict situations 
6. Frequency of making decisions that affect other people, financial resources, 
and/or image and reputation of one’s firm of employment 
7. Degree with which one’s decisions impact the results of coworkers, clients, and 
firm of employment 
8. Importance of being exact or accurate 
9. Degree of competitive pressures as part of one’s job requirements 
10. Degree of being responsible for work outcomes and results of other workers 
11. Degree of being responsible for the health and safety of others 
12. Degree for worker to meet strict deadlines as part of one’s job requirements 
 
 
The index accounting for the lack of freedom to control one’s work tasks and pace 
of work (WrkFreedom) has five measures, which are listed in Table 3.4. The average of 
these five grades is calculated and then assigned as the “mean degree” of the lack of work 
freedom (WrkFreedom) in the selected occupation. 
The decision to use mean grade indices instead of individual work condition 
measures as controls is because the theory of compensating differentials does not identify 
specific undesirable work conditions that are associated with pecuniary rewards. For 
example, the theory states workers who are employed in physically demanding 
occupations earn wage premiums, but it does not say whether a specific physically 
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TABLE 3.4 
CHARACTERISTICS INCLUDED IN THE LACK OF WORK FREEDOM INDEX 
1. Degree of work automation 
2. Importance of repeating the same physical or mental activities over and over, 
without stopping 
3. Degree in which one’s work tasks are determined by the speed of equipment or 
machinery 
4. Degree in which one is required to make repetitive motions 
5. Extent to which one’s work tasks, priorities, and goals are determined by 
superiors and not oneself. 
 
demanding work condition is more important than another condition. England et al. 
(1988), Filer (1989), Jacobs and Steinberg (1990), and Macpherson and Hirsch (1990) 
have operationalized compensating differentials theory by selecting measures they deem 
are important wage determinants, but their variable selections differ from each other to a 
great extent. This approach is problematic if one considers the variation of working 
conditions within occupations. An occupation may be deemed physically demanding 
when examined from the lens of one specific work condition measure but is not 
physically demanding from the perspective of another measure. The mean grade 
approach gives equal weight to each measure, thus allowing one to gauge the average 
physical, mental, or work freedom un-desirableness of an occupation. Interested readers 
can find the Physical, Mental, and WrkFreedom mean grades for each selected 
occupation at https://sites.google.com/site/bridgecodes/. 
Occupational Outlook Handbooks 
 The Occupational Outlook Handbooks (OOHs) are used to construct three 
measures of occupational level bargaining power status: LicenseRe, LicenseVol, and 
Apprentice. The first OOH was published in 1949 as a joint project between the Bureau 
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of Labor Statistics and the Veterans Administration; the purpose of this publication was 
to aid returning veterans to prepare for civilian sector employment.  The OOHs provide 
entry level and career advancement information of hundreds of occupations. The OOH 
editions are matched up with the surveyed time periods in the Census and ACS PUMS. 
The 1949 OOH was used to construct the power variables in the 1950 PUMS because the 
reported wages refer to employment done during the 1949 calendar year. The 1959 OOH 
was paired with the 1960 PUMS, 1968-1969 OOH with the 1970 PUMS,26 1978-1979 
OOH with the 1980 PUMS, 1988-1989 OOH with the 1990 PUMS, 1989-1999 OOH 
with the 2000 PUMS, 2004-2005 OOH with the 2005 PUMS, 2006-2007 OOH with the 
2006 and 2007 PUMS, and the 2008 OOH with the 2008 PUMS.      
 Two rules are created for coding the OOH’s description of a selected occupation 
into power dummies. The first rule is if the description clearly states a required license or 
certification (LicenseRe) or required apprenticeship (Apprentice) or voluntary license or 
certification (LicenseVol) exists, then occupation is assigned a value of “1” for the given 
variable of interest; otherwise, the occupation is assigned a value of “0” for the variable. 
The second rule is called the “rule of precedence” and refers to cases where the OOH 
edition under consideration does not contain information about a given selected 
occupation. The rule of precedence is specified below: 
1) If the power variable under consideration is coded as 0 in both the preceding and 
subsequent PUMS, then it is coded as 0 in the current PUMS. 
2) If the power variable under consideration is coded as 1 in both the preceding and 
subsequent PUMS, then it is coded as 1 in the current PUMS. 
                                                          
26 The Bureau of Labor Statistics moved to a biannual edition of the OOH in this year.   
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3) If the power variable under consideration is coded as 1 in the preceding PUMS 
but coded as 0 in the subsequent PUMS, then it is coded as 1 in the current 
PUMS. 
4) If the power variable under consideration is coded as 0 in the preceding PUMS 
but coded as 1 in the subsequent PUMS, then it is coded as 0 in the current 
PUMS. 
5) If there is no information about the power variable under consideration (missing 
value) in the preceding PUMS but it is coded as 0 in the subsequent PUMS, then 
it is coded as 0 in the current PUMS. 
6) If there is no information about the power variable under consideration (missing 
value) in the preceding PUMS, but it is coded as 1 in the subsequent PUMS, then 
it is coded as 0 in the current PUMS. 
7) If the power variable under consideration is coded as 0 in the preceding PUMS, 
but no information is available in the subsequent PUMS (missing value), then it is 
coded as 0 in the current PUMS. 
8) If the power variable under consideration is coded as 1 in the preceding PUMS 
but no information is available in the subsequent PUMS (missing value), then it is 
coded as 1 in the current PUMS. 
9) Since there is no preceding PUMS to compare the 1950 Census against, I code all 
missing values in the 1950 PUMS as 0. Likewise, since there is no subsequent 
PUMS to compare the 2008 ACS against, I code the missing values in the 2008 
PUMS with the information provided by the previous PUMS. There are 42 and 
nine selected occupations with missing values in the 1950 Census and 2008 ACS, 
 
 
80 
 
respectively. Consequently, it is likely that workers’ power to impose 
occupational entry requirements is not well represented in the 1950 Census 
sample. 
Union Membership and Coverage Database 
 The two other power variables included in the wage models are percentage of 
workers in occupation who have union membership status (UnionPer) and percentage of 
workers in occupation covered by collective bargaining agreements (BargainPer). The 
information for these two variables is taken from Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson’s 
Union Membership and Coverage Database. Interested readers can access the database 
at http://unionstats.gsu.edu/. Hirsch and Macpherson reported union membership and 
collective bargaining agreements information for the year 1983 and forward, and their 
data are collected from the March supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS). 
Consequently, wage effects of UnionPer and BargainPer are only examined for the 
period between 1990 Census through 2008 ACS. The 1989 union statistics file provides 
the union and collective bargaining information needed to examine the wage effects of 
UnionPer and BargainPer in the 1990 PUMS; the 1999 union statistics file with the 2000 
PUMS, 2005 file with 2005 PUMS, 2006 file with 2006 PUMS, 2007 file with 2007 
PUMS, and 2008 file with 2008 PUMS.    
Interested readers should access https://sites.google.com/site/bridgecodes/ and 
navigate to the Occupational Bridge Codes tables to view required licensing or 
certification (LicenseReq), voluntary licensing or certification (LicenseVol), required 
apprenticeship (Apprentice), union membership coverage (UnionPer), and collective 
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bargaining agreement coverage (BargainPer) information of the 103 selected 
occupations.   
 This chapter has outlined the study’s hypotheses and explained the data and 
methods that will be used to examine the hypotheses. The next chapter presents the 
study’s findings.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 Chapter 4 is divided into three sections. The first section reports demographic and 
work-related characteristics of individuals employed in selected occupations in the ten 
PUMS. The second section discusses the selection of the preferred wage models for each 
PUMS. The third section compares the findings with the hypotheses made in Chapter 3.   
Demographic and Occupational Characteristics of Male and Female Workers in 
Selected Occupations 
Table 4.1 compares the number of men and women who work in the 103 selected 
occupations to the number of male and female workers in all occupations. It is important 
to note that Table 4.1 only accounts for the number of men and women who are at least 
16 years old, report wages earned for the survey period, have assigned occupational 
codes, and have either part-time or full-time work status. Table 1 shows approximately 
30% of male workers and 40% of female workers are employed in the selected 
occupations. Hence, even though the 103 selected occupations make up a small 
proportion of all occupations listed in the PUMS, they include a significant number of 
workers. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is because the selected occupations 
make up the traditional, well-established segment of the overall labor market. Also, it 
seems female workers are more likely than their male counterparts to gravitate towards 
this traditional segment; thus, this dissertation examines male and female wage 
experience in a more feminized segment than the overall labor force.  
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 TABLE 4.1 
 
PROPORTIONS OF MALE AND FEMALE WORKERS EMPLOY IN THE 
SELECTED OCCUPATIONS 
 
PUMS Total Male Selected  
Male 
Total MaleSelected Male Total Female Selected Female Total FemaleSelected Female 
       
1950 Census 78,222 21,459 27.43% 28,299 11,412 40.33% 
1960 Census 296,507 83,405 28.13% 121,431 51,003 42.00% 
1970 Census 369,173 111,830 30.29% 191,829 86,526 45.11% 
1980 Census 469,406 140,867 30.01% 340,126 151,068 44.42% 
1990 Census 530,834 160,860 30.30% 446,655 193,721 43.37% 
2000 Census 607,177 171,962 28.32% 530,864 208,340 39.25% 
2005 ACS 618,598 176,416 28.52% 562,984 229,784 40.82% 
2006 ACS 636,261 182,582 28.70% 577,191 234,644 40.65% 
2007 ACS 641,330 184,292 28.74% 584,275 237,134 40.59% 
2008 ACS 659,626 188,885 28.64% 614,280 251,412 40.93% 
 
Table 4.2 reports the number of selected men and women and their mean values 
for ten demographic and work-related characteristics in the selected occupations by 
PUMS year. Men outnumber women in the selected occupations in the 1950, 1960, and 
1970 Census, but women begin to outnumber men in the 1980 Census. Women’s share of 
the selected occupations increased with each subsequent PUMS. While women’s 
participation in 103 selected occupations increases over time, their share of the feminized 
selected occupation increases in the early postwar decades and then declines in recent 
decades. Women in the 1950 Census work in selected occupations with a mean ratio of 
female-to-total workers (FEM) of 0.754. Women work in selected occupations with a 
mean FEM ratio of 0.826 in the 1970 Census. Women move out of the female selected  
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TABLE 4.2 
MEAN VALUES OF SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC AND OCCUPATIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS IN THE SELECTED OCCUPATIONS 
 
Characteristic PUMS 
  
 1950 Census  
1960 Census 
 
1970 Census 
 
 Male  
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
n = 21,459 11,412 83,405 51,003 111,830 86,526 
 
W 3,161.410 
(1,535.651) 
2,139.507 
(1,015.74) 
 
5,561.183 
(2,998.788) 
3,288.588 
(1,696.963) 
8,741.694 
(5,497.317) 
5,023.520 
(2,939.344) WfWm 0.677 0.591 0.575   
Age 40.899 
(12.247) 
35.372 
(12.721) 
41.321 
(12.782) 
39.070 
(13.249) 
41.014 
(13.563) 
38.874 
(13.993) 
 
Schooling 10.563 
(3.362) 
11.939 
(2.721) 
11.363 
(3.388) 
12.112 
(2.486) 
12.004 
(3.127) 
12.521 
(2.303) 
 
Exp 25.336 
(14.408) 
18.433 
(13.234) 
24.958 
(14.039) 
21.958 
(13.696) 
24.009 
(14.646) 
21.353 
(14.404) 
 
FEM 0.113 
(0.210) 
0.754 
(0.247) 
0.162 
(0.250) 
0.825 
(0.220) 
0.211 
(0.262) 
0.826 
(0.220) 
 
Mental 60.598 
(7.266) 
59.137 
(7.338) 
60.501 
(7.345) 
59.372 
(7.772) 
60.223 
(7.715) 
59.038 
(7.823) 
 
Physical 35.889 
(14.522) 
18.796 
(8.535) 
34.861 
(14.672) 
18.871 
(8.170) 
33.690 
(14.642) 
18.717 
(8.240) 
 
WrkFreedom 47.143 
(8.602) 
51.600 
(9.218) 
46.963 
(8.592) 
51.190 
(8.948) 
46.485 
(8.287) 
50.453 
(8.632) 
 
LicenseRe 0.053 
(0.224) 
0.163 
(0.370) 
0.171 
(0.376) 
0.210 
(0.407) 
0.173 
(0.379) 
0.217 
(0.413) 
 
LicenseVol 0.122 
(0.328) 
0.042 
(0.200) 
0.116 
(0.320) 
0.023 
(0.151) 
0.116 
(0.320) 
0.026 
(0.158) 
 
Apprentice 0.203 
(0.402) 
0.011 
(0.102) 
0.061 
(0.239) 
0.008 
(0.086) 
0.073 
(0.260) 
0.007 
(0.081) 
 
UnionPer -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 
BargainPer -- -- -- -- -- -- 
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TABLE 4.2: Continued    
 
Characteristic PUMS 
  
 1980 Census 
 
1990 Census 
 
2000 Census 
 
 Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
n = 140,867 151,068 160,860 193,721 171,962 208,340 
 
W 16,521.627 
(11,682.038) 
8,760.920 
(6,178.400) 
28,628.271 
(23,673.216) 
16,827.970 
(13,134.897) 
38,616.698 
(33,037.150) 
25,883.418 
(21,026.754) 
 WfWm 0.530 0.588  0.670  
Age 38.575 
(14.038) 
36.187 
(13.726) 
39.413 
(13.528) 
38.175 
(13.146) 
40.679 
(13.520) 
40.146 
(13.216) 
 
Schooling 12.877 
(3.004) 
12.951 
(2.328) 
13.223 
(2.749) 
13.251 
(2.290) 
13.240 
(2.785) 
13.521 
(2.378) 
 
Exp 20.698 
(14.701) 
18.237 
(14.043) 
21.190 
(13.753) 
19.924 
(13.348) 
22.438 
(13.446) 
21.625 
(13.225) 
 
FEM 0.252 
(0.253) 
0.791 
(0.240) 
0.309 
(0.262) 
0.755 
(0.229) 
0.321 
(0.277) 
0.755 
(0.217) 
 
Mental 60.622 
(8.248) 
59.168 
(8.289) 
60.709 
(8.500) 
59.636 
(8.520) 
60.848 
(8.552) 
60.553 
(8.930) 
 
Physical 33.165 
(14.476) 
19.768 
(8.562) 
32.253 
(14.406) 
20.359 
(8.570) 
32.454 
(14.432) 
21.244 
(8.583) 
 
WrkFreedom 45.820 
(8.277) 
49.385 
(8.496) 
45.786 
(8.335) 
49.037 
(8.793) 
45.706 
(8.202) 
47.978 
(8.669) 
 
LicenseRe 
 
0.168 
(0.374) 
0.248 
(0.432) 
0.176 
(0.381) 
0.273 
(0.446) 
0.248 
(0.432) 
0.336 
(0.472) 
 
LicenseVol 
 
0.156 
(0.363) 
0.056 
(0.230) 
0.151 
(0.358) 
0.089 
(0.285) 
0.200 
(0.400) 
0.258 
(0.437) 
 
Apprentice 
 
0.116 
(0.321) 
0.011 
(0.104) 
0.089 
(0.284) 
0.006 
(0.075) 
0.076 
(0.265) 
0.013 
(0.115) 
 
UnionPer -- -- 21.041 
(18.464) 
15.330 
(14.565) 
17.742 
(16.125) 
15.212 
(14.455) 
 
BargainPer -- -- 23.431 
(19.330) 
18.016 
(16.575) 
19.253 
(16.742) 
17.118 
(15.792) 
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TABLE 4.2: Continued  
 
Characteristic PUMS  
 2005 ACS 
 
2006 ACS 
 
2007 ACS 
 
 Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
n = 176,416 229,784 182,582 234,644 184,292 237,134 
 
W 44,059.307 
(33,774.529) 
31,343.414 
(24,345.415) 
45,191.478 
(35,413.331) 
32,301.715 
(25,370.351) 
50,184.078 
(47,180.098) 
34,303.516 
(29,517.035) 
 WfWm 0.711 0.715  0.684   
Age 42.554 
(13.919) 
42.107 
(13.564) 
42.414 
(14.042) 
42.154 
(13.740) 
42.647 
(14.155) 
42.317 
(13.837) 
 
Schooling 13.584 
(2.682) 
13.828 
(2.335) 
13.572 
(2.700) 
13.838 
(2.334) 
13.603 
(2.686) 
13.889 
(2.335) 
 
Exp 23.970 
(13.800) 
23.278 
(13.627) 
23.842 
(13.886) 
23.316 
(13.785) 
24.044 
(14.001) 
23.428 
(13.884) 
 
FEM 0.345 
(0.278) 
0.757 
(0.212) 
0.342 
(0.279) 
0.753 
(0.211) 
0.346 
(0.279) 
0.751 
(0.209) 
 
Mental 61.169 
(8.775) 
60.846 
(8.996) 
61.131 
(8.799) 
60.884 
(9.019) 
61.179 
(8.803) 
60.972 
(9.045) 
 
Physical 31.381 
(14.401) 
21.041 
(8.442) 
31.533 
(14.453) 
21.111 
(8.419) 
31.387 
(14.424) 
21.152 
(8.390) 
 
WrkFreedom 45.373 
(8.083) 
47.438 
(8.615) 
45.343 
(8.046) 
47.439 
(8.610) 
45.326 
(8.020) 
47.315 
(8.607) 
 
LicenseRe 0.297 0.358 0.297 0.360 0.300 0.365 
 
 
(0.457) (0.480) 
 
(0.457) (0.480) (0.458) (0.482) 
 
LicenseVol 
 
 
Apprentice 
0.228 
(0.419) 
 
0.078 
(0.269) 
 
0.113 
(0.317) 
 
0.002 
(0.041) 
0.192 
(0.394) 
 
0.080 
(0.271) 
0.093 
(0.290) 
 
0.002 
(0.040) 
0.193 
(0.395) 
 
0.081 
(0.273) 
0.095 
(0.294) 
 
0.002 
(0.041) 
 
UnionPer 
 
16.062 
(14.913) 
15.669 
(14.719) 
15.241 
(14.181) 
14.911 
(14.296) 
15.422 
(14.549) 
15.447 
(14.496) 
 
BargainPer 17.440 
(15.740) 
17.559 
(15.960) 
16.354 
(15.224) 
16.385 
(16.017) 
16.725 
(15.208) 
17.204 
(15.799) 
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TABLE 4.2: Continued  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Characteristic              PUMS 
  
2008 ACS 
 
 Male 
 
Female 
  
n = 188,885 251,412 
 
 
W 51,271.203 
(47,813.204) 
35,681.981 
(30,405.595) 
 
 
WfWm 0.696  
Age 42.876 
(14.285) 
42.598 
(13.920) 
 
 
Schooling 13.603 
(2.759) 
13.915 
(2.396) 
 
 
Exp 24.273 
(14.187) 
23.683 
(14.024) 
 
 
FEM 0.349 
(0.281) 
0.752 
(0.208) 
 
 
Mental 61.147 
(8.823) 
61.081 
(9.013) 
 
 
Physical 31.230 
(14.331) 
21.196 
(8.289) 
 
 
WrkFreedom 45.295 
(8.038) 
47.055 
(8.680) 
 
 
LicenseRe 0.304 0.380  
 (0.460) (0.485) 
 
 
LicenseVol 0.195 0.095  
 
 
Apprentice 
(0.396) 
 
0.080 
(0.271) 
(0.293) 
 
0.001 
(0.037) 
 
 
UnionPer 16.033 
(14.590) 
16.498 
(14.968) 
 
 
BargainPer 17.367 
(15.462) 
18.170 
(16.443) 
 
    
The standard deviation is reported in parentheses.  
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occupations beginning in the 1980 Census, and they work in occupations with a mean 
FEM ratio of 0.755 in 2000 Census and 0.752 in the 2008 ACS. The trend of women 
moving out of the feminized selected occupations coincides with the trend of men 
experiencing greater occupational feminization over time. Men work in selected 
occupations with a mean FEM ratio of 0.113 in the 1950 Census, 0.252 in the 1980 
Census, 0.321 in the 2000 Census, and 0.349 in the 2008 ACS. Despite these trends, men 
and women do not work with each other in selected occupations. Table 4.3 reports the 
nature of gender segregation in selected occupations. 𝑘𝑚 is the number of men in each 
PUMS who worked in selected occupations with a female-to-total workers ratio of less 
than 0.30. 𝑘𝑓 is the number of women who worked in selected occupations with a female-
to-total workers ratio of greater than 0.70. Approximately two of three women work in a 
selected occupation with more than 70% of female workers in any given PUMS. 
Approximately one of two men work in a selected occupation with less than 30% of 
female workers in any given PUMS. Women are more likely to work with other women 
and men with other men in selected occupations. 
In addition, men and women do not earn similar annual wages (W) in selected 
occupations (see Table 4.2). Men earn more than women in every PUMS, but women 
earn more as a proportion of male mean wage-over-time. The female-to-male mean wage 
ratio �𝑊𝑓
𝑊𝑚
� decreases from 0.677 in the 1950 Census to 0.591 in the 1960 Census. The 
ratio decreases to 0.530 in the 1980 Census, the lowest level in the ten PUMS. The 
gender mean wage ratio begins to increase again in the 1990 Census, registering at 0.588 
in that PUMS and 0.670 in the 2000 Census. The gender wage ratio stands at 0.696 in the 
2008 ACS. It is important to note that the decline in the female-to-male mean wage ratios  
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TABLE 4.3 
GENDER SEGREGATION IN THE SELECTED OCCUPATIONS 
 
 
                                    Male                                        Female 
   PUMS 𝑘𝑚 𝑛𝑚 𝑘𝑚 𝑛𝑚⁄  𝑘𝑓 𝑛𝑓 𝑘𝑓 𝑛𝑓⁄  
       1950 Census 18,998 21,459 0.885 7,854 11,412 0.688 
 
1960 Census 72,220 83,405 0.866 43,770 51,003 0.858 
 
1970 Census 86,135 111,830 0.770 74,495 86,526 0.861 
 
1980 Census 100,831 140,867 0.716 119,680 151,068 0.792 
 
1990 Census 91,118 160,860 0.566 135,862 193,721 0.701 
 
2000 Census 94,652 171,962 0.550 151,291 208,340 0.726 
 
2005 ACS 82,569 176,416 0.468 168,709 229,784 0.734 
 
2006 ACS 86,084 182,582 0.471 168,978 234,644 0.720 
 
2007 ACS 86,035 184,292 0.467 169,776 237,134 0.716 
 
2008 ACS 87,449 188,885 0.463 181,078 251,412 0.720 
       𝑘𝑚 is the number of sampled men who worked in selected occupations where FEM < 0.30 
𝑘𝑓 is the number of sampled women who worked in selected occupations where FEM > 0.70 
𝑛𝑚 is the total number of sampled men.  
𝑛𝑓 is the total number of sampled women. 
 
in the 1960 through 1980 Census coincides with the period in which working women 
enter the feminized selected occupations in large numbers, which results in working 
women outnumbering working men in the 1980 Census in the selected occupations. Also, 
the observed wage gap trend in selected occupations is consistent with the trend in all 
occupations. Table 4.2 reports the gender wage gaps in the selected occupations in every 
PUMS and Table 4.3 reports the same statistics in all occupations. The observed wage 
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gaps in the selected and all occupations are similar to those reported in Goldin (1990). 
She found women earned 60% of male wages between 1950 and 1980, and the wage gap 
began to narrow after 1980 (Goldin 1990, 62). 
TABLE 4.4 
MEAN MALE AND FEMALE ANNUAL WAGE IN ALL OCCUPATIONS 
 
PUMS Wm Wf 𝑊𝑓 𝑊𝑚⁄   
 
1950 Census 
 
3,025.81 
(1,675.65) 
 
1,899.341 
(1,021.627) 
 
0.628 
 
 
1960 Census 5,411.435 
(3,225.208) 
2,936.436 
(1,693.877) 
0.543 
 
 
1970 Census 8,772.720 
(5,793.016) 
4,561.924 
(2,922.764) 
0.520 
 
 
1980 Census 17,048.730 
(11,724.924) 
8,661.470 
(6,251.700) 
0.508 
 
 
1990 Census 29,208.433 
(23,068.908) 
16,913.250 
(13,211.904) 
0.579 
 
 
2000 Census 40,062.452 
(32,380.189) 
25,985.239 
(21,465.500) 
0.649 
 
 
2005 ACS 46,633.445 
(33,735.921) 
31,587.559 
(24,986.318) 
0.677 
 
 
2006 ACS 47,686.666 
(35,157.115) 
32,402.542 
(25,925.431) 
0.679 
 
 
2007 ACS 52,294.430 
(45,349.602) 
34,489.043 
(30,208.693) 
0.660 
 
 
2008 ACS 53,355.220 
(46,044.029) 
35,611.190 
(31,008.721) 
0.667 
 
 
The standard deviation is reported in parentheses.  
 
The gender wage gap in selected occupations cannot be explained by a gender 
difference in educational attainment because women, on average, have more years of 
schooling (Schooling) than men in every PUMS (see Table 4.2). Women have fewer 
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potential years of work experience (Expr) compared to men, but they have narrowed 
much of this gap over the decades. Women have 18.433 mean years of potential work 
experience whereas men have 25.336 mean years in the 1950 Census.27 The gap narrows 
to 21.625 and 22.438 mean years for women and men, respectively, by the 2000 Census. 
The narrowing of the gender gap of mean years of potential work experience may be 
attributed to the changes in demographics over time. Women employed in selected 
occupations in the early postwar years are much younger than their male counterparts. 
The female mean age is 35.372 years and the male mean age is 40.899 years in the 1950 
Census. The same statistics are 40.146 years for women and 40.679 years for men in the 
2000 Census.28   
Men and women do not share similar work environments (see Table 4.2). Men are 
employed in the selected occupations with a higher mean degree of physical hardship 
(Physical) and mental stress (Mental). Women are employed in selected occupations with 
a slightly higher mean degree of lack of work freedom (WrkFreedom). Men and women 
also do not work in occupations with similar bargaining power status. Women are more 
likely to work in selected occupations with licensing or certification entry requirement 
(LicenseRe) whereas men are more likely to work in selected occupations with voluntary 
licenses and certifications (LicenseVol). Men are also more likely to work in selected 
occupations with apprenticeship requirements for entry (Apprentice). Men work in 
occupations with higher mean rates of union membership (UnionPer) and collective 
                                                          
27 Years of potential work experience = an individual’s age – years of schooling – 5.  
 
28 Regression results of Models 7a and 7b indicate women earn higher wage premiums for their 
years of schooling compared to their male counterparts in every PUMS except the 1950 Census. On the 
other hand, men earn higher wage premiums than women for their years of potential work experience in 
every PUMS. Women’s wages are not correlated with schooling and are negatively correlated with 
potential work experience in the 1950 PUMS. Interested readers should refer to Appendix D to examine 
these regression coefficients. 
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bargaining coverage (BargainPer) than women, but their occupational union power status 
has been declining since the 1990 Census. Men have a mean occupational union 
membership incidence of 21.041% in the 1990 Census, 17.742% in the 2000 Census, and 
16.033% in the 2008 ACS. Male workers’ mean occupational collective bargaining 
coverage incidence is 23.431% in the 1990 Census, 19.253% in the 2000 Census, and 
17.367% in the 2008 ACS. Women experience no major changes in their mean 
occupational union membership or collective bargaining coverage percentage over time. 
Women have a mean union membership incidence of 15.330% and mean collective 
bargaining coverage incidence of 18.016% in the 1990 Census; the same percentages are 
16.498% and 18.170% in the 2008 ACS. 
Selection of the Preferred Wage Models 
 The selection of the preferred wage model for each PUMS is a two step process. 
First, the joint significance of the compensating differential and power variables of 
Models 7a and 7b is examined to determine whether the inclusion of these measures 
increase the predictive power of Model 2. Model 2 is the standard wage model that 
includes human capital and crowding variables. Second, the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) of Models 7a and 7b are examined; the wage model with the smaller AIC is chosen 
as the preferred wage model for the PUMS. 
Wald Tests of Joint Significance 
 Five Wald tests are performed on Models 7a and 7b. Tests of joint significance of 
three compensating differential variables, Mental, Physical, and WrkFreedom, and three 
power dummies, LicenseRe, LicenseVol, and Apprentice, are performed on Model 7a. 
The same Wald test of the compensating differential variables is also performed on  
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TABLE 4.5 
 
WALD TESTS PERFORMED ON MODEL 7A 
 
PUMS 𝐇𝟎: 𝛄𝟏 = 𝛄𝟐 = 𝛄𝟑 = 𝟎 𝐇𝟎: 𝛗𝟏 = 𝛗𝟐 = 𝛗𝟑 = 𝟎 
 
   
 Male Female Male Female 
 
1950 Census 8.31 185.20 174.89 125.19 
 
1960 Census 418.71 959.66 1,512.00 357.07 
 
1970 Census 804.29 981.55 1,281.80 367.91 
 
1980 Census 1,022.10 565.85 1,456.50 440.94 
 
1990 Census 2,345.30 3,606.20 2,310.50 380.11 
 
2000 Census 7,749.90 6,479.70 1,073.40 1,586.70 
 
2005 ACS 8,929.10 9,716.70 1,414.10 509.29 
 
2006 ACS 10,468.00 9,437.70 1,262.80 689.07 
 
2007 ACS 9,608.20 10,801.00 756.30 1,288.70 
 
2008 ACS 13,485.00 12,074.00 1,682.20 1,137.50 
 
 
The critical chi-square value when 𝛼 = 0.05 is 7.81 and 𝛼 = 0.01 is 11.34 
𝐻0: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 𝛾3 = 0. This is the null hypothesis of the Wald test of the compensating differential 
variables. 
𝐻0: 𝜑1 = 𝜑2 = 𝜑3 = 0. This is the null hypothesis of the Wald test of the three power dummy variables. 
 
 
Model 7b, along with a Wald test of the two non-dummy power variables, UnionPer and 
BargainPer, and another test of all five power variables. Table 4.5 reports the calculated 
chi-square test statistics for the restricted Model 7a without the compensating differential 
variables and the power dummies, respectively. The Wald tests show the compensating 
differentials and power coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
of significance in the male and female Model 7a in all PUMS with the exception of the 
1950 Census. The compensating differential measures are significantly different from 
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zero at the 5% level of significance but not the 1% level of significance in the male 
Model 7a in the 1950 Census. 
Table 4.6 reports the calculated chi-square test statistics for the restricted Model 
7b without the compensating differentials, the non-dummy power, and all five power 
variables, respectively. The coefficients of the compensating differential and five 
bargaining power status variables are statistically and significantly different from zero at 
the 1% level of significance in all PUMS. The non-dummy power variables, UnionPer 
and BargainPer, are statistically different from zero at the 1% level of significance for all 
PUMS with the exception of female workers in the 2007 ACS. The Wald tests on Model  
7b indicate it has greater predictive power than Model 7a when fitted to male and female 
samples from the 1990 Census through 2008 ACS, the lone exception being the female 
2007 ACS sample. 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Preferred Wage Models 
 Table 4.7 reports the AIC of Models 7a and 7b. AIC values are not available for 
Model 7b in the 1950 through 1980 Census because the model is not constructed for 
these PUMS due to the lack of occupational unionization information. However, Model 
7a has the smallest AIC value among all the constructed wage models for the 1950 
through 1980 Census for both sexes, which suggests Model 7a has the best goodness-of-
fit for these PUMS. Interested readers should refer to Appendix C to examine the AIC 
values of all ten wage models constructed for all male and female PUMS. The reported 
AIC values for Model 7b in the 1990 Census through 2008 ACS indicate Model 7b has a 
better goodness-of-fit in all PUMS except for the male 2007 ACS sample.  
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TABLE 4.6 
 
WALD TESTS PERFORMED ON MODEL 7B 
 
PUMS 𝐇𝟎: 𝛄𝟏 = 𝛄𝟐 = 𝛄𝟑 = 𝟎 𝐇𝟎: 𝛗𝟒 = 𝛗𝟓 = 𝟎 
     
 Male Female Male Female 
 
1990 Census 2,557.10 1,827.90 238.82 506.02 
 
2000 Census 7,383.70 351.36 3,348.90 643.80 
 
2005 ACS 8,704.20 4,935.60 358.31 1,063.20 
 
2006 ACS 9,961.20 5,031.50 885.30 934.30 
 
2007 ACS 5,652.00 9,783.10 717.77 1.20 
 
2008 ACS 12,377.00 6,786.70 513.06 850.27 
     
 𝐇𝟎:  𝛗𝟏 = 𝛗𝟐 = 𝛗𝟑 = 𝛗𝟒 = 𝛗𝟓 = 𝟎 
     
 Male Female   
 
1990 Census 2,544.90 886.28 
 
  
2000 Census 1,430.10 2,232.70 
 
  
2005 ACS 1,775.30 1,574.90 
 
  
2006 ACS 2,154.80 1,622.10 
 
  
2007 ACS 1,474.80 1,285.60 
 
  
2008 ACS 2,198.60 1,994.00   
 
The critical chi-square value when 𝛼 = 0.05 is 7.81 and 𝛼 = 0.01 is 11.34 
𝐻0: 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 𝛾3 = 0. This is the null hypothesis of the Wald test of the compensating differential 
variables. 
𝐻0: 𝜑4 = 𝜑5 = 0. This is the null hypothesis of the Wald test of the two power dummy variables. 
𝐻0 = 𝜑1 = 𝜑2 = 𝜑3 = 𝜑4 = 𝜑5 = 0. This is the null hypothesis of the Wald test of the five power 
variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 
 
TABLE 4.7 
 
AIKAIKE INFORMATION CRITERION VALUES OF MODELS 7A AND 7B 
 
PUMS            Model 7a           Model 7b 
 
 Male Female Male Female 
 
1950 Census 37,285 18,062 -- -- 
 
1960 Census 122,065 80,035 -- -- 
 
1970 Census 191,966 158,320 -- -- 
 
1980 Census 295,469 318,190 -- -- 
 
1990 Census 322,763 399,162 322,530 398,660 
 
2000 Census 341,873 405,694 341,523 405,056 
 
2005 ACS 347,199 467,491 346,845 466,434 
 
2006 ACS 382,857 486,149 381,978 485,220 
 
2007 ACS 390,473 492,415 390,477 491,700 
 
2008 ACS 396,528 504,303 396,018 503,451 
 
 
Table 4.8 reports the models selected as the preferred ones for men and women in 
each of the ten PUMS. Model 7a is chosen as the preferred wage model for males and 
females in the 1950 through 1980 Census. Model 7b is selected as the preferred wage 
model for both sexes in the 1990 and 2000 Census and 2005, 2006, and 2008 ACS. Each 
of the chosen models includes compensating differentials and power variables that have 
been determined to increase the predictive power of Model 2, which is the standard 
model that includes human capital and crowding variables. Each model also has the 
smallest AIC among the constructed models.    
The 2007 ACS is an exception from the other PUMS. Model 7a is chosen as the 
preferred wage model over Model 7b for both sexes. The Wald test of the joint  
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TABLE 4.8 
 
PREFERRED WAGE MODEL BY GENDER AND PUMS 
 
 
significance of UnionPer and BargainPer indicates the inclusion of these variables does 
not increase its predictive power over Model 7a for female workers. Also, Model 7b has a 
slightly larger AIC than Model 7a for male workers, suggesting the increase in predictive 
power from the inclusion of UnionPer and BargainPer does not outweigh the penalty 
imposed for using more variables. Nevertheless, Model 7b is the best performing model 
for both sexes in five out of six PUMS between 1990 Census and 2008 ACS. This result 
indicates that Model 7b would be the preferred model for the pre-1990 PUMS if 
information about occupational unionization and collective bargaining were available. 
 
PUMS 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
1950 Census 
 
Model 7a 
 
Model 7a 
 
1960 Census 
 
Model 7a 
 
Model 7a 
 
1970 Census 
 
Model 7a 
 
Model 7a 
 
1980 Census 
 
Model 7a 
 
Model 7a 
 
1990 Census 
 
Model 7b 
 
Model 7b 
 
2000 Census 
 
Model 7b 
 
Model 7b 
 
2005 ACS 
 
Model 7b 
 
Model 7b 
 
2006 ACS 
 
Model 7b 
 
Model 7b 
 
2007 ACS Model 7a Model 7a 
   
2008 ACS Model 7b Model 7b 
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Hypothesis Tests: Wage Effects of Compensating Differentials, Power, and 
Crowding Variables 
The preferred wage models are then fitted to their respective time-dependent 
Census and ACS PUMS to examine hypotheses made in Chapter 3. Interested readers 
should note the full estimates of the preferred wage model are not reported in the 
following discussion about the hypothesis tests. Readers should refer to Appendix D to 
view the complete estimated preferred models; there is also the option of downloading all 
seven estimated wage models (preferred and non-preferred) for the 1950 through 1980 
Census and ten estimated models for the 1990 Census through 2008 ACS by 
accessing https://sites.google.com/site/bridgecodes/. 
Wage Effects of Compensating Differentials Factors 
 Table 4.9 reports the regression coefficients of the compensating differentials 
variables. A hypothesis was made in Chapter 3 that both sexes should receive wage 
penalties when employed in selected occupations that are physically demanding and that 
lack work freedom because Jacobs and Steinberg (1990) reported these results. Also, 
workers employed in mentally stressful occupations should also receive wage premiums, 
which is consistent with Filer (1989). I find that men and women receive wage premiums 
when employed in selected occupations that are mentally stressful in all PUMS except 
the 1950 and 1960 Census. Women receive wage penalties in the 1950 and 1960 Census, 
and men receive no wage benefits in the 1950 but premiums in the 1960. Women also 
receive larger wage premiums compared to men in six out of eight PUMS between the 
1970 Census and 2008 ACS. Table 4.2 reports that men are employed in occupations 
with a slightly greater mean degree of mental stress compared to their female 
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TABLE 4.9 
WAGE EFFECTS OF COMPENSATING DIFFERENTIALS IN PREFERRED MODELS29 
 
PUMS Mental Physical WrkFreedom 
 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female 
 
1950 
Census 
0.000520 
(0.000632) 
-0.002202~ 
(0.001051) 
0.000201 
(0.000397) 
-0.008603* 
(0.000932) 
0.001297* 
(0.000537) 
0.004830* 
(0.000887) 
 
 
1960 
Census 
0.004506* 
(0.000267) 
-0.001114~ 
(0.000533) 
0.001517* 
(0.000182) 
-0.012008* 
(0.000481) 
0.001683* 
(0.000228) 
0.004042* 
(0.000431) 
 
 
1970 
Census 
0.006524* 
(0.000275) 
0.007363* 
(0.000437) 
-0.001839* 
(0.000187) 
-0.010813* 
(0.000390) 
0.000760* 
(0.000244) 
0.001632* 
(0.000384) 
 
 
1980 
Census 
0.005925* 
(0.000294) 
0.006901* 
(0.000366) 
-0.002775* 
(0.000218) 
-0.005325* 
(0.000308) 
0.003182* 
(0.000263) 
0.005909* 
(0.000320) 
 
 
1990 
Census 
0.007098* 
(0.000268) 
0.012523* 
(0.000338) 
-0.006819* 
(0.000233) 
-0.005418* 
(0.000289) 
0.002896* 
(0.000247) 
-0.000441 
(0.000283) 
 
 
2000 
Census 
0.016825* 
(0.000248) 
0.016881* 
(0.000301) 
-0.007150* 
(0.000232) 
-0.005151* 
(0.000233) 
-0.001709* 
(0.000223) 
-0.002192* 
(0.000250) 
 
 
2005 ACS 0.017968* 
(0.000249) 
0.018988* 
(0.000298) 
-0.007131* 
(0.000230) 
-0.008099* 
(0.000232) 
-0.002528* 
(0.000225) 
-0.001168* 
(0.000254) 
 
 
2006 ACS 0.019002* 
(0.000253) 
0.018671* 
(0.000296) 
-0.009230* 
(0.000234) 
-0.009743* 
(0.000227) 
-0.004900* 
(0.000241) 
-0.003563* 
(0.000263) 
 
 
2007 ACS 0.020203* 
(0.000252) 
0.022582* 
(0.000255) 
-0.007384* 
(0.000215) 
-0.009500* 
(0.000225) 
-0.003486* 
(0.000233) 
-0.001968* 
(0.000251) 
 
 
2008 ACS 0.021797* 
(0.000247) 
0.021007* 
(0.000270) 
-0.008419* 
(0.000232) 
-0.008281* 
(0.000215) 
-0.003770* 
(0.000230) 
-0.003680* 
(0.000242) 
 
The estimated standard error is reported in parentheses.  
* = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 1% level of significance. 
~ = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 5% level of significance. 
                                                          
29 The coefficients report in this table are taken from the estimated best fitting wage models, which the 
readers can find in Appendix D. Readers who want to compare the magnitude of the compensating differentials 
coefficients between the best fitting and non-best fitting models should refer to the dissertation website: 
https://sites.google.com/site/bridgecodes/. 
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counterparts in all ten PUMS. If women are receiving larger wage premiums when employed in 
mentally stressful occupations compared to men in six out of ten PUMS, then occupational 
mental stress is no longer a contributing factor to the gender wage gap.  
On the other hand, women receive wage penalties in all ten PUMS when employed in 
physically demanding selected occupations whereas men received penalties in the 1970 Census 
through 2008 ACS. Men receive wage premiums in the 1960 Census, but their wage is not 
correlated with the degree of physical hardship in selected occupations in the 1950 Census. In the 
eight PUMS where both sexes receive wage penalties, male workers receive larger penalties in 
four PUMS. Overall, male workers are employed in selected occupations with a higher mean 
degree of physical hardship than women, but they are not continuously rewarded for such 
employment decision.  This finding is not consistent with Filer (1989), who argues men should 
receive wage premiums because they are more likely to choose employment in physically 
demanding occupations. Occupational physical hardship, thus, does not contribute to the gender 
wage gap.  
Women do receive larger wage premiums compared to men when employed in selected 
occupations where they lack the freedom to determine their work tasks and pace of work 
between 1950 and 1980. Women’s wages are not correlated with the degree of lack of work 
freedom in the 1990 Census while men receive wage premiums. Both sexes receive wage 
penalties between the 2000 Census and 2008 ACS, but women earn smaller penalties compared 
to men. Table 4.2 reports that women are more likely to work in selected occupations that restrict 
their freedom to control their work tasks and pace of work compared to men; however, women 
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are also more likely to receive larger wage premiums prior to 1980 and smaller wage penalties 
starting in 2000 than men. As a consequence, the lack of occupational work freedom is not a 
contributing factor to the gender wage gap in the selected occupations.  
It is important to note that the change to a negative wage effect pattern from positive 
wage effect occurs in the 2000 Census, which is the second PUMS for which controls for the 
percentages of workers in a selected occupation who are union members (UnionPer) and who are 
covered by collective bargaining agreements (BargainPer) are used. The change in wage effect 
pattern resembles a state dependent phenomenon. Heckman (1991; 2001) notes a researcher’s 
observation of a relationship between two variables is dependent on the time period chosen in the 
study. Socioeconomic factors that influence the relationship under consideration may change 
through time, and these changes may in turn change the very nature of the correlation between 
the variables of interest. The correlation between wages and lack of work freedom in the selected 
occupations is positive between 1950 and 1980 for women and between 1950 and 1990 for men. 
The correlation turns negative between 2000 and 2008 for both sexes. The coefficient sign 
change occurs even though the same preferred model (Model 7b) is used between 1990 and 
2000. The study switches from Model 7a to Model 7b as the preferred model between 1980 and 
1990 due to data availability, but regression results show the correlation between wages and lack 
of work freedom is statistically negative for female workers in the 1990 Census whereas it has 
been positive in the 1980 Census. The male coefficient in Model 7a is also positive like it is in 
Model 7b in the 1990 Census. Model specification does not seem to be the likely explanation. 
Also, the study is examining the same group of occupations through time so this reduces the 
variation in the data as well; no new occupations are being introduced that may influence the 
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relationship between wages and lack of work freedom. Consequently, the change between 
receiving wage premiums in the pre-1990 samples to wage penalties in the post-1990 samples 
seem to demonstrate a state dependency phenomenon.   
Wage Effects of Gender Power Differences 
Table 4.10 reports the estimated coefficients of the five power variables—LicenseRe, 
LicenseVol, Apprentice, UnionPer, and BargainPer—in the preferred wage models. Men and 
women receive wage premiums, with women earning larger premiums, when employed in 
selected occupations with license or certification requirements between 1950 and 1980. Women 
continue to receive premiums after 1980, but the premiums begin to decline at a rapid pace until 
2006. Women receive a small wage penalty in 2007, but regain their premium in 2008. Male 
workers experience a gradual increase in their wage premiums until 2000, when they start to 
receive wage penalties through 2008. Furthermore, both sexes receive wage premiums when 
employed in occupations that offer voluntary licenses or certifications. Men earn larger 
premiums in occupations with this characteristic than women in nine out of ten PUMS. Table 4.2 
reports that women are more likely to work in selected occupations with required licenses and 
certifications whereas men are more likely to work in occupations with voluntary licensing and 
certification. Given the high level of gender segregation in the selected occupations, it is possible 
that female-dominated occupations have more formalized means of restricting entry while male-
dominated occupations have voluntary means of entry restriction. The regression results, thus, do 
not indicate women are negatively affected by occupational barriers to entry. On the contrary, 
both sexes benefit from these barriers.  
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TABLE 4.10 
WAGE EFFECTS OF POWER STATUS IN PREFERRED MODELS30 
 
PUMS LicenseRe LicenseVol Apprentice 
 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female 
 
1950 
Census 
0.094765* 
(0.023429) 
0.277853* 
(0.026128) 
0.171832* 
(0.013556) 
0.027878 
(0.027761) 
0.016634 
(0.013657) 
0.073627 
(0.050802) 
 
1960 
Census 
0.069010* 
(0.005734) 
0.238550* 
(0.012766) 
0.248221* 
(0.006769) 
0.076416* 
(0.016746) 
0.062122* 
(0.007839) 
0.038527 
(0.027847) 
 
1970 
Census 
0.085127* 
(0.005963) 
0.189459* 
(0.010309) 
0.209682* 
(0.006469) 
0.093679* 
(0.013969) 
0.065082* 
(0.007405) 
0.036987 
(0.026297) 
 
1980 
Census 
0.150675* 
(0.007341) 
0.175631* 
(0.009114) 
0.079590* 
(0.006308) 
0.112512* 
(0.009386) 
0.093284* 
(0.006677) 
0.015832 
(0.018362) 
 
1990 
Census 
0.205894* 
(0.006784) 
0.121930* 
(0.008983) 
0.170763 
(0.005557) 
0.090598* 
(0.006163) 
0.125364* 
(0.007178) 
0.290312* 
(0.021856) 
 
2000 
Census 
-0.054388* 
(0.004755) 
0.048299* 
(0.007482) 
0.127280* 
(0.004770) 
0.144454* 
(0.004344) 
0.056904* 
(0.007865) 
-0.096814* 
(0.014446) 
 
2005 ACS -0.073030* 
(0.004336) 
0.067786* 
(0.007268) 
0.147582* 
(0.004527) 
0.118945* 
(0.005066) 
0.108101* 
(0.007662) 
0.480560* 
(0.035829) 
 
2006 ACS -0.011814* 
(0.004572) 
0.072997* 
(0.007345) 
0.114401* 
(0.005256) 
0.072203* 
(0.007516) 
0.027059* 
(0.008376) 
0.331034* 
(0.036661) 
 
2007 ACS -0.038187* 
(0.004455) 
-0.027918 
(0.006191) 
0.157436* 
(0.004936) 
0.137300* 
(0.005476) 
0.094542* 
(0.007366) 
0.253849* 
(0.035253) 
 
2008 ACS -0.077437* 
(0.004414) 
0.043711* 
(0.006651) 
0.177442* 
(0.004940) 
0.147363* 
(0.005131) 
0.135959* 
(0.008088) 
0.403351* 
(0.037591) 
                                                          
30 The coefficients report in this table are taken from the estimated best fitting wage models, which the 
readers can find in Appendix D. Readers who want to compare the magnitude of the power coefficients between the 
best fitting and non-best fitting models should refer to the dissertation website: 
https://sites.google.com/site/bridgecodes/. 
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TABLE 4.10: Continued 
PUMS UnionPer BargainPer 
 
 Male Female Male Female 
     
1990 Census -0.010472* 
(0.001356) 
0.000232 
(0.002121) 
0.011506* 
(0.001278) 
-0.003585 
(0.001889) 
 
2000 Census -0.021726* 
(0.001698) 
0.046825* 
(0.002092) 
0.022293* 
(0.001601) 
-0.052398* 
(0.002261) 
 
2005 ACS -0.033731* 
(0.002450) 
0.076058* 
(0.002876) 
0.033475* 
(0.002301) 
-0.085158* 
(0.003106) 
 
2006 ACS 0.045816* 
(0.001551) 
-0.021100* 
(0.001767) 
-0.041464* 
(0.001432) 
0.018770* 
(0.001971) 
 
2007 ACS -- -- -- -- 
 
 
2008 ACS -0.039942* 
(0.001948) 
0.041787* 
(0.002068) 
0.038612* 
(0.001817) 
-0.049239* 
(0.002281) 
 
The estimated standard error is reported in parentheses.  
* = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 1% level of 
significance. 
~ = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 5% level of 
significance. 
 
 
Men and women have different experiences in occupations with apprenticeship 
requirement, however. Male workers receive wage premiums when employed in the 
selected occupations that have apprenticeship requirement in all PUMS except the 1950 
Census. Women’s wages are not correlated with occupational apprenticeship 
requirements between 1950 through 1980 Census. Women receive wage penalties in the 
2000 Census. They receive wage premiums in the 1990 Census and 2005 through 2008 
ACS, and their premiums are larger than men’s in these years. The coefficients of Model 
7a in the 1990 and 2000 Census have the same sign as the preferred model (Model 7b) 
for those years. The switching of coefficient signs do not seem to depend on model 
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specification, suggesting the relationship between wages and occupational apprenticeship 
requirement relationship is undergoing a state dependency change. Table 4.2 shows that 
women are much less likely to work in the selected occupations with apprenticeship 
requirement compared to their male counterparts and that women have also not increased 
their participation in these occupations over the years. It is thus possible that occupations 
with apprenticeship requirements are male-dominated, and women may have been 
penalized for being the minority until 1990. Women have overcome this impediment in 
terms of wage return, but they are still largely excluded from these occupations. 
 A hypothesis was made in Chapter 3 that men and women should receive wage 
premiums when employed in occupations with high percentages of union membership 
and collective bargaining coverage. Regression results show men do receive wage 
premiums when employed in selected occupations with high percentages of union 
membership in 1990 Census and 20006 ACS, but they receive wage penalties in the 2000 
Census, 2005 ACS, and 2008 ACS. This finding suggests the decline of unionization in 
male-dominated occupations has had a significant negative effect on wages of men 
employed in these occupations. Women have fared better than their male counterparts. 
Women receive wage premiums when employed in selected occupations with high 
unionization rate in 2000, 2005, and 2008. It is interesting to note that the female wage 
premiums coincide with a steady increase of unionization among female workers. 
Women’s mean occupational unionization rate is slightly larger than men’s in 2008. 
Consequently, it seems there is a reversal of fortune in the unionized selected 
occupations. Women are gaining ground and reaping benefits from unionism in their 
“female” occupations while men are being punished in their “male” occupations.   
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 Men and women also do not reap equal benefits when employed in selected 
occupations with high percentages of workers covered by collective bargaining 
agreements. Women receive wage penalties in the 2000 Census and 2005 and 2008 ACS, 
and they receive premiums in one year—2006. Men receive premiums between 1990 and 
2005 and also 2008. Men are slightly less likely to work in occupations with collective 
bargaining coverage compared to women in 2005 and 2008, but they receive wage 
premiums in these years anyways (while women are penalized).31 It is possible that men 
and women are not employed in the same selected occupations, and, thus, the collective 
bargaining structure in female occupations is different from men’s. Men and their unions 
have had more successful wage negotiations than women and their respective unions in 
female-dominated occupations. Another possibility is that “female” occupations with 
collective bargaining have such coverage in the first place because paid wages would 
have been even lower otherwise. Further studies are needed to explain the structural 
mechanism that gives rise to the different wage returns due to collective bargaining in the 
selected occupations.      
Wage Effect of Female Occupational Crowding 
 Table 4.11 reports the estimated FEM coefficients in the preferred and in the 
“base” model. FEM is the female-to-total workers ratio, and it is the measure of female 
occupational crowding in selected occupations in this study. The base model includes 
demographic and human capital variables and FEM. The female FEM coefficients in the 
preferred model are negative in every PUMS whereas they are negative in six out of ten 
PUMS in the base model. The female FEM coefficients in the base model are not  
 
                                                          
31 Refer to Table 4.2 to compare male and female mean occupational collective bargaining rates.  
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TABLE 4.11 
WAGE EFFECT OF FEMALE OCCUPATIONAL CROWDING IN PREFERRED 
AND BASE MODELS32 
 
       Preferred Model                                Base Model 
[Human Capital + FEM] 
     
PUMS Male Female Male Female 
     
1950 Census 0.054766~ 
(0.023783) 
-0.095080* 
(0.023876) 
 
0.043510~ 
(0.020649) 
 
0.006681 
(0.021919) 
1960 Census -0.020991~ 
(0.008914) 
-0.137887* 
(0.012922) 
 
-0.096376* 
(0.007882) 
-0.003490 
(0.011073) 
1970 Census -0.070426* 
(0.008883) 
-0.181917* 
(0.011987) 
 
-0.086776* 
(0.007384) 
-0.030525* 
(0.009601) 
1980 Census -0.280043* 
(0.010804) 
-0.052138* 
(0.010227) 
 
-0.224217* 
(0.008806) 
0.016001~ 
(0.007665) 
1990 Census -0.472151* 
(0.010159) 
-0.037023* 
(0.009120) 
 
-0.291206* 
(0.007962) 
0.000716 
(0.007145) 
2000 Census -0.309945* 
(0.009536) 
-0.182537* 
(0.007892) 
 
-0.182526* 
(0.007328) 
-0.072313* 
(0.006905) 
2005 ACS -0.270866* 
(0.009349) 
-0.183807* 
(0.008290) 
 
-0.182298* 
(0.007182) 
-0.102427* 
(0.007064) 
2006 ACS -0.317545* 
(0.009877) 
-0.101184* 
(0.008370) 
 
-0.197769* 
(0.007593) 
-0.100428* 
(0.007166) 
2007 ACS -0.298309* 
(0.009227) 
-0.133316* 
(0.008329) 
 
-0.240080* 
(0.007601) 
-0.127898* 
(0.007187) 
2008 ACS -0.310163* 
(0.009628) 
-0.070397* 
(0.007947) 
-0.187646* 
(0.007411) 
-0.127369* 
(0.006795) 
 
The estimated standard error is reported in parentheses.  
* = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 1% level of significance. 
~ = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 5% level of significance. 
 
                                                          
32 The coefficients report in this table are taken from the estimated best fitting wage models, which 
the readers can find in Appendix D. Readers who want to compare the magnitude of female crowding 
coefficients between the best fitting and non-best fitting models should refer to the dissertation website: 
https://sites.google.com/site/bridgecodes/. 
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significant in the 1950, 1960, and 1990 Census, and the coefficient is positive at in the 
1980 Census. Even in years when the female FEM coefficients in both models are 
negative, the coefficients in the preferred model are still more negative in all but one 
PUMS. The female FEM coefficient in the preferred model is less negative compared to 
the coefficient in the base model in the 2008 ACS. On the other hand, the male FEM 
coefficients in the preferred and base models are negative in nine out of ten PUMS. The 
male FEM is positive at 5% level of significance in the 1950 Census in both the preferred 
and base models. In the preferred model, male FEM coefficients are more negative than 
female coefficients in every PUMS beginning in the 1980. Furthermore, male coefficients 
are also much larger in the 1980 and subsequent samples compared to the pre-1980s 
samples. The male FEM coefficient is -0.070426 in the 1970 Census and decreases to  
-0.280043 in the 1980 in the preferred model.  
 The pattern of larger negative male FEM coefficients in 1980 coincides with a 
reverse pattern in the female FEM coefficients. FEM coefficients in the preferred model 
in the 1980 and 1990 Census are much less negative than in other years. It is interesting 
to note that the 1980 Census marks the first time that working women outnumber 
working men in the selected occupations. Women also suffer less wage penalties due to 
female crowding when they first overtake men in the selected occupations. The smaller 
negative wage effect women receive in the selected occupations does not last long. 
Women receive larger wage penalties again starting with the 2000 Census, and the 
magnitude of the penalties is comparable to the coefficients in the pre-1980 sample. For 
example, the FEM coefficient of the preferred model in the 2000 Census is -0.182537, 
whereas it is -0.181917 in the 1970 Census.  
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Three conclusions are made from the examination of FEM coefficients. First, the 
negative wage effect of female occupational crowding is much more pronounced when 
there are controls for compensating differentials and power differences. Second, the sign 
of the FEM coefficients do not change when controls for percentages of occupational 
union membership and occupational collective bargaining agreements are included.33 
Third, the negative wage effect of female occupational crowding is a state dependent 
phenomenon. Male workers suffer more in feminized selected occupations after 1980 
whereas women suffer less between 1980 and 1990 but revert back to the same level of 
wage penalty starting in 2000. The large-picture implication of the three conclusions is 
that both consistently suffer from lower wages when employed in feminized selected 
occupations in the postwar era. Table 4.3 reports that approximately two out of three 
female workers are employed in selected occupations with more than 70% women in 
every PUMS. On the contrary, approximately one out of two male workers is employed 
in selected occupations with less than 30% men in the 1990 Census and forward.34 
Consequently, women are more likely to receive wage penalties due female occupational 
crowding in the selected occupations even though they receive smaller penalties 
compared to men who are employed in feminized selected occupations. Female 
occupational crowding is a contributing factor to the gender wage gap in the selected 
occupations.   
 
 
                                                          
33 That is, there is no significant change in the magnitude or sign of FEM coefficient between 
Models 7a and 7b. 
 
34 Men are much more concentrated in male-dominated selected occupations prior to the 1990 
Census. See Table 4.3 for details.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PLAN FOR RESEARCH 
 Even though the focus of this study is limited to 103 selected occupations, there is 
reason to believe the findings have implications for occupations not in this selected 
group. First, determinants of the gender wage gap are state-dependent. Factors that are 
hypothesized to contribute to the gender wage gap behave differently through the postwar 
decades, even in the same set of occupations. Second, power is an important, although 
complex, variable of wage determination. Labor segmentation and patriarchy theories 
have examined the role gender power differences play in the creation and maintenance of 
the gender wage gap. More empirical research is needed to understand the differences 
between men and women’s power positions in jobs, occupations, and the general labor 
force.  
Third, the study’s findings highlight the importance of considering female 
workers’ quality of employment instead of quantity of employment. The layoffs of male 
workers in the current recession have given women the opportunity to become the 
majority of workers for the first time in history in February 2009 (Rampell 2010). 
Discussions are taking place as to whether women will soon close the gender wage gap if 
they continue to increase their share of the labor force; this view is short-sighted because 
it is not taking into consideration the important question of the quality of women’s 
employment; it is only focusing on the quantity of female employment. This dissertation 
shows women in selected occupations outnumber men in the 1980 Census through 2008 
ACS, and, while they temporarily receive smaller wage penalties between the 1980 and 
1990 decades, the “benefit” disappears in the 2000s. Women in the selected occupations 
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fail to close the gender wage gap after they outnumber men because they are concentrated 
in female-crowded selected occupations, where they are penalized for their work. Women 
are also penalized when they work in selected occupations that are physically demanding, 
have high percentages of collective bargaining coverage, and offer voluntary 
certifications and licenses. Consequently, if we are serious about closing the gender wage 
gap, then a concerted effort to address factors that contribute to the male wage premiums 
is needed. Women will only achieve wage parity with men when they have equal wage 
bargaining status.  
In order to properly address the problem of gender power differences, additional 
research is needed to determine the relative positions of wage bargaining power between 
men and women in all occupations across all industries, whether they are male-
dominated, gender-neutral, or female-dominated ones. It is towards this direction that the 
author of this dissertation plans to conduct her future research.  
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APPENDIX A 
THE SELECTED OCCUPATIONS 
The following list of “selected” occupations is based on the occupational titles 
presented in the 2005 American Community Survey (ACS). Readers should refer to 
Chapter 3 and the Occupational Bridge Codes tables for a detailed explanation of how 
occupational codes are matched in each Census or ACS Public Use Microdata Sample 
(PUMS) to selected occupations listed in this appendix. Readers can examine the 
Occupational Bridge Codes as SAS® tables by 
visiting  https://sites.google.com/site/bridgecodes/.  
 
Selected Occupational Title 
Assigned 
“Recode” 
  
 
1. Farm, Ranch, and Other Agricultural Managers 20 
2. Purchasing Agents and Buyers, Farm Products 51 
3. Accountants and Auditors 80 
4. Aerospace Engineers 132 
5. Chemical Engineers 135 
6. Civil Engineers 136 
7. Electrical and Electronics Engineers 141 
8. Industrial Engineers, Health and Safety 143 
9. Mechanical Engineers 146 
10. Drafters 154 
11. Agricultural and Food Scientists 160 
12. Biological Scientists 161 
13. Conservation Scientists and Foresters 164 
14. Chemists and Material Scientists 172 
15. Environmental Scientists and Geoscientists 174 
16. Economists 180 
17. Psychologists 182 
18. Social Workers 201 
19. Clergy 204 
20. Postsecondary Teachers 220 
21. Librarians 243 
22. Designers 263 
23. Writers and Authors 285 
24. Photographers 291 
25. Dentists 301 
26. Dieticians and Nutritionists 303 
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APPENDIX A: Continued 
 
Selected Occupation Name 
 
Assigned 
“Recode” 
 
27. Optometrists 304 
28. Pharmacists 305 
29. Physicians and Surgeons 306 
30. Registered Nurses 313 
31. Veterinarians 325 
32. Licensed Practical and Licensed Vocational Nurses 350 
33. Fire Fighters 374 
34. Security Guards and Gaming Surveillance Officers 392 
35. Bartenders 404 
36. Waiters and Waitresses 411 
37. Janitors and Building Cleaners 422 
38. Maids and Housekeeping Cleaners 423 
39. Grounds Maintenance Workers 425 
40. Motion Picture Projectionists 441 
41. Ushers, Lobby Attendants, and Ticket Takers 442 
42. Cashiers 472 
43. Advertising Sales Agents 480 
44. Securities, Commodities, and Financial Services Sales Agents 482 
45. Models, Demonstrators, and Product Promoters 490 
46. Real Estate Brokers and Sales Agents 492 
47. Door-to-Door Sales Workers, News and Street Vendors, and 
Related Workers 
495 
48. Telephone Operators 502 
49. Bill and Account Collectors 510 
50. Bookkeeping, Accounting, and Auditing Clerks 512 
51. Tellers 516 
52. Couriers and Messengers 551 
53. Dispatchers 552 
54. Postal Service Mail Carriers 555 
55. Shipping, Receiving, and Traffic Clerks 561 
56. Office Machine Operators 590 
57. First-Line Supervisors/Managers/Contractors of Farming, 
Fishing, and Forestry Workers 
600 
58. Logging Workers 613 
59. Boilermakers 621 
60. Brickmasons, Blockmasons, and Stonemasons 622 
61. Carpenters 623 
62. Electricians 635 
63. Glaziers 636 
64. Painters, Construction and Maintenance 642 
65. Paperhangers 643 
66. Pipelayers, Plumbers, Pipefitters, and Steamfitters 644 
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APPENDIX A: Continued 
 
 Selected Occupational Title 
 
 
“Assigned 
Recode" 
 
67. Plasterers and Stucco Masons 646 
68. Roofers 651 
69. Sheet Metal Workers 652 
70. Structural Iron and Steel Workers 653 
71. Derrick, Rotary Drill, and Service Unit Operators, and 
Roustabouts, Oil, Gas, and Mining 
680 
72. Explosives Workers, Ordnance Handling Experts, and 
Blasters 
683 
73. Millwrights 736 
74. Bakers 780 
75. Machinists 803 
76. Tool and Die Makers 813 
77. Welding, Soldering, and Brazing Workers 814 
78. Bookbinders and Bindery Workers 823 
79. Laundry and Dry-Cleaning Workers 830 
80. Upholsterers 845 
81. Sawing Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Wood 853 
82. Power Plant Operators, Distributors, and Dispatchers 860 
83. Stationary Engineers and Boiler Operators 861 
84. Furnace, Kiln, Oven, Drier, and Kettle Operators and Tenders 873 
85. Jewelers and Precious Stone and Metal Workers 875 
86. Painting Workers 881 
87. Photographic Process Workers and Processing Machine 
Operators 
883 
88. Cementing and Gluing Machine Operators and Tenders 885 
89. Etchers and Engravers 891 
90. Bus Drivers 912 
91. Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs 914 
92. Railroad Brake, Signal, and Switch Operators 923 
93. Subway, Streetcar, and Other Rail Transportation Workers 926 
94. Dredge, Excavating, and Loading Machine Operators 952 
95. Directors, Religious Activities and Education; Religious 
Workers, All Other 
2051 
96. Lawyers, and Judges, Magistrates, and Other Judicial 
Workers 
2101 
97. PreK-12th Grade Teachers (Preschool, Kindergarten, 
Elementary, Secondary, and Special Education) 
2301 
98. Library Assistants, Clerical and Librarian Technicians 2441 
99. Editors, News Analysts, Reporters, and Correspondents  2811 
 
 
4051 
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 APPENDIX A: Continued   
 
Selected Occupational Title 
 
“Assigned 
Recode” 
 
100. Counter Attendant, Cafeteria, Food Concession, and Coffee 
Shop; Combined Food Preparation and Serving Workers, 
Including Fast Food 
 
101. Word Processors, Typists, Secretaries, and Administrative 
Assistants 
5701 
102. Printing Machine Operators, Prepress Technicians and 
Workers, and Job Printers 
8241 
103. Service Station and Parking Lot Attendants 9351 
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APPENDIX B 
ELECTRONIC CORRESPONDENCES WITH MR. BRANDON TRAMPE OF THE 
INTEGRATED PUBLIC USE MICRODATA SERIES (IPUMS) OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA POPULAR CENTER 
The electronic correspondences have been edited for ease of reading. 
From Xuan Pham to Mr. Brandon Trampe 
Monday, September 27, 2010 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Hello! I am using the 1950 through 2000 Census PUMS and 2005 through 2008 
(single year files) ACS PUMS for my dissertation research. I need to know whether the 
Census/ACS top code the incwage (wage and salary) variable by the state in which the 
individual lived or by the state in which they worked for beginning in the 1990 
PUMS.  I've tried to look for the answer on the Census PUMS website and googling but 
without much success. If you can help, I'd appreciate it very much.  
From Mr. Trampe to Pham 
Wednesday, September 29, 2010 
I'm unaware of any CB documentation that specifically states whether the top 
code is by state of residence or by state of work. I did find previous research stating that 
it is by state of residence in the ACS, but they didn't cite a source for that information. 
Additionally, I couldn't find any similar sources for 1990 or 2000. 
However, I think I would likely conclude that it is by state of residence.  I 
determined this as follows... 
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All persons living in California but working in a different state with top-coded 
income: 
Wage and | 
   salary | 
   income |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
   195516 |        445        0.13        0.13 
   999999 |    348,962       99.87      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
    Total |    349,407      100.00 
Then, the distribution of pwstate for persons with top-coded income: 
   Place of work: state, 1980 to 2005 |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                                  N/A |    349,336       99.98       99.98 
                               Alaska |          1        0.00       99.98 
                              Arizona |          2        0.00       99.98 
                             Colorado |          2        0.00       99.98 
                          Connecticut |          1        0.00       99.98 
                 District of Columbia |          1        0.00       99.98 
                              Florida |          3        0.00       99.98 
                               Hawaii |          1        0.00       99.98 
                             Illinois |          6        0.00       99.98 
                            Louisiana |          2        0.00       99.99 
                        Massachusetts |          2        0.00       99.99 
                             Michigan |          1        0.00       99.99 
                             Missouri |          2        0.00       99.99 
                               Nevada |          2        0.00       99.99 
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Place of work: state, 1980 to 2005 |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                           New Jersey |          2        0.00       99.99 
                           New Mexico |          1        0.00       99.99 
                             New York |          8        0.00       99.99 
                               Oregon |          4        0.00       99.99 
                         Pennsylvania |          1        0.00       99.99 
                         Rhode island |          1        0.00       99.99 
                       South Carolina |          2        0.00       99.99 
                                Texas |          4        0.00       99.99 
                                 Utah |          1        0.00       99.99 
                             Virginia |          2        0.00       99.99 
                           Washington |          3        0.00      100.00 
                            Wisconsin |          2        0.00      100.00 
                               Abroad |         14        0.00      100.00 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                                Total |    349,407      100.00 
I performed similar tests for 2000 and the 2008 ACS. I assume it would be the 
same in other ACS years, but you'd want to verify independently….Since the topcodes 
are consistent across state of residence but vary of state of work, I think it would be fair 
to conclude that the topcode is based on state of residence. Of course, since we can't find 
any additional documentation (and I don't have any personal knowledge about this) you'd 
want to use the results of this analysis at your own risk. 
From Pham to Mr. Trampe 
Sunday, October 3, 2010 
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Thank you for replying to my question. I do have another question about the top 
coding of the INCWAGE variable in the ACS. According to the IPUMS website, it states 
that the Census set the wage cutoff at the 99.5 percentile of each state. All wage 
observations above the 99.5% cutoff is assigned the mean of all observations above this 
cutoff for the state (http://usa.ipums.org/usa-
action/codes.do?mnemonic=INCWAGE).  On the other hand, the PUMS documentation 
website states, "within each state, all base dollar amounts are top coded using the mean of 
cases greater than the national minimum value" 
(http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/data_documentation/pums/ 
TopCodedValues/2005PUMS_top_coded_values.pdf). The same explanation is also 
given for the 2006, 2007, and 2008 ACS PUMS.  I tried looking for the referred "national 
minimum value" on the PUMS documentation website, but I did not have any luck.   
Can you help clarify this confusion for me? Is there a reported national minimum 
value for wage and salary in the 2005 through 2008 ACS PUMS (single year files)?  
From Trampe to Pham 
Monday, October 4, 2010 
I believe the cutoffs are in fact by state. The CB documentation states that the 
values (except for tax values) are topcoded based on state minimum values in 2003, 2006, 
2007, 2008 (I believe). I see the documentation for 2005 and 2004 says that the topcode 
is based on a national minimum value, but I don't think that is correct. 
See, for example, the incwage distribution for Connecticut in 2005. There are 
many values above 142,000, which is Arizona's topcode value for INCWAGE. This 
would not make sense if the cutoff was really a national value. 
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     Wage and | 
     salary | 
     income |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
     141000 |          4        0.05        0.05 
     142000 |          2        0.02        0.07 
     143000 |          2        0.02        0.10 
     144000 |          5        0.06        0.16 
     145000 |         14        0.17        0.33 
     146000 |          1        0.01        0.35 
     147000 |          6        0.07        0.42 
     148000 |          3        0.04        0.46 
     149000 |          2        0.02        0.48 
     150000 |         93        1.15        1.63 
     151000 |          3        0.04        1.67 
     152000 |          4        0.05        1.72 
     153000 |          5        0.06        1.78 
     154000 |          1        0.01        1.79 
     155000 |          3        0.04        1.83 
     156000 |          1        0.01        1.84 
     157000 |          1        0.01        1.86 
     158000 |          1        0.01        1.87 
     159000 |          2        0.02        1.89 
     160000 |         35        0.43        2.33 
     162000 |          5        0.06        2.39 
     163000 |          2        0.02        2.41 
     165000 |          9        0.11        2.52 
     166000 |          2        0.02        2.55 
     168000 |          3        0.04        2.59 
     169000 |          1        0.01        2.60 
     170000 |          2        0.02        2.62 
     337000 |        631        7.81       10.43 
     999999 |      7,238       89.57      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      8,081      100.00 
From Pham to Mr. Trampe 
Tuesday, October 12, 2010 
I went through the codebooks for 1950-2000 and did not find any specific 
documentation about how the wage top code was determined, except for the one pageyou 
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pointed out to me in the 1990 codebook. I searched for numerous keywords, including 
"wage," "earnings," "economic," "economic items," "universe," "topcoded," "national 
mean," and "national median." I didn't find anything pertaining to the methodology used 
to construct wage top code values in the non-1990 PUMS. I want to reach out and ask 
whether you have any additional resource/persons I can contact who may know the 
answer.   
From Mr. Trampe to Pham 
Wednesday, October 13, 2010 
I'm also not really finding much in the codebooks about how the top code was 
determined. It appears that 1990 was the exception rather than the rule. From what I've 
been told, researchers seem to have been content with looking at the income distribution 
in the data to determine where the topcoded 'cutoffs' are  In other words, researchers have 
been satisfied in knowing where the cutoffs are rather than knowing why they have been 
set there. I have not found anyone here who knows how these levels were determined, 
unfortunately. This isn't to say that you won't be able to find an answer, but I don't know 
of anyone here who has had to explore this question as part of their own research. 
I'm sorry I can't really give you a good answer on this one. If I knew someone 
who might be able to help then I would certainly point you that way, but I don't think I 
know who that person might be. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
AKAIKE INFORMATION CRITERION (AIC) OF ALL ESTIMATED WAGE MODELS 
 
 
1950 Census 1960 Census 1970 Census 1980 Census 1990 Census 
      
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Model 1 37,463 18,275 124,045 81,085 194,719 160,076 298,610 320,814 330,821 404,969 
 
          
Model 2 37,461 18,277 123,898 81,087 194,584 160,067 297,965 320,811 329,492 404,971 
 
          
Model 3 37,454 18,191 123,692 80,531 193,669 158,939 296,613 318,696 326,526 399,576 
 
          
Model 4a 37,292 18,238 122,532 80,984 192,839 159,290 297,256 319,756 327,006 402,806 
 
          
Model 4b -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 326,941 400,469 
 
          
Model 5 37,453 18,180 123,560 80,384 193,236 158,681 296,026 318,625 325,048 399,536 
 
          
Model 6a 37,287 18,240 122,483 80,980 192,765 159,291 296,484 319,636 325,090 402,728 
 
          
Model 6b -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 325,056 400,470 
 
          
Model 7a 37,285 18,062 122,065 80,035 191,966 158,320 295,469 318,190 322,763 399,162 
 
          
Model 7b -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 322,530 398,660 
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APPENDIX C—Continued 
 
2000 Census 2005 ACS 2006 ACS 2007 ACS 2008 ACS 
 
     
 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
 
          
Model 1 350,907 415,594 357,357 480,034 395,024 499,657 403,186 506,050 411,514 521,523 
 
          
Model 2 350,287 415,486 356,716 479,826 394,348 499,462 402,187 505,735 410,876 521,173 
 
          
Model 3 344,160 407,737 350,004 468,691 385,797 487,503 393,746 493,989 400,236 506,341 
 
          
Model 4a 349,903 412,472 356,241 477,060 393,442 495,408 401,605 501,863 409,899 516,130 
 
          
Model 4b 349,372 408,874 355,670 471,613 391,945 490,195 400,337 497,273 408,260 510,122 
 
          
Model 5 342,943 407,270 348,601 467,994 384,108 486,828 391,754 493,163 398,198 505,433 
 
          
Model 6a 349,470 412,072 355,903 477,002 393,093 495,405 400,994 501,829 409,592 516,094 
 
          
Model 6b 348,750 408,364 355,335 471,312 391,705 490,194 400,018 497,270 408,021 510,124 
 
          
Model 7a 341,873 405,694 347,199 467,491 382,857 486,149 390,473 492,415 396,528 504,303 
 
          
Model 7b 341,523 405,056 346,845 466,434 381,978 485,220 390,477 491,700 396,018 503,451 
 
          
Model with minimum AIC is highlighted. 
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APPENDIX D 
REGRESSION ESTIMATE OF PREFERRED MODEL BY GENDER AND PUMS 
 
PREFERRED MODELS OF 1950 CENSUS PUMS 
 Male 
[Model 7a] 
Female 
[Model 7a] 
 
Schooling 0.044629* 
(0.001630) 
0.000207 
(0.011668) 
Expr 0.030328* 
(0.001113) 
-0.034362 ~ 
(0.015525) 
Expr² 0.000442* 
(0.000018) 
-0.160934* 
(0.023645) 
Spouse 0.242929* 
(0.013541) 
-0.229603 
(0.211582) 
Divorced 0.133797* 
(0.02016) 
-0.100431 
(0.125679) 
Black -0.348148* 
(0.016459) 
-0.075033* 
(0.025321) 
Native -0.195265 
(0.148366) 
-0.805678* 
(0.018329) 
Asian -0.028097 
(0.077923) 
0.081474 
(0.087370) 
Under5 0.017019 
(0.010296) 
0.073295 
(0.059726) 
PT -0.731878* 
(0.018445) 
0.149032 
(0.037027) 
Mine 0.267389* 
(0.037947) 
0.166831 
(0.050412) 
Cons 0.162210* 
(0.023730) 
0.059063 
(0.041312) 
Man 0.232222* 
(0.021080) 
0.089548 
(0.057050) 
Trans 0.172547* 
(0.024846) 
0.088784 ~ 
(0.042408) 
Info 0.245719* 
(0.058186) 
-0.121330* 
(0.037298) 
Util 0.195173* 
(0.032246) 
-0.153336* 
(0.040469) 
WS 0.149770* 
(0.033310) 
0.043282 
(0.038066) 
Re 0.001436 
(0.024055) 
-0.011875 
(0.037576) 
Ser 0.002658 
(0.028267) 
0.191443* 
(0.039511) 
Fi 0.072628~ 
(0.029119) 
0.043802 
(0.002482) 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 1950 CENSUS PUMS: Continued 
 Male  
[Model 7a] 
Female 
[Model 7a] 
Prof -0.049788~ 
(0.025297) 
0.028076* 
(0.001301) 
Pub 0.207519* 
(0.024301) 
-0.000464* 
(0.000027) 
FEM 0.054766 ~ 
(0.023783) 
-0.095080* 
(0.023876) 
Mental 0.000520 
(0.000632) 
-0.002202~ 
(0.001051) 
Physical 0.000201 
(0.000397) 
-0.008603* 
(0.000932) 
WrkFreedom 0.001297 ~ 
(0.000537) 
0.004830* 
(0.000887) 
LicenseRe 0.094765* 
(0.023429) 
0.277853* 
(0.026128) 
LicenseVol 0.171832* 
(0.013556) 
0.027878 
(0.027761) 
Apprentice 0.016634 
(0.013657) 
0.073627 
(0.050802) 
n =  21,459 11,412 
   
The estimated standard error is reported in parentheses.  
* = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 1% level of significance. 
~ = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 5% level of significance. 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 1960 CENSUS PUMS 
 Male 
[Model 7a] 
Female 
[Model 7a] 
 
Schooling 0.061490* 0.063903* 
 (0.000771) (0.001307) 
Expr 0.035246* 0.022447* 
 (0.00502) (0.000614) 
Expr² -0.000523* -0.000313* 
 (0.000008) (0.000012) 
Spouse 0.268548* -0.021292* 
 (0.006549) (0.006034) 
Divorced 0.144152* 0.000003 
 (0.010371) (0.007832)* 
Black -0.334475* -0.110655 
 (0.007232) (0.010360) 
Native -0.201733* -0.081519 
 (0.045462) (0.084912) 
Other -0.057246 0.002512 
 (0.058733) (0.073558) 
Asian -0.032987 0.067204~ 
 (0.021372) (0.030390) 
Under5 0.054529* -0.072376* 
 (0.004573) (0.008795) 
PT -0.760996* -0.973536* 
 (0.008106) (0.007220) 
Mine 0.435378* 0.391182* 
 (0.022918) (0.062005) 
Cons 0.366506* 0.282729* 
 (0.016799) (0.052989) 
Man 0.441489* 0.377392* 
 (0.016461) (0.049211) 
Trans 0.233396* 0.333571* 
 (0.017966) (0.052131) 
Info 0.464074* 0.280349* 
 (0.026501) (0.050345) 
Util 0.402022* 0.363719* 
 (0.020445) (0.053679) 
WS 0.323581* 0.286086* 
 (0.020853) (0.050521) 
Re 0.167135* -0.015443 
 (0.017928) (0.049199) 
Ser 0.189926* 0.025449 
 (0.018001) (0.049662) 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 1960 CENSUS PUMS: Continued  
 Male 
[Model 7a] 
Female 
[Model 7a] 
   
Fi 0.290221* 0.230852* 
 (0.018718) (0.049329) 
Prof 0.203686* 0.164763* 
 (0.017128) (0.049194) 
Pub 0.334503* 0.352612* 
 (0.017241) (0.049694) 
FEM -0.020991~ -0.137887* 
 (0.008914) (0.012922) 
Mental 0.004506* -0.001114~ 
 (0.000267) (0.000533) 
Physical 0.001517* -0.012008* 
 (0.000182) (0.000481) 
WrkFreedom 0.001683* 0.004042* 
 (0.000228) (0.000431) 
LicenseRe 0.069010* 0.238550* 
 (0.005734) (0.012766) 
LicenseVol 0.248221* 0.076416* 
 (0.006769) (0.016746) 
Apprentice 0.062122* 0.038527 
 (0.007839) (0.027847) 
n = 83,405 51,003 
   
The estimated standard error is reported in parentheses.  
* = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 1% level of significance. 
~ = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 5% level of significance. 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 1970 CENSUS PUMS 
 Male 
[Model 7a] 
Female 
[Model 7a] 
 
Schooling 0.065834* 0.068956* 
 (0.000804) (0.001202) 
Expr 0.040875* 0.022196* 
 (0.000458) (0.000506) 
Expr² -0.000640* -0.000310* 
 (0.000008) (0.000010) 
Spouse 0.324687* 0.014102* 
 (0.006200) (0.005682) 
Divorced 0.219717* 0.073264* 
 (0.009355) (0.007209) 
Black -0.242637* -0.051577* 
 (0.006394) (0.008041) 
Native -0.178739* -0.221522* 
 (0.033751) (0.047951) 
Other -0.114326~ 0.009737 
 (0.050032) (0.072768) 
Asian -0.003318 0.057313* 
 (0.017466) (0.021562) 
Under5 0.072362* -0.049429* 
 (0.004752) (0.007599) 
PT -0.703600* -0.878702* 
 (0.007141) (0.005553) 
Mine 0.239210* 0.226069* 
 (0.021405) (0.048803) 
Cons 0.289299* 0.221934* 
 (0.014092) (0.036332) 
Man 0.273172* 0.250731* 
 (0.013640) (0.032859) 
Trans 0.098347* 0.168275* 
 (0.015862) (0.035925) 
Info 0.263728* 0.115351* 
 (0.023055) (0.034617) 
Util 0.227380* 0.233158* 
 (0.017933) (0.039294) 
WS 0.188030* 0.160363* 
 (0.017495) (0.034261) 
Re -0.039633* -0.122711* 
 (0.014663) (0.032795) 
Ser 0.069776* 0.008398 
 (0.015266) (0.033488) 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 1970 CENSUS PUMS: Continued  
 Male 
[Model 7a] 
Female 
[Male 7a] 
   
Fi 0.150578* 0.093439* 
 (0.015845) (0.032953) 
Prof 0.102085* 0.090765* 
 (0.014133) (0.032663) 
Pub 0.209398* 0.258664* 
 (0.014579) (0.033468) 
FEM -0.070426* -0.181917* 
 (0.008883) (0.011987) 
Mental 0.006524* 0.007363* 
 (0.000275) (0.000437) 
Physical -0.001839* -0.010813* 
 (0.000187) (0.000390) 
WrkFreedom 0.000760* 0.001632* 
 (0.000244) (0.000384) 
LicenseRe 0.085127* 0.189459* 
 (0.005963) (0.010309) 
LicenseVol 0.209682* 0.093679* 
 (0.006469) (0.013969) 
Apprentice 0.065082* 0.036987 
 (0.007405) (0.026297) 
n = 111,830 86,526 
   
The estimated standard error is reported in parentheses.  
* = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 1% level of significance. 
~ = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 5% level of significance. 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 1980 CENSUS PUMS 
 Male 
[Model 7a] 
Female 
[Model 7a] 
 
Schooling 0.072888* 0.074496* 
 (0.000870) (0.001012) 
Expr 0.039814* 0.028523* 
 (0.000525) (0.000485) 
Expr² -0.000617* -0.000412* 
 (0.000009) (0.000009) 
Spouse 0.233564* 0.002989 
 (0.005993) (0.005272) 
Divorced 0.125504* 0.042819* 
 (0.008083) (0.006402) 
Black -0.192018* -0.039838* 
 (0.006722) (0.006485) 
Native -0.196404* -0.133104* 
 (0.025048) (0.026668) 
Other -0.134582* -0.030527 
 (0.032892) (0.038947) 
Asian -0.015175 0.103757* 
 (0.013405) (0.013430) 
Under5 0.026548* -0.052162* 
 (0.005603) (0.006026) 
PT -1.297468* -1.266375* 
 (0.007363) (0.004437) 
Mine 0.423527* 0.344219* 
 (0.021414) (0.037720) 
Cons 0.214897* 0.174314* 
 (0.013868) (0.029244) 
Man 0.292103* 0.274999* 
 (0.013395) (0.026286) 
Trans 0.298972* 0.273100* 
 (0.015062) (0.029033) 
Info 0.392693* 0.309848* 
 (0.023679) (0.029495) 
Util 0.315372* 0.290124* 
 (0.018540) (0.033602) 
WS 0.210925* 0.186951* 
 (0.018417) (0.027860) 
Re 0.027345 -0.038448 
 (0.014680) (0.025969) 
Ser 0.006342 0.020363 
 (0.014822) (0.026480) 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 1980 CENSUS PUMS: Continued  
 Male 
[Model 7a] 
Female 
[Model 7a] 
   
Fi 0.126530* 0.108026* 
 (0.015647) (0.026276) 
Prof 0.102379* 0.130544* 
 (0.013744) (0.025939) 
Pub 0.191383* 0.223602* 
 (0.015014) (0.026836) 
FEM -0.280043* -0.052138* 
 (0.010804) (0.010227) 
Mental 0.005925* 0.006901* 
 (0.000294) (0.000366) 
Physical -0.002775* -0.005325* 
 (0.000218) (0.000308) 
WrkFreedom 0.003182* 0.005909* 
 (0.000263) (0.000320) 
LicenseRe 0.150675* 0.175631* 
 (0.007341) (0.009114) 
LicenseVol 0.079590* 0.112512* 
 (0.006308) (0.009386) 
Apprentice 0.093284* 0.015832 
 (0.006677) (0.018362) 
n = 140,867 151,068 
   
The estimated standard error is reported in parentheses.  
* = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 1% level of significance. 
~ = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 5% level of significance. 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 1990 CENSUS PUMS 
 Male 
[Model 7b] 
Female 
[Model 7b] 
 
Schooling 0.076817* 0.095216* 
 (0.000845) (0.000903) 
Expr 0.041736* 0.032449* 
 (0.000487) (0.000438) 
Expr² -0.000623* -0.000468* 
 (0.000009) (0.000008) 
Spouse 0.166296* -0.021635* 
 (0.005233) (0.004801) 
Divorced 0.056831* 0.006554 
 (0.006879) (0.005718) 
Black -0.149935* -0.034483* 
 (0.006284) (0.005559) 
Native -0.234814* -0.151202* 
 (0.020221) (0.018594) 
Other -0.029701* 0.058145* 
 (0.009365) (0.010477) 
Asian -0.002575 0.096529* 
 (0.009616) (0.009427) 
Under5 0.055718* 0.026073* 
 (0.005035) (0.004880) 
PT -1.388333* -1.258394* 
 (0.006164) (0.003872) 
Mine 0.415244* 0.384333* 
 (0.021313) (0.035165) 
Cons 0.267954* 0.263753* 
 (0.010191) (0.021772) 
Man 0.334525* 0.210689* 
 (0.009842) (0.018852) 
Trans 0.291100* 0.427254* 
 (0.012909) (0.021715) 
Info 0.433390* 0.367532* 
 (0.020231) (0.023371) 
Util 0.390293* 0.380547* 
 (0.015357) (0.026654) 
WS 0.308338* 0.225811* 
 (0.014585) (0.020929) 
Re 0.143883* -0.101280* 
 (0.011038) (0.018589) 
Ser 0.105910* 0.057276* 
 (0.010884) (0.019052) 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 1990 CENSUS PUMS: Continued  
 Male 
[Model 7b] 
Female 
[Model 7b] 
   
Fi 0.264848* 0.144630* 
 (0.011965) (0.019041) 
Prof 0.233969* 0.192650* 
 (0.010619) (0.018583) 
Pub 0.256020* 0.237794* 
 (0.012145) (0.019799) 
FEM -0.472151* -0.037023* 
 (0.010159) (0.009120) 
Mental 0.007098* 0.012523* 
 (0.000268) (0.000338) 
Physical -0.006819* -0.005418* 
 (0.000233) (0.000289) 
WrkFreedom 0.002896* -0.000441 
 (0.000247) (0.000283) 
LicenseRe 0.205894* 0.121930* 
 (0.006784) (0.008983) 
LicenseVol 0.170763* 0.090598* 
 (0.005557) (0.006163) 
Apprentice 0.125364* 0.290312* 
 (0.007178) (0.021856) 
UnionPer -0.010472* 0.000232 
 (0.001356) (0.002121) 
BargainPer 0.011506* -0.003585 
 (0.001278) (0.001889) 
n =  160,860 193,721 
   
The estimated standard error is reported in parentheses.  
* = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 1% level of significance. 
~ = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 5% level of significance. 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 2000 CENSUS PUMS 
 Male 
[Model 7b] 
Female 
[Model 7b] 
 
Schooling 0.073780* 0.089079* 
 (0.000789) (0.000814) 
Expr 0.039046* 0.034224* 
 (0.000448) (0.000395) 
Expr² -0.000575* -0.000466* 
 (0.000008) (0.000007) 
Spouse 0.161238* -0.005635 
 (0.004741) (0.004296) 
Divorced 0.034444* -0.004686 
 (0.006169) (0.005087) 
Black -0.130798* -0.026519* 
 (0.006813) (0.004828) 
Native -0.155963* -0.094356* 
 (0.017306) (0.016152) 
Other -0.048442* 0.050142* 
 (0.007412) (0.007933) 
Asian -0.005401 0.116927* 
 (0.008372) (0.007783) 
Under5 0.067409* 0.055842* 
 (0.005003) (0.004589) 
PT -1.347471* -1.183201* 
 (0.005928) (0.003685) 
Mine 0.448795* 0.444869* 
 (0.027056) (0.041590) 
Cons 0.300477* 0.371853* 
 (0.013173) (0.024415) 
Man 0.415904* 0.434426* 
 (0.013104) (0.022917) 
Trans 0.303027* 0.503679* 
 (0.015139) (0.024623) 
Info 0.318991* 0.341953* 
 (0.016461) (0.023655) 
Util 0.507369* 0.530718* 
 (0.018848) (0.030335) 
WS 0.304406* 0.370615* 
 (0.017624) (0.024637) 
Re 0.199086* 0.170322* 
 (0.014535) (0.022733) 
Ser 0.081324* 0.113955* 
 (0.014027) (0.022658) 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 2000 CENSUS PUMS: Continued  
 Male 
[Model 7b] 
Female 
[Model 7b] 
   
Fi 0.395184* 0.317412* 
 (0.014903) (0.022991) 
Prof 0.324359* 0.322003* 
 (0.013019) (0.022272) 
Pub 0.311189* 0.369924* 
 (0.014770) (0.023287) 
FEM -0.309945* -0.182537* 
 (0.009536) (0.007892) 
Mental 0.016825* 0.016881* 
 (0.000248) (0.000301) 
Physical -0.007150* -0.005151* 
 (0.000232) (0.000233) 
WrkFreedom -0.0017009* -0.002192* 
 (0.000223) (0.000250) 
LicenseRe -0.054388* 0.048299* 
 (0.004755) (0.007482) 
LicenseVol 0.127280* 0.144454* 
 (0.004770) (0.004344) 
Apprentice 0.056904* -0.096814* 
 (0.007865) (0.014446) 
UnionPer -0.021726* 0.046825* 
 (0.001698) (0.002092) 
BargainPer 0.022293* -0.052398* 
 (0.001601) (0.002261) 
n =  171,962 208,340 
   
The estimated standard error is reported in parentheses.  
* = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 1% level of significance. 
~ = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 5% level of significance. 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 2005 ACS PUMS 
 Male 
[Model 7b] 
Female 
[Model 7b] 
 
Schooling 0.081638* 0.09880* 
 (0.000817) (0.000835) 
Expr 0.041437* 0.037932* 
 (0.000448) (0.000402) 
Expr² -0.000614* -0.000519* 
 (0.000008) (0.000007) 
Spouse 0.155860* 0.019287* 
 (0.004758) (0.004371) 
Divorced 0.044655* 0.010373~ 
 (0.006306) (0.005181) 
Black -0.140981* -0.055152* 
 (0.006046) (0.005063) 
Native -0.117495* -0.076559* 
 (0.018378) (0.017074) 
Other -0.037269* 0.065755* 
 (0.007262) (0.007896) 
Asian 0.013289* 0.113914* 
 (0.007462) (0.007088) 
Under5 0.094478* 0.100537* 
 (0.005072) (0.004843) 
PT -1.428491* -1.23574* 
 (0.005563) (0.003631) 
Mine 0.457803* 0.392643* 
 (0.025594) (0.043408) 
Cons 0.211273* 0.260310* 
 (0.012074) (0.023314) 
Man 0.314321* 0.316028* 
 (0.011771) (0.022027) 
Trans 0.233121* 0.389296* 
 (0.013957) (0.023526) 
Info 0.205984* 0.177677* 
 (0.015497) (0.022948) 
Util 0.399430* 0.391207* 
 (0.018230) (0.031253) 
WS 0.212777* 0.221264* 
 (0.017329) (0.023863) 
Re 0.107774* -0.007354 
 (0.013415) (0.021686) 
Ser -0.037296* -0.053608~ 
 (0.012560) (0.021652) 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 2005 ACS PUMS: Continued  
 Male 
[Model 7b] 
Female 
[Model 7b] 
   
Fin 0.342206* 0.175048* 
 (0.013551) (0.021844) 
Prof 0.233678* 0.189818* 
 (0.011884) (0.021288) 
Pub 0.297841* 0.245293* 
 (0.013699) (0.022165) 
FEM -0.270866* -0.183807* 
 (0.009349) (0.008290) 
Mental 0.017968* 0.018988* 
 (0.000249) (0.000298) 
Physical -0.007131* -0.008099* 
 (0.000230) (0.000232) 
WrkFreedom -0.002528* -0.001168* 
 (0.000225) (0.000254) 
LicenseRe -0.073030* 0.067786* 
 (0.004336) (0.007268) 
LicenseVol 0.147582* 0.118945* 
 (0.004527) (0.005066) 
Apprentice 0.108101* 0.480560* 
 (0.007662) (0.035829) 
UnionPer -0.033731* 0.076058* 
 (0.002450) (0.002876) 
BargainPer 0.033475* -0.085158* 
 (0.002301) (0.003106) 
n =  176,416 229,784 
   
The estimated standard error is reported in parentheses.  
* = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 1% level of significance. 
~ = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 5% level of significance. 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 2006 ACS PUMS 
 Male 
[Model 7b] 
Female 
[Model 7b] 
 
Schooling 0.084139* 0.102842* 
 (0.000846) (0.000830) 
Expr 0.042807* 0.038428* 
 (0.000469) (0.000405) 
Expr² -0.000640* -0.000521* 
 (0.000008) (0.000007) 
Spouse 0.164832* 0.032243* 
 (0.004956) (0.004383) 
Divorced 0.041105* 0.012064~ 
 (0.006587) (0.005211) 
Black -0.173189* -0.069322* 
 (0.006228) (0.005030) 
Native -0.150603* -0.136909* 
 (0.019518) (0.017088) 
Other -0.027740* 0.043109* 
 (0.007260) (0.007620) 
Asian 0.037027* 0.109944* 
 (0.007862) (0.006994) 
Under5 0.102423* 0.096979* 
 (0.005389) (0.004906) 
PT -1.472118* -1.248145* 
 (0.005810) (0.003668) 
Mine 0.534798* 0.309637* 
 (0.025578) (0.040952) 
Cons 0.217616* 0.246422* 
 (0.013020) (0.022769) 
Man 0.318661* 0.305557* 
 (0.012741) (0.021503) 
Trans 0.241224* 0.374564* 
 (0.014761) (0.022999) 
Info 0.216936* 0.183131* 
 (0.016563) (0.022391) 
Util 0.421929* 0.386312* 
 (0.019396) (0.031167) 
WS 0.222689* 0.203137* 
 (0.018635) (0.023378) 
Re 0.107946* -0.058052* 
 (0.014316) (0.020973) 
Ser -0.029274~ -0.109885* 
 (0.013378) (0.020945) 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 2006 ACS PUMS: Continued  
 Male 
[Model 7b] 
Female 
[Model 7b] 
   
Fin 0.348199* 0.152576* 
 (0.014468) (0.021235) 
Prof 0.281543* 0.192688* 
 (0.012756) (0.021235) 
Pub 0.187746* 0.225511* 
 (0.014461) (0.021657) 
FEM -0.317545* -0.101184* 
 (0.009877) (0.008370) 
Mental 0.019002* 0.018671* 
 (0.000253) (0.000296) 
Physical -0.009230* -0.009743* 
 (0.000234) (0.000227) 
WrkFreedom -0.004900* -0.003563* 
 (0.000241) (0.000263) 
LicenseRe -0.011814* 0.072997* 
 (0.004572) (0.007345) 
LicenseVol 0.114401* 0.072203* 
 (0.005256) (0.007516) 
Apprentice 0.027059* 0.331034* 
 (0.008376) (0.036661) 
UnionPer 0.045816* -0.021100* 
 (0.001551) (0.001767) 
BargainPer -0.041464* 0.018770* 
 (0.001432) (0.001971) 
n = 182,582 234,644 
   
The estimated standard error is reported in parentheses.  
* = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 1% level of significance. 
~ = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 5% level of significance. 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 2007 ACS PUMS 
 Male 
[Model 7a] 
Female 
[Model 7a] 
 
Schooling 0.088683* 0.099214* 
 (0.000845) (0.000823) 
Expr 0.043241* 0.039441* 
 (0.000470) (0.000407) 
Expr² -0.000643* -0.000535* 
 (0.000008) (0.000007) 
Spouse 0.172464* 0.015909* 
 (0.004974) (0.004386) 
Divorced 0.045782* -0.000012 
 (0.006646) (0.005233) 
Black -0.166995* -0.057901* 
 (0.006217) (0.005027) 
Native -0.111034* -0.094995* 
 (0.019087) (0.016967) 
Other 0.000481 0.048525* 
 (0.007379) (0.007692) 
Asian 0.016819~ 0.133269* 
 (0.007723) (0.006861) 
Under5 0.095004* 0.105651* 
 (0.005374) (0.004888) 
PT -1.443862* -1.248338* 
 (0.005813) (0.003666) 
Mine 0.529552* 0.402850* 
 (0.025006) (0.040981) 
Cons 0.214478* 0.264935* 
 (0.012842) (0.022949) 
Man 0.319018* 0.282920* 
 (0.012541) (0.021638) 
Trans 0.249020* 0.276231* 
 (0.014157) (0.022724) 
Info 0.213025* 0.152364* 
 (0.016448) (0.022555) 
Util 0.362692* 0.372491* 
 (0.018966) (0.031443) 
WS 0.240856* 0.231390* 
 (0.019014) (0.023691) 
Re 0.111723* -0.057378* 
 (0.014193) (0.021141) 
Ser -0.035458* -0.095374* 
 (0.013164) (0.021042) 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 2007 ACS PUMS: Continued  
 Male 
[Model 7a] 
Female 
[Model 7a] 
   
Fi 0.384857* 0.158105* 
 (0.014277) (0.021387) 
Prof 0.281187* 0.181696* 
 (0.012542) (0.020837) 
Pub 0.259357* 0.229548* 
 (0.014202) (0.021790) 
FEM -0.298309* -0.133316* 
 (0.009227) (0.008329) 
Mental 0.020203* 0.022582* 
 (0.000252) (0.000255) 
Physical -0.007384* -0.009500* 
 (0.000215) (0.000225) 
WrkFreedom -0.003486* -0.001968* 
 (0.000233) (0.000251) 
LicenseRe -0.038187* -0.027918* 
 (0.004455) (0.006191) 
LicenseVol 0.157436* 0.137300* 
 (0.004936) (0.005476) 
Apprentice 0.094542* 0.253849* 
 (0.007366) (0.035253) 
n =  184,292 237,134 
   
The estimated standard error is reported in parentheses.  
* = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 1% level of significance. 
~ = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 5% level of significance. 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 2008 ACS PUMS 
 Male 
[Model 7b] 
Female 
[Model 7b] 
 
Schooling 0.075198* 0.091611* 
 (0.000791) (0.000747) 
Expr 0.041985* 0.035365* 
 (0.000453) (0.000374) 
Expr² -0.000616* -0.000463* 
 (0.000008) (0.000007) 
Spouse 0.175103* 0.032220* 
 (0.004852) (0.004075) 
Divorced 0.044884* 0.014646* 
 (0.006482) (0.004851) 
Black -0.153501* -0.061598* 
 (0.005972) (0.004594) 
Native -0.174791* -0.108796* 
 (0.018103) (0.015501) 
Other -0.045813* 0.077127* 
 (0.008137) (0.008217) 
Asian 0.019073* 0.120589* 
 (0.007388) (0.006386) 
Under5 0.100097* 0.096211* 
 (0.005284) (0.004507) 
PT -1.404288* -1.209428* 
 (0.005585) (0.003466) 
Mine 0.590576* 0.505643* 
 (0.023111) (0.036810) 
Cons 0.290580* 0.320851* 
 (0.012699) (0.022558) 
Man 0.388052* 0.351086* 
 (0.012450) (0.021231) 
Trans 0.281315* 0.401732* 
 (0.014399) (0.022524) 
Info 0.314853* 0.230070* 
 (0.016364) (0.022128) 
Util 0.471091* 0.420401* 
 (0.018855) (0.029443) 
WS 0.337445* 0.285923* 
 (0.019343) (0.02336) 
Re 0.198130* 0.010235 
 (0.013986) (0.020751) 
Ser 0.041556* -0.043068~ 
 (0.013024) (0.020661) 
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PREFERRED MODELS OF 2008 ACS PUMS: Continued  
   
 Male 
[Model 7b] 
 
Female 
[Model 7b] 
 
Fi 0.473809* 0.205890* 
 (0.014682) (0.021099) 
Prof 0.351040* 0.256132* 
 (0.012367) (0.020460) 
Pub 0.353696* 0.280013* 
 (0.014240) (0.021318) 
FEM -0.310163* -0.070397* 
 (0.009628) (0.007947) 
Mental 0.021797* 0.021007* 
 (0.000247) (0.000270) 
Physical -0.008419* -0.008281* 
 (0.000232) (0.000242) 
WrkFreedom -0.003770* -0.003680* 
 (0.000230) (0.000242) 
LicenseRe -0.077437* 0.043711* 
 (0.004414) (0.006651) 
LicenseVol 0.177442* 0.147363* 
 (0.004940) (0.005131) 
Apprentice 0.135959* 0.403351* 
 (0.008088) (0.037591) 
UnionPer -0.039942* 0.041787* 
 (0.001948) (0.002068) 
BargainPer 0.038612* -0.049239* 
 (0.001817) (0.002281) 
n =  188,885 251,412 
   
The estimated standard error is reported in parentheses.  
* = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 1% level of significance. 
~ = estimated regression coefficient is statistically different from 0 at 5% level of significance. 
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